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ABSTRACT 
 
After Florida Star v. B.J.F. in 1989 applied a constitutional privilege for truthful 
publications of lawfully obtained information on matters of public significance, some scholars 
suggested Florida Star signaled the end of the disclosure tort, and perhaps other areas of privacy 
law. One legal scholar, however, warned that the Court’s creation of narrow privileges in Florida 
Star and its progeny threatened “to erode both press freedom and the public’s right to know.” 
Such debate clarified that privacy torts addressing emotional harms resulting from publication 
directly conflict with the First Amendment right to publish. 
This dissertation analyzed if and how state high courts and federal appellate courts have 
reconciled free press values and privacy values when those sets of values conflicted in post­
Florida Star privacy tort cases. It examined cases involving two publication­ or publicity­based 
privacy torts—disclosure of private facts and appropriation—to identify how courts have 
attempted to reconcile these two sets of values considered fundamental in our democratic 
society. 
The analysis found that most rulings did not discuss clashes between free expression and 
privacy rights because the appeals were simply based on claims that lower courts erroneously 
applied the elements of the torts. And only about half of the rulings did discuss or imply at least 
one democratic value undergirding free expression or privacy rights.  
  vi 
If courts attempted to reconcile clashes between press freedom and privacy, they 
typically sought to identify the boundary between categories of privileged disclosures and 
categories of tortious disclosures and determined whether the facts at issue fell into the category 
of privileged publications or into the category of invasions of privacy. In those cases, courts 
typically found published information was protected under privileges for matters of public 
interest associated with audience­based free expression values.  
In fact, courts only ruled in favor of plaintiffs in cases involving non­media defendants 
when at least one privacy value was harmed and no free expression values were promoted. This 
dissertation concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court should establish a broader constitutional 
privilege for publications of matters of public interest by individual communicators as well as by 
the news media.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Press freedom and privacy both serve values considered fundamental for 
American democratic society.1 Free expression and privacy rights even serve some of the 
same values, such as autonomy.2 Despite those underlying similarities, the press’s First 
Amendment rights occasionally conflict with privacy rights recognized by state common 
law and statutory torts3 that protect individuals’ privacy interests against invasions by 
individuals or private entities.4 The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the potential 
collision between the press’s right to publish information and individuals’ privacy rights 
in Time, Inc. v. Hill in 1967.5 In that ruling, a narrow majority of the Warren Court 
emphasized the importance of protecting speech and press freedom under the 
                                                 
 
1 GEORGE KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 3-4 (1992). See also 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 119 (1992). Smolla wrote: 
     Privacy, like freedom of expression, has both an individual and a collective dimension. Laws  
           protecting privacy are the means through which the collective acknowledges rules of civility  
           that are designed to affirm human autonomy and dignity. If conscience and consciousness are  
           the roots of free expression, they are also the roots of privacy.  
 
2 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of The First 
Amendment, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 215, 220-21 (2004). The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized an 
autonomy-based constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965. Thomas I. Emerson, 
The Right of Privacy and Freedom of The Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 328, 328 (1979) (citing 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
 
3 For the sake of clarity, the term common law torts will be used to refer to privacy torts recognized under 
state common law and statutory laws throughout this dissertation. 
 
4 Emerson, supra note 2, at 330-31. 
 
5 385 U.S. 374, 381, 387-89 (1967). 
 
 2 
circumstances of that case.6 That was the first of six Supreme Court rulings in cases 
involving complaints that media defendants’ publications violated plaintiffs’ tort-based 
rights to privacy.7 In most cases, the Court handed down narrow, fact-specific rulings, 
providing limited guidance to state and federal courts tasked with reconciling future 
conflicts between press and privacy rights.8  
Scholars have suggested the Court’s failure to create clear guidelines has a 
potentially chilling effect on the press’s freedom to publish. Bruce Sanford, author of a 
leading treatise on privacy and libel law, summarized the case law as “laden with fact-
intensive cases in which results are of limited precedential value.”9 In Libel and Privacy 
Law, published in 1999, Sanford suggested those rulings implied that “slight alterations 
in material or in newsgathering” could convert “provocative, enterprising journalism” 
into a tortious invasion of privacy.10 Thus, he described editors as tending to be “fearful” 
                                                 
 
6 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Brennan reasoned: “Exposure of the self to others in varying 
degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident 
of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.” 385 U.S. at 388.  
 
7 The other five cases are Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 
(1989); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g, 419 U.S. 245 (1974).  
 
8 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (“The tension between the right which the First 
Amendment accords to a free press, on the one hand, and the protections which various statutes and 
common law doctrines accord to personal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the 
other, is a subject we have addressed several times in recent years. . . . [A]lthough our decisions have 
without exception upheld the press' right to publish, we have emphasized each time that we were resolving 
this conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context.”). See also Nadine Strossen, Protecting Privacy 
and Free Speech in Cyberspace, 89 GEO. L. J. 2103, 2104 (2000) (“[E]ach of the pertinent Supreme Court 
rulings concerning press versus privacy is intensely fact-specific, carefully limited to the particular 
circumstances, and an ad hoc weighing of the competing privacy and free speech concerns under those 
specific circumstances.”).  
 
9 BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 11.1 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2004)(1999). 
 
10 Id.  
 3 
of invasion of privacy lawsuits during the twentieth century.11 Twenty-seven years 
earlier, Don R. Pember, an expert on mass communication law, had asserted, “[T]he 
newsman is affected every day, many times a day, as he prepares his record of 
contemporary events. Each news story, each advertisement, and each picture poses the 
threat of a possible lawsuit.”12 In 2004, David Anderson, a scholar of tort and First 
Amendment law, warned that uncertainty about the constitutional limitations on torts, in 
general, threatened to chill press freedom and that the lack of precision in defining 
restrictions on expression could cause “excessive deterrence,” dissuading the media from 
publishing non-tortious, as well as tortious, content.13 A 2007 publication by the 
Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press described the right to privacy as an 
evolving area of law in which “many legal questions remain unsettled” in most 
jurisdictions and advised journalists that they need to know “how the law in their 
jurisdiction balances” individuals’ interests in privacy against the interests of the press 
and public.14 The uncertainty, of course, cuts both ways, making it difficult for 
individuals to know when they have legitimate privacy invasion claims against the media.  
Legal scholars have suggested the Supreme Court’s narrow, fact-tied rulings have 
favored free expression and provided little clarity on privacy rights.15 In 1992, Ken 
                                                 
 
11 Id.  
 
12 DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
vii (1972). 
 
13 David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 761-65 (2004). 
Anderson also commented that the Supreme Court’s approach for identifying the constitutional limitations 
for privacy torts that target the content of publications “does not yet appear to be solidified.” Id. at 758. 
 
14 A primer on Invasion of Privacy, 31 NEWS MEDIA & L. 2, 2 (Fall 2007).   
 
15 See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. 
REV. 1195, 1207 (1989) (“The Court in Florida Star made a choice. It decided that when the violation of  
 4 
Gormley, a scholar of constitutional law, claimed that the Court’s rulings on privacy torts 
resulted in “state privacy tort actions [being] effectively squashed in nearly every 
instance when they have come into conflict with the constitutional guarantee of free 
press.”16 In contrast, in 1991, Jane Kirtley, then head of the Reporter’s Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, claimed “concern for personal privacy” posed one of the greatest 
threats to the First Amendment.17 Kirtley suggested courts’ approaches to the conflict had 
allowed privacy values to limit press rights. She warned that the common law right to 
privacy had “helped to create exceptions to and carve-outs of constitutional principles 
that threaten to erode both press freedom and the public’s right to know.”18 
While legal scholarship has indicated the Supreme Court’s decisions in privacy 
cases primarily have been narrow and fact-tied and have not created unnecessarily broad 
constitutional principles, those scholars have not examined whether lower courts are 
making ad hoc decisions or whether they are attempting to reconcile the competing free 
expression and privacy values present in the disputes. The purpose of this dissertation is 
to analyze if and how state high courts and federal appellate courts have weighed free 
                                                 
 
privacy involves publication of private information about an individual, free speech wins; everything is 
newsworthy, and nothing is private.”); Emerson, supra note 2, at 336 (“The constitutional basis for the 
privacy tort thus remains largely an open question.”); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 
WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1387-88 (“[S]tate privacy tort actions have been effectively squashed in nearly every 
instance when they have come into conflict with the constitutional guarantee of free press.”); Irwin R. 
Kramer, The Full-Court Press: Sacrificing Vital Privacy Interests on the Altar of First Amendment 
Rhetoric, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 116-17 (1990) (“While this conflict can only properly be 
resolved through a first amendment analysis that accommodates both interests, a recent line of Supreme 
Court cases declined to take this approach, disregarded the trial participant’s privacy interests, and granted 
the press what amounts to an absolute First Amendment privilege.”). 
 
16 Gormley, supra note 15, at 1387-90 (1992) (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Cantrell v. 
Forest City Publ’g Co. 419 U.S. 254 (1975); Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)). 
 
17 Jane Kirtley, Freedom of the Press: The Most Serious Threat Is . . . The Cloak of Privacy, 30 COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. 46 (1991). 
 
18 Id.  
 
 5 
press values and privacy values when those sets of values conflict in privacy tort cases. 
Specifically, this dissertation examined cases involving two publication- or publicity-
based privacy torts—disclosure of private facts and appropriation—in an effort to 
identify how courts have attempted to reconcile these two sets of values considered 
fundamental in our democratic society. 
Most states have recognized at least one of the four privacy torts: intrusion upon 
seclusion,19 appropriation of another’s name or likeness to one’s own benefit,20 disclosure 
of private facts,21 and placing another in a false light.22 Courts generally do not view 
claims that media defendants intruded on individuals’ seclusion as directly conflicting 
                                                 
 
19 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) states, “One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.” Bruce Sanford explained that intrusion is similar to trespass, but intrusion addresses a 
“highly offensive invasion of personal privacy” that “need not be a physical trespass.” SANFORD, supra 
note 9, at §11.2.  
 
20 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) declares, “One who appropriates to his own use 
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”). 
Only twelve states have not recognized the privacy tort of appropriation. Those states are Colorado, 
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wyoming. SANFORD, supra note 9, at § 11.5 n.217. Most states have recognized the right 
to privacy under common law appropriation torts. Most states, however, have not recognized a statutory 
right of publicity. California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have 
recognized a right of publicity under statutory law. THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS, 31 CAUSES OF ACTION § 47 
(2d ed. 2008).  
 
21 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) states, “One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of 
legitimate concern to the public.” Most jurisdictions have recognized the publication of private facts tort 
via common law. Only Hawaii, Illinois, Nebraska, Virginia, Montana, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, and Utah have not. SANFORD, supra note 9, at §11.3 & n.65.  
 
22 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) states, “One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the 
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.” False light invasion of privacy 
claims are viable under the common law of many states and the District of Columbia.  
 
 6 
with First Amendment rights because the intrusion tort addresses harms to one’s solitude 
that result from an invasive action rather than from publication or publicity.23 In contrast, 
courts in eleven states have rejected the false light tort, with some suggesting the tort 
overlaps with the defamation tort without providing sufficient constitutional safeguards.24 
The disclosure and appropriation torts address emotional harms resulting from 
publication, and thus directly conflict with the First Amendment right to publish 
information—the focus of this dissertation.25  
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify how federal appellate courts and 
state high courts, without much guidance from the Supreme Court, reconciled free press 
and privacy values in cases involving two widely accepted common law privacy torts 
involving publication or publicity. A key step in this process is reviewing the literature to 
identify and explicate the values underlying the rights to freedom of expression and 
                                                 
 
23 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel 
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 957 (1968). Intrusion is considered a “law of general 
applicability” that does not conflict with the press’s First Amendment right to publish news. Rodney A. 
Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1126-28 
(1999). 
 
24 Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin have rejected the tort. SANFORD, supra note 9, at § 11.4. See also Judith 
Crown, Florida High Court Rejects ‘False Light’ As a Cause of Action, INSIDE COUNSEL 75, 75 (Jan. 
2009). 
 
25 E.g., Emerson, supra note 2, at 331-32 (1979) (“At most points the law of privacy and the law sustaining 
a free press do not contradict each other. . . . There, are, however, two major areas where an 
accommodation must be developed. One concerns the privacy tort, where the privacy right comes into 
sharp contrast with the right to publish. The other involves the right of the press to obtain information from 
the government”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on 
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 722-24 (1992) (suggesting that making 
the appropriation of a name or likeness for a commercial use actionable challenges the First Amendment 
right to publish information); Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That 
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 364 (1989); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem For a Heavyweight: Farewell 
to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 292, 293 (1982) (asserting that no matter how 
courts or legislatures formulate a tort that addresses the disclosure of true information, as a disclosure tort 
or appropriation tort, such a law “cannot coexist with constitutional protections for freedom of speech and 
press”).  
 7 
privacy. First, however, the following section provides a brief overview of the 
development of the common law privacy torts. 
Section A reviews the development of the disclosure of private facts and 
appropriation torts. Section B, the literature review, synthesizes legal scholars’ 
definitions for key free expression values, identification of key privacy values, assertions 
that publication-based privacy torts protect key privacy values, suggestions for 
reconciling conflicts between free expression and privacy values, and arguments that 
defenses have provided a means of balancing individual and societal values at stake when 
free expression and privacy collide. Section C identifies the research questions addressed 
by this dissertation. And Section D outlines the method and limitations.  
 
A. Background 
Legal commentators generally recognize an 1890 Harvard Law Review article as 
the origin of laws that protect individuals from media invasions of privacy in the United 
States.26 In that article, “The Right to Privacy,” Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis 
called on judges to extend the common law to protect the “inviolate personality,” or inner 
person, from unwanted public exposure likely to result from keyhole journalism.27 
Warren and Brandeis, attorneys in Boston, argued that judges should develop common 
                                                 
 
26 E.g., Baker, supra note 2, at 215 (describing the legal right of informational privacy as “the great modern 
achievement often attributed to the classic Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis article); John H. Fuson, 
Comment, Has The Promise Of The Free Press Failed?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 646 (1999) (calling the 
article “history’s most influential law review article”); Jesse A. Mudd, Note, Right to Privacy v. Freedom 
of Speech: A Review and Analysis of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 41 BRANDEIS L. J. 179, 179 (2002) (noting that 
the article “created an entirely new field of law); Daniel Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying 
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 966, 970 (2003) (“The tort of public disclosure 
originates from an 1890 article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.”).  
 
27 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 194-96 (1890). 
 8 
law to protect individuals from the emotional distress resulting from unwanted public 
disclosures of personal information “as part of a more general right to immunity of the 
person.”28 More than a quarter of a century before Brandeis joined the Supreme Court in 
1916, he and his law partner observed that newspaper reporters and amateur 
photographers were intruding on private affairs to collect personal information and 
powerful images that would lure readers to purchase newspapers.29  
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises have invaded the  
sacred precincts of private and domestic life. Gossip is no longer the resource  
of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with  
industry as well as effrontery. . . . To occupy the indolent, column upon  
column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion  
upon the domestic circle.30  
 
Their arguments for a common law right to privacy were published when the 
yellow press, which one journalism historian described as “a product of a lusty, fiercely 
competitive, and intolerant time,” published sensational details about individuals.31 Many 
Americans desired respite, reserve, and secrecy as an unprecedented surge in urban 
populations, as well as newspaper circulations, challenged the physical and social 
boundaries that traditionally allowed individuals to protect their intimate lives from 
public scrutiny.32 At that time, Americans’ conception of privacy related to a desire for 
                                                 
 
28 Id.  
 
29 Id. at 195.  
 
30 Id.  
 
31 W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, YELLOW JOURNALISM 8 (2003).  
 
32 E.g., MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS  88-106 (1978); Louis F. Nizer, The Right of 
Privacy: A Half Century’s Developments 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 528-29 (1941). 
 9 
protection against emotional distress caused by loss of control over personal information 
and public image.33  
Over the next seventy years, hundreds of law review articles cited the Warren and 
Brandeis article as a foundation for common law remedies addressing invasions of 
privacy.34 By 1939, a number of courts also had recognized the right to privacy,35 
inspiring members of the American Law Institute — attorneys and legal scholars 
responsible for drafting and approving official reports on trends in American law36 — to 
recognize the right of privacy in the Restatement of Torts.37 The original Restatement 
                                                 
 
33 E.g., Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 33, 36 (1967); Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as 
a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 376-78 (2003).  
 
34 E.g., Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, And Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REV. 37, 
37 (1905) (describing the article as “one of the most brilliant excursions in the field of theoretical 
jurisprudence”); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 
1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1992) (explaining that the attorneys’ article “presented the idea 
of privacy as it should be understood); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An 
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 963-64 (1964); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, 
and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis’ Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 
611, 611 (1968); Ruth Gavison, Too Early for a Requiem, 43 S. CAROLINA L. REV. 437, 438-39 (1992) 
(stating that “the article is supposed to be the most influential law review article ever written, an essay that 
single-handedly created a tort and an awareness of the need for legal remedies for invasion of privacy. It is 
a classic, a pearl of common-law reasoning . . ..”); Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First 
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1254 (1976); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century 
Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703-04 (1990); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights 
in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1995); Nizer, supra note 32, 
at 527; Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 649-53 (1990); 
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Law Review 
Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540, 1545 (1985); Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 25, at 291. 
 
35 Kramer, supra note 34, at 718. 
 
36 The American Law Institute was formed after a committee of attorneys, legal scholars, and judges found 
that the complexity and uncertainty of American law were its primary flaws. The Institute asked lawyers 
and scholars to synthesize legal judgments to provide specific rules in a series of texts called Restatements 
of the Law. One commentator proposed that the Restatements have become “the pinnacle of this process of 
deliberative synthesis, so much so that they themselves take on the weight of binding authority, displacing 
the earlier material from which they have drawn their conclusions.” Oliver R. Goodenough, Go Fish: 
Evaluating the Restatement’s Formulation of the Law of Publicity, 47 S.C.L. REV. 709, 713 (1996). See 
also MORRIS L. COHEN & KENT C. OLSON, LEGAL RESEARCH IN A NUTSHELL 52-53 (2003) (asserting the 
work published in the Restatements “is perhaps more persuasive in the courts than any other secondary 
material. Courts may sometimes even adopt Restatement provisions as correct statements of each law”).  
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section declared, “[A] person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's 
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is 
liable to the other.”38 Several decades later, William Prosser, the great twentieth century 
American tort scholar,39 found more than 300 court rulings had recognized four distinct 
privacy torts:  
     1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.  
     2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3) Publicity  
     which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4) Appropriation, for  
     the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.40  
 
Professor Edward Bloustein, a philosopher and expert on tort law, criticized Prosser’s 
reduction of the common law invasion of privacy into torts that “involve violations of 
‘four different interests,’ none of which, it turns out, is a distinctive interest in privacy.”41 
Nonetheless, the American Law Institute added each of those torts to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts in 1977.42  
Just over a decade after Prosser published his landmark article, Don R. Pember 
provided one of the most significant analyses of privacy law for professional 
journalists.43 Pember’s 1972 book, Privacy and the Press: The Law, The Mass Media, 
                                                 
 
37 Kramer, supra note 34, at 718. 
 
38 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). 
 
39 Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, supra note 34, at 962 (observing that “Dean Prosser 
is by far the most influential contemporary exponent of the tort”). 
 
40 Prosser, supra note 34, at 389. 
 
41 Bloustein, supra note 34, at 965 & n.14 (suggesting that the four torts proposed by Prosser involve “the 
interest in freedom from mental distress,” “the interest in reputation,” and “the proprietary interest in name 
and likeness”).  
 
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 A-E (1977). 
 
43 PEMBER, supra note 12. 
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and The First Amendment, traced the evolution of the legal right to privacy through 
invasion of privacy suits filed against media defendants in the United States. He 
identified three types of media actions that led to privacy suits: “1) The use of an 
individual’s name or photograph in an advertisement without his consent; 2) the 
publication of private information about an individual; and 3) the publication of 
nondefamatory falsehoods about a person.”44  
That study provided an important foundation for scholarship examining how state 
and federal courts had reconciled common law invasion of privacy rights with the First 
Amendment right of freedom of the press. Pember’s book suggested that state courts had 
recognized the inevitable collision between press and privacy rights for decades. At the 
time the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled on only one tort-based invasion of privacy case 
that involved a media defendant.45 Since then, the Supreme Court, federal appellate 
courts, and many state high courts have handed down scores of rulings involving the 
press and privacy torts requiring publication.  
State courts and legislatures started to address statutory and common law privacy 
rights almost two decades before the U.S. Supreme Court announced that the First 
Amendment applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in 1925.46  The Court’s 
ruling in that case, which involved the constitutionality of a conviction under a state 
                                                 
 
44 Id. at 233. 
 
45 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 
46 The Supreme Court first applied the First Amendment to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
(1925). The earliest recorded privacy case was Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 
1902), in which the New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize a common law right of privacy. That 
case led to enactment of the New York Civil Rights Law, making appropriation of an individual’s likeness 
for commercial purposes a misdemeanor and allowing civil suits for damages and injunctions. N.Y. CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (1909). In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court became the first state high court to 
recognize a common law right of privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (1905). 
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criminal anarchy statute, provided the foundation for constitutional defenses to limit 
common law and statutory claims.47 In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court first applied the 
First Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment to state tort actions in New York Times 
v. Sullivan, a defamation case filed by a Montgomery, Alabama, commissioner.48 Three 
years later, in Time Inc. v. Hill, the Court handed down its first ruling on First 
Amendment press rights and state privacy torts, extending the actual malice rule created 
in Sullivan to false light invasion of privacy cases involving discussion of matters of 
public concern.49 Since that time, Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg, and Paul Schwartz, 
leading legal experts on privacy, have argued that the privacy torts have “exist[ed] in an 
uneasy tension with the First Amendment.”50  
Privacy law is relatively new, only a little more than 100 years old, and still 
evolving.51 Since Dean Prosser’s landmark article was published, most states have 
recognized at least one of the four types of privacy tort actions that he identified. As state 
and federal appellate courts have considered what legal standards should be applied in 
their jurisdictions, they have examined the relatively short history of the common law 
privacy torts as well as the short list of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving privacy tort 
                                                 
 
47 G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century 
America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 332 (1997). 
 
48 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
49 285 U.S. 372 (1967). 
 
50 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION  PRIVACY LAW 132 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 
51 See Edelman, supra note 15, at 1195 (1990) (stating Warren and Brandeis called for recognition of a 
legal right to privacy “in their classic article.”); Zimmerman, False Light, supra note 25, at 365 (“The 
common law right of privacy was conceived in the late nineteenth century by the fertile intellects of Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis”).  
 
 13 
conflicts with the First Amendment. Courts and commentators are still sorting out how to 
reconcile the privacy and free press values that collide in such cases. The literature 
review discusses key values that courts might consider when weighing privacy and press 
rights. 
 
B. Literature Review 
In order to analyze if and how state high courts and federal appellate courts have 
weighed free press values and privacy values when those sets of values conflict in 
privacy tort cases, it is necessary to identify and explicate the key values served by press 
and privacy rights. This section reviews three broad categories of scholarly literature. The 
first section explores key values underlying freedom of expression, including freedom of 
the press, theories and categorizes those values under two models: the individual liberty 
model and audience-based, communitarian model.52 The second section reviews 
important privacy values and theories and categorizes those under individual or social 
models. The third section explains how First Amendment and privacy scholars have 
proposed courts should weigh those conflicting values. 
Free Press Values: The Liberty Model 
The liberty model is based on an individual’s right to communicate, which 
includes the right to publish information, and is associated with key overlapping values 
often identified as autonomy, self-fulfillment, and self-realization. The model also serves 
other values—allowing individuals to participate in the search for and discovery of truth 
                                                 
 
52 A recent note on privacy and the First Amendment divided theories of First Amendment protection into 
“collectivist” and “autonomy-based” approaches. Ryan Kilkenny, Note, Why Bartnicki v. Vopper Disserves 
the Right of Privacy and the First Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. L.J. 999, 999 (2003). 
 14 
and the social and political decision-making process. While the liberty model firmly 
emphasizes the individual’s right to communicate, it recognizes this individual right can 
also have societal benefits—helping all of society find truth, facilitating communal 
decision-making and promoting change with stability. Unlike the audience model, which 
will be discussed in the next part, the liberty model sees social benefits as corollaries to 
the individual values that result from protecting the liberty to communicate free of 
impediments from government and society. The liberty model holds that freedom of 
expression serves the ultimate good of society by promoting values that primarily benefit 
individuals.53 Free expression theory relevant to this model recognizes a broad right for 
individuals to communicate.     
In “Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,” published in the UCLA 
Law Review in 1977, C. Edwin Baker contended that a broad “liberty model” would 
provide “the most coherent theory” of freedom of expression, grounding First 
Amendment rights in the autonomy value recognized by social contract doctrines.54 
Baker asserted that those doctrines require the community to respect “the dignity and 
equal worth” of individual members for the community “legitimately to expect 
individuals to respect collective decisions.”55 His liberty model emphasizes the 
importance of protecting individuals’ free expression rights against governmental or 
societal restrictions that limit individual autonomy.56 Under that model, the First 
                                                 
 
53 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 964 (1977). 
 
54 Id. at 964, 990-92. See also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLE 71 (1982) (“In order for the 
argument from autonomy to hold up, it must be rooted in social contract theory”). 
 
55 Baker, supra note 53, at 991. 
 
56 Id. 
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Amendment requires that a speaker have the freedom to choose the content of his or her 
speech.57 That aspect of personal agency, or control over one’s decisions and actions, is 
essential for the liberty model to serve its key values—self-fulfillment and individual 
participation in change.58 The scope of protection tied to those values is limited to 
nonviolent, noncoercive activity that “fosters individual self-realization and self-
determination without improperly interfering with the legitimate claims of others.”59 That 
freedom of expression model, then, would allow governors to limit only expression that 
harms other individuals, thereby violating the social contract. Baker supported that 
limitation by quoting the nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill’s argument that 
“‘[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’” 60 
In 1972, Thomas Scanlon, a legal philosopher, had also drawn on what he termed 
the “Millian principle” to propose an individual liberty model of freedom of expression, 
which he said was grounded in the Kantian notion of autonomy: “[A] legitimate 
government is one whose authority citizens can recognize while still regarding 
themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.”61 Scanlon identified two types of 
harms to individuals that, under an autonomy principle, could not justify restricting 
expression. 
                                                 
 
57 Id.  
 
58 Baker explained, “The emphasis on ‘self’ in self-fulfillment requires the theory to delineate a realm of 
liberty for self-determined processes of self-realization. The participation in change value requires the 
theory to specify and protect activities essential to a democratic, participatory process of change.” Id. 
 
59 Id. at 966. 
 
60 Id. at 1013 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1956)). 
 
61 Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 214 (1972).  
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      There are certain harms which, although they would not occur but for certain acts  
      of expression, nonetheless cannot be taken as part of a justification for legal  
      restrictions on these acts. These harms are: (a) harms to certain individuals which  
      consist in their coming to have false beliefs as a result of those acts of expression;  
      (b) harmful consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts of expression,  
      where the connection between the acts of expression and the subsequent harmful  
      acts consist merely in the fact that the act of expression led the agents to believe  
      (or increased their tendency to believe) these acts to be worth performing.62  
 
Both types assign some degree of agency for the resulting harms to the injured 
individuals themselves—not solely to the communicator. Both involve individuals’ 
formation of beliefs, a process that must remain within the control of any individual who 
values autonomy and self-realization.63 
 Thomas I. Emerson, a major First Amendment scholar, also connected the 
underlying values of freedom of expression to the development of personal autonomy, 
which he asserted was essential for the development and maintenance of a well-
functioning democratic society.64  Emerson’s book, The System of Freedom of 
Expression, published in 1969, linked four key functions, or values, of freedom of 
expression, to serving both individual and communal interests.65 He described the first 
function of freedom of expression as encouraging self-fulfillment, or self-realization. 66  
                                                 
 
62 Id. at 213. 
 
63 Id. at 214-15. 
 
64 THOMAS I. EMERSON, SYSTEMS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1969). 
 
65 Id. It is important to note that Baker referred to Emerson’s functions as values because he defined values 
as purposes. Baker, supra note 53, at 990-91. 
 
66 EMERSON, supra note 64, at 6. It is also important to note that Professor Martin H. Redish later argued 
that “the constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value,” which Redish called 
“individual self-realization.” That value encompasses “development of the individual’s powers and 
abilities” and “the individual’s control of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions.” 
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 592, 604 (1981). Cf. Eric B. Easton, Public 
Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 139, 159  
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Emerson proposed that the ability to express ideas, without fear of censorship or 
unwarranted punishment, is essential to develop one’s personal dignity and to affirm 
one’s sense of self, personal autonomy, and independence—all of which are essential for 
self-fulfillment.67 Emerson’s other functions of freedom of expression serve both 
individual and social interests. The second function, the attainment of truth, suggests 
individuals’ ability to discover truth through discussion and debate is essential to the 
ultimate good of society.68  Emerson’s third function recognizes freedom of expression as 
necessary for individuals to participate in social and political decision-making.69 As 
Baker recognized, that function depends on individuals’ ability to assert opinions as 
autonomous individuals and as members of society.70 Emerson also contended that 
freedom of expression is essential to promoting orderly change within a society.71 That 
function envisions freedom of expression as somewhat of a safety valve, a mechanism 
through which individuals can discuss matters that might foster anger, violence, or other 
antisocial behavior if left unaddressed.72 Emerson considered each of those functions 
integral parts of a well-functioning system of freedom of expression, which includes the 
right to speak, to publish, and to receive information.73  
                                                 
(2003) (arguing that the value of self-fulfillment underlying the right to speak “is utterly hollow if there is 
no audience.”).  
 
67 EMERSON, supra note 64, at 6.  
 
68 Id. at 6-7. 
 
69 Id. at 7. 
 
70 Baker, supra note 53, at 992. 
 
72 EMERSON, supra note 64, at 7.  
 
73 Id. 
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The autonomy value, which assigns each communicator the agency to determine 
the content of his or her communications, has been applied to press freedom as well as 
speech freedom. In several law review articles, Randall Bezanson, a prominent First 
Amendment scholar, has tied the First Amendment freedom of the press to editorial 
autonomy—the right of the press to publish information free from laws that impose 
government suppression or result in self-censorship.74 Professor Bezanson identified two 
principles necessary for the press to serve its key functions.75 The first principle means 
that government regulations cannot provide the press with “special treatment.”76 As an 
example Bezanson discussed Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, in which he said the U.S. 
Supreme Court applied the neutrality principle when it struck down a Georgia statute that 
sanctioned the press for publishing the name of a rape victim that was first reported in 
court documents.77 Bezanson noted the statute did not prevent individuals from 
discussing or publishing that information; thus “the statute effectively singled out the 
press for regulation.”78  Bezanson declared, “[W]e may surmise that the statute would not 
have offended the first amendment if it had also prohibited public, as well as press,” from 
revealing the identity of rape victims in order to protect the victim’s privacy.79   
                                                 
 
74 Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension between Exemption and 
Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L.J. 895 (1998); Randall P. Bezanson, supra note 
34, at 1153; Randall P. Bezanson, Political Agnosticism, Editorial Freedom, and Government Neutrality 
Toward the Press, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1359 (1987); Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 
VA. L. REV. 731 (1977). 
 
75 Bezanson, New Free Press Guarantee, supra note 74, at 732, 761; Bezanson, Means and Ends, supra 
note 74, at 897-899, 927 n.22. 
 
76 Bezanson, New Free Press Guarantee, supra note 74, at 734. 
 
77 Id. at 762 (1977) (citing 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975). 
 
78 Id.  
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Under Bezanson’s second principle, the principle of independence, the First 
Amendment prevents the government from influencing the content of the press.80 For 
instance, Bezanson wrote that in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court 
struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to provide political candidates 
with space to respond to opponents’ criticism.81 The Court held that it was 
“unconstitutional for the state to compel a newspaper publisher to print replies by 
candidates for public office who have been assailed in the press.”82 That ruling declared 
the First Amendment protects the press’s right to editorial autonomy “with regard to 
public issues or matters pertaining to public officials.”83 Thus, Bezanson connected the 
scope of press freedom to the institutional press’s agency, or autonomy, its editorial 
freedom to determine the content of what it communicates.  
Although the self-fulfillment and self-realization values of freedom of expression 
may seem inapplicable to the institutional press, even the earliest free expression 
theorists, John Milton and John Stuart Mill, associated those values with freedom to 
publish. Milton’s Areopagatica, published in 1644, provided a foundation for the model 
that emphasizes personal liberty and freedom from censorship.84 The English poet and 
                                                 
 
79 Id. at 763 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 
(1974); noting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings on access to prisons “support the propriety of such a 
neutral ban on access to sources of information under governmental control”). 
 
80 Id. 
 
81 Bezanson, New Free Press Guarantee, supra note 74, at 757 (citing Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 257-58 (1974)). 
 
82 418 U.S. at 257-58. 
 
83 Bezanson, New Free Press Guarantee, supra note 74, at 757 (citing 418 U.S. at 257-58). 
 
84 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGATICA: A SPEECH TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, FOR THE LIBERTY OF 
UNLICENSED PRINTING 3 (Cambridge” Chadwyck-Healey, 1999) (1644). He wrote:  
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philosopher suggested that censorship and licensing, which at that time were required 
prior to publication, threatened individuals’ abilities to discover the religious truth 
necessary for personal salvation, an aspect of self-realization and self-fulfillment.85 Just 
over two centuries later, in 1859, Mill’s On Liberty specifically addressed liberty of the 
press. Mill contended that government actions that suppress expression, whether by 
individuals or the press, undermined the ultimate development of humanity by hindering 
individuals from debating the merits of opposing opinions, a process that can benefit both 
the individual and society.86 Emphasizing the benefit to individuals, Mill said liberty of 
expression is intricately connected to that sphere of life in which “society, as 
distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest.”87 That sphere 
comprises 1) “the inward domain of consciousness,” 2) “liberty of conscience, in the 
most comprehensive sense,” 3) “liberty of thought and feeling,” and 4) “absolute freedom 
of opinion and sentiment on all subjects.”88 Although freedom to speak and publish can 
                                                 
 
         If ye be thus resolv’d, as it were injury to thinke ye were not, I know not what should withhold  
         me from presenting ye with a fit instance wherein to shew both that love of truth which ye  
         eminently  prosesse, and that uprightnesse of your judgement which is not wont to be partial to 
         your selves; by judging over again that Order which ye have ordain’d to regulate Printing.  
         That no Book pamphlet, or [p]aper shall be  henceforth Printed, unlesse the same be first  
         approv’d and licenc’t by such, or at least one of such, as shall be thereto appointed.  
         (emphasis added).  
  
85 Id. 
 
86 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (David Bromwich & George Kateb, eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) 
(1859). Mill offered the utilitarian rationale that individuals would need to pit truth against falsehoods if 
they wished to find “the clearer and livelier perception of truth.” He wrote:  
     [T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race:  
   posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than           
   those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error  
   for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier     
   impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.  
 
87 Id. at 26. 
 
88  Id.  
 21 
affect others and society in general, Mill described those liberties as “being of almost as 
much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same 
reasons, is practically inseparable from it.”89 Mill’s concept of free expression provides 
individuals with freedom “without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as 
what we do does not harm them.”90  For Mill those liberties, based on individual 
autonomy and its reciprocal values of self-realization and self-fulfillment, were necessary 
for any society to remain free from tyranny by governors or society at large.91  
In summary, scholars have recognized several key liberty values served by 
freedom of expression. In a democratic society grounded in social contract theory, 
freedom of speech and of the press serves the individual’s needs for autonomy, self-
fulfillment and self-realization, as well as enabling the individual to discover truth and 
participate in social and political decision-making. While the focus of the liberty value is 
on the individual, proponents also recognize that freedom of speech and press inevitably 
results in societal and communal benefits, facilitating the democratic decision-making 
process overall, creating a marketplace of ideas in which society as a whole can discover 
truth, and helping create a balance between change and stability. While these latter 
societal benefits are some of the same identified with the audience-based, communitarian 
model discussed below, the crucial difference is that the liberty model grounds freedom 
of expression in the value of autonomy, emphasizing the rights of individuals under the 
social contract. That theoretical framework limits governments’ abilities to impose 
                                                 
 
89 Id. at 82-83. 
 
90 Id. at 83. 
 
91 Id. at 73-74. 
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sanctions that would interfere with individuals’ self-determination absent direct harm to 
others. As Scanlon and Baker noted, under a liberty model, even expression that results in 
others acquiring “false beliefs”92 or acting on those beliefs cannot be sanctioned.93 The 
general autonomy-based principles of this model can also apply to the institutional press, 
protecting the press against government censorship, licensing, or other actions that 
interfere with the press’s autonomy or control over the content it publishes.94  
Free Press Values: The Audience Model 
While the liberty model recognizes both individual and societal interests served 
by each communicator’s freedom of expression, the “audience model” focuses solely on 
the societal interests, the values expression serves for its audience. The audience-based 
values most often discussed in the literature are enabling effective self-governance, 
providing a check on government, creating a marketplace of ideas, facilitating a balance 
between societal stability and change, and fostering toleration. Some of those values 
overlap with values associated with the liberty model, but whereas the liberty model 
associates those values with the right to communicate and disseminate information, the 
audience model connects those values to individuals’ and society’s rights to receive 
                                                 
 
92 Scanlon, supra note 61, at 217.  
 
93 Id. See also Baker, supra note 53, at 1028-29. Baker wrote: 
 
         By protecting substantively valued conduct from abridgement by general prohibitions, the liberty  
         model provides for a process of public decision making and a search for, or creation of, truth that  
         avoids the problems and improper assumptions of both the market models. Thus, the liberty model  
         better promotes the key value that justified the classic marketplace of ideas theory of freedom of  
         speech: the value of furthering the search for truth or best premises, a value that, due to a failure  
         of assumptions, the classic theory could not adequately serve.  
 
94 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 632 (1975); Bezanson, New Free Press 
Guarantee, supra note 74, at 762. 
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information or right to know.95 The audience model grounds freedom of expression in 
audience members’ rights to receive information.96 
In 1948, Alexander Meiklejohn, a prominent philosopher who advocated for First 
Amendment freedoms, provided the foundation for theories that associate the scope of 
First Amendment coverage with the rights of message recipients.97 Meiklejohn’s seminal 
treatise, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, connected freedom for citizens 
to discuss government actions to American citizens’ moral obligation to participate in 
self-governance and in public life.98 He posited that the founding fathers protected 
freedom of speech and press to ensure that American citizens received the information 
necessary to cast informed votes.99 Meiklejohn’s self-governance rationale, while similar 
to Emerson’s participation in decision-making value, provides narrower protection for 
free expression.100 Meiklejohn proposed the First Amendment was intended to provide 
absolute protection for speech on matters of governing importance, matters that 
contribute to citizens’ understanding of matters they need to know to remain sovereign 
                                                 
 
95 Gerald J. Baldasty & Roger A. Simpson, The Deceptive ‘Right to Know’: How Pessimism Rewrote the 
First Amendment, 56 WASH. L. REV. 365 (1981); Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right 
to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1; James C. Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 29; Michael J. Hayes, What Ever Happened to ‘the Right to Know’?: Access to Government-
Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2007); William E. Lee, The 
Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303; David M. Obrien, The First 
Amendment and the Public’s ‘Right to Know,’  7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1979).  
 
96 Id. 
 
97 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 
98 Id. at 33. 
 
99 Id. 
 
100 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878 (1963) 
(describing freedom of expression as a “method of securing participation by the members of society in 
social, including political, decision-making”).  
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over their governors.101 He called that type of speech public speech and argued that all 
other types of speech, which he called private speech, fell under the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.102 Under that rationale, the First Amendment 
right to publish would cover only the publication of information that promoted self-
government. 
Another prominent First Amendment theorist, Harry Kalven, Jr., also connected 
freedom of speech to the necessity for individuals to receive information in a democratic 
society. 103 In 1964, Kalven contended that the Warren Court’s unanimous ruling in New 
York Times v. Sullivan established a “central meaning” for the First Amendment: “a core 
of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, in 
[James] Madison’s phrase, ‘the censorial power,’ would be in the Government over the 
people and not ‘in the people over the Government.’”104  Kalven explained that allowing 
speech to be sanctioned for government criticism would dissuade some speakers from 
making true, critical statements about the government. 105 That, in turn, would extinguish 
the political freedom that defines a democratic society.106 
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In 1971, Judge Robert H. Bork agreed that the First Amendment is central to 
“democratic organization” but proposed a much more restricted arena of protected 
speech, “expressly political” speech.107 Bork said the First Amendment protects “speech 
about how we are governed, and the category therefore includes a wide range of 
evaluation, criticism, electioneering, and propaganda.”108 But, among other things, it 
would exclude speech “advocating forcible overthrow of the government or violation of 
law”109 because such speech would not lead to the discovery and spread of political 
truth.110  
Closely related to the self-government value is what commentators have referred 
to as the “checking value” or “watchdog function” of the press. This theory began to gain 
prominence after the Vietnam War and Watergate, when pessimism and distrust of 
“public power” underscored the necessity for an independent press to serve as a check on 
misconduct by powerful institutions.111 Unlike the other values, which can be applied to 
both individual speech and the press, this value focuses directly on the Press Clause of 
the First Amendment. In a key 1974 law review article, Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart acknowledged the social need for an autonomous press free to criticize and 
question government.112 He said, “[T]he primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee 
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of a free press was . . . to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an 
additional check on the three official branches.”113 That conception of press freedom 
acknowledges that the press protects the public’s interest in learning about matters of 
public concern, which is essential for the participation in political decision-making 
value.114  
In an influential law review article published in 1977, “The Checking Value in 
First Amendment Theory,” Professor Vincent Blasi described that value of freedom of 
the press as “the checking value,” the value of the press serving as a check on the 
government and other powerful institutions.115 The press was provided with freedom to 
serve as a watchdog that would warn citizens about threats to the balance of powers 
essential in a democracy. Like the self-government value, the checking value focuses on 
the audience’s need to receive information. 
The audience model of freedom of expression has led several scholars to assert 
the First Amendment protects a “right to know,” a concept that emphasizes a right for 
citizens to receive information that promotes government accountability.116 In 1976, 
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Professor Emerson proposed that concept is an “integral part” of a well-functioning 
system of freedom of expression: 
Reduced to its simplest terms the concept includes two closely related features.  
First, the right to read, to listen, to see, and to otherwise receive communications;  
and second, the right to obtain information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts  
to others. Together these constitute the reverse side of the coin from the right to  
communicate.117 
 
Emerson suggested the concept could make the greatest contribution to society when 
asserted as a right of the public to obtain information stored, collected, or created by 
government actors, especially to obtain information “necessary or proper for the citizen 
to perform his function as ultimate sovereign.”118 That concept ultimately serves as a 
composite of rights associated with the self-governance and checking values of freedom 
of expression. 
 As mentioned in the discussion of the liberty value above, the discovery of truth 
value has both an individual and societal dimension. The audience-based variation is 
often referred to as the marketplace of ideas value. Many twentieth-century theorists, 119 
as well as the Supreme Court, have claimed that freedom of expression leads to a 
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marketplace in which the audience benefits by having access to all manners of 
information and ideas.120 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., first applied this concept to 
the First Amendment in his 1919 dissenting opinion objecting to the conviction of self-
proclaimed “revolutionists” charged with espionage for printing leaflets encouraging 
resistance to the United States’ war efforts.121 Holmes wrote:  
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may  
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own  
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas  
– that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in  
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which  
their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our 
Constitution.122  
 
Rodney Smolla, a major First Amendment scholar, suggested the ultimate benefit of the 
marketplace metaphor is its emphasis on the ongoing process of searching for and testing 
truth. The theory assumes that society benefits from a free flow of information that 
fosters public debate and allows speech to remedy harms caused by other speech.123  
 Some scholars have debated whether the marketplace theory is fundamentally 
flawed.124 Proposing that the ultimate value served by the First Amendment is individual 
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autonomy, Baker criticized key assumptions underlying the marketplace theory. He 
argued that the theory, based on laissez-faire economics fails in a society, where 
individuals lack equal access to media channels.125 He suggested that media monopolies, 
the wealthy, and powerful control access to national media, which could limit the range 
of viewpoints available from other sources. Baker criticized the market metaphor’s 
assumptions about the quality of information provided and received, as well as the 
assumptions about the breadth of information available for public debate. He claimed that 
the theory erroneously assumed that the people providing and receiving information are 
capable of rational and rich debate.126 Martin Redish, another theorist, acknowledged that 
Baker’s criticism would be valid if the ultimate goal for freedom of speech is to discover 
truth.127 Yet, Redish claimed that Baker’s criticism “becomes irrelevant” when the 
marketplace theory is considered a means of facilitating another value, such as “self-
realization.”128  
 Professor Emerson argued that freedom of expression also benefits audiences by 
facilitating a balance between societal stability and change.129 That value overlaps with 
the marketplace and participation in public decision-making values. All three suppose 
that a free flow of information benefits society by ensuring that audiences receive 
information that enriches discussion and debate. Unlike the other values, however, the 
                                                 
 
125 Baker, supra note 53, at 965-66. 
 
126 Id. at 966.  
 
127 Redish, supra note 66, at 619. 
 
128 Id.  
 
129 EMERSON, supra note 64, at 7. 
 
 30 
stability and change value could be compared to a safety valve. The theory assumes that 
suppression of discussion could lead to violence and weaken the social foundation 
essential for community building. Emerson described the value as “a method of achieving 
a more adaptable and hence a more stable community, of maintaining the precarious 
balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.”130 In other words, freedom 
of expression encourages individuals to discuss and adapt to change rather than to resort 
to secrecy and violence. Emerson proposed that “suppression of discussion makes a 
rational judgment impossible, substituting force for reason.” He continued, 
“[S]uppression promotes inflexibility and stultification.”131 Under the safety-valve value, 
freedom of expression benefits society, allowing individuals to resolve conflicts, promote 
progress, and strengthen community.132  
 The final societal value, toleration, was articulated by Professor Lee C. Bollinger, 
who criticized mechanistic theorists for defining the scope of free speech in terms of 
political functions.133 Bollinger suggested that a system of free speech should serve broad 
intellectual values by encouraging individuals to share and to receive diverse opinions. 
He claimed that toleration is the key value for free speech: “Through toleration . . . we 
create the community, define the values of that community and affirm a commitment to 
and confidence in those values.”134 Toleration, which encourages individuals to listen to 
unpopular, as well as favored, messages, helps prepare individuals to participate in social 
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and political decision-making. Listening to extreme viewpoints that may contradict their 
own beliefs may even help individuals to evaluate the truth of minority and majority 
views and promote stable change.135 While individuals clearly can benefit from the 
toleration value of freedom of expression, Bollinger asserted, “[T]he ultimate aim of the 
First Amendment is the advancement of the public or collective good and not that of any 
single individual.”136 Thus, the toleration value, like the other values associated with the 
right to receive information, primarily benefits society as a whole.  
In summary, leading legal theorists have suggested that a right to receive and right 
to know information are important parts of a well-functioning system of free expression. 
Under an audience model, the broad right to receive information serves five primary 
communal values: effective self-governance, the checking value, creation of a 
marketplace of ideas, societal stability and change, and toleration. The right to know 
primarily serves the societal values of effective self-governance and the checking value. 
All five values associated with an audience model benefit society as a whole because free 
speech fosters community building and democratic governance as members of society 
remedy harms through discussion and debate, rather than violence.  
  The audience model and the liberty model noticeably serve some of the same 
values considered essential to a well-functioning democratic society. The aforementioned 
scholarship has provided a foundation for those values to be assigned to an audience 
model when the underlying values are described as societal benefits associated with the 
receipt of information, or to the liberty model when the underlying values are described 
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primarily as benefits resulting from an individual’s communication. Of course, Professor 
Emerson clarified that those models and their underlying values are part of the larger 
system of freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment.137 Distinctions 
among those values and models, however, are essential to considering how much weight 
to assign to expression-based rights that conflict with privacy rights. For instance, 
Professor Meiklejohn assigned speech that effectuates self-governance that falls under the 
audience-based model absolute protection, which would allow free speech to trump 
privacy.138 On the other hand, Professor Scanlon’s “Millian principle,” which falls under 
the liberty-model, limits protection for expression to expression that does not harm 
another individual.139 In parallel, Professor Emerson suggested the societal right to 
receive information should yield to individual privacy interests that protect the autonomy 
of the individual.140 The following section explores how scholarship has defined 
autonomy and other key values for privacy. 
 Defining the Values of Privacy 
As is the case with freedom of expression, there is no single theory for privacy.141 
Nor is there a bright line distinction between the individual and societal values 
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underlying privacy.  By its very nature, privacy is more clearly an individual rather than a 
societal value; still some values serve society as well as individuals. Part one of this 
section examines how the literature has presented privacy values as primarily individual, 
primarily societal, and both individual and societal. Part two explores how key literature 
connects those values to the mass-publication-based privacy torts identified in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
 Defining the Individual and Societal Values of Privacy 
Scholarship from law, philosophy, sociology, and psychology has addressed 
privacy as a condition,142 space,143 or claim144 for individuals to enjoy a physical and 
emotional realm where they can flourish as autonomous individuals, a realm where they 
may be free from social or political pressure.145 Fred C. Cate, a communication law 
expert, has claimed that it is important to explicate privacy values because “privacy is not 
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an end in itself but rather an instrument for achieving other goals.”146 In a case book 
published in 2007, privacy law expert Anita Allen suggested that one meaningful way for 
theorists to advance privacy scholarship is to “clearly explicate the costs, benefits, and 
values associated with whatever ‘privacy’ is intended to denote.”147 Several important 
scholarly explications of privacy values are grounded in sociologist Erving Goffman’s 
theory on the presentation of self,148 psychoanalyst Sidney M. Jourard’s theory on 
privacy,149 and sociologist Alan F. Westin’s theory on privacy in modern democratic 
societies.150 While theorists have explored connections between some types of privacy 
and key individual and societal values, this section demonstrates that scholarship has 
suggested relationships exist between all of the key privacy values and at least one of the 
publication-based privacy torts. 
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This section first addresses how one’s core identity, or core self, is the 
fundamental individual privacy value, recognizing that value is integrally related to other 
key individual privacy values: autonomy,151 liberty,152 emotional release,153 personal 
growth and self-evaluation,154 and psychic self-preservation.155 This section then 
explicates the key societal privacy values of promoting civility and community,156 
fostering human relationships,157 and encouraging participation in a democratic 
society.158 
 Key Individual Privacy Values 
Scholarship from sociology, philosophy, and law has described an essential 
individual value for privacy as personhood or selfhood, or, alternately, the integrated 
values of personality, dignity, independence, individuality, and identity.159 The Warren 
and Brandeis article, considered the metaphorical seedling for privacy law, blasted 
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newspaper journalists and photographers for intruding in individuals’ personal affairs and 
harming individuals’ “inviolate personality.”160 That article called for the law to protect 
the right of individuals to be let alone, suggesting that privacy would protect individuals 
against intrusions by society and the demands of collective life.161  More than 70 years 
later, Professor Bloustein described Warren and Brandeis’ vision for privacy law as a 
mechanism for protecting an “individual’s independence, dignity and integrity.”162 
Suggesting that privacy was a shield for individuals’ interest in human dignity, Bloustein 
proposed that the key privacy value of personhood “defines man’s essence as a unique 
and self-determining being.”163 More recently, in 2003, Jonathan Kahn, a legal and 
historical scholar of identity, suggested that maintaining and developing one’s sense of 
dignity and integrity are key aspects of identity, a key underlying principle for privacy.164 
As such, the personhood value protects each individual’s ability to define her own 
identity, or self, as she perceives herself as being distinct from other members of 
society.165 
The core self, or personhood, value and the autonomy value are both grounded in 
Goffman’s suggestions that an individual desires to control others’ perceptions of 
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himself. 166 He claimed that each individual attempts to influence social conceptions of 
his identity by concealing personal attributes that would contradict social expectations for 
context-specific conduct or otherwise taint others’ perceptions of his social identity. 
Westin observed, “Each person is aware of the gap between what he wants to be and 
what he actually is, between what the world sees of him and what he knows to be his 
much more complex reality.”167 Jourard, a psychoanalyst, explained that adults are 
expected to perform certain social roles. When an adult’s behavior noticeably deviates 
from the pattern of socially expected conduct, the nonconforming adult may be socially 
sanctioned.168 Yet, an adult who strives to constantly conform to social expectations, 
suppressing contradictory desires, risks “self-alienation,” which undermines one’s 
physical and mental health.169 Privacy provides each individual with opportunities to 
experience and to reflect on her uniqueness as a human being without exposing her core 
self to society.  
The desire to protect one’s individuality is integrally related to the value of 
autonomy.170 Whereas the personhood value of privacy emphasizes one’s essence as a 
unique person, the autonomy value stresses one’s independence of judgment and one’s 
ability to choose whether to resist pressures to conform to social norms.171 Westin 
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described autonomy as “the desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly by 
others.”172 In an article published in 1979, Gavison asserted, “Autonomy requires the 
capacity to make an independent moral judgment, the willingness to exercise it, and the 
courage to act on the results of this exercise even when the judgment is not a popular 
one.”173 More than twenty years later, Jeffrey Rosen, a privacy scholar, suggested that the 
autonomy value of privacy presumes that each individual is capable of realizing “a self-
actualized individual self,” a self who chooses to assert her uniqueness as an individual 
and a member of her community.174 According to those conceptions, privacy helps 
individuals exercise self-determination and make independent judgments.175   
The value of autonomy also is related to the third individual value of privacy—
liberty.176 While conceptions of privacy as control over information about oneself or 
access to oneself may relate to autonomy or personhood, some scholars have claimed that 
those conceptions relate more precisely to a liberty value of privacy.177 In 1968, Charles 
Fried, a legal scholar, suggested that privacy allows individuals to do or say things that 
would be scorned or scrutinized by members of the general public without “fear of 
disapproval or more tangible retaliation.”178 Fifteen years later, W.A. Parent, a legal 
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philosopher, argued that such conceptions of privacy as control over information about 
oneself ultimately relate to personal freedom, or liberty. 179  He asserted, “Whenever one 
person or group of persons tries to deprive another of control over some aspect of his life, 
we should recognize this as attempted coercion and should evaluate it as such, under the 
general concept of freedom-limiting action.”180 Gavison labeled that value “liberty of 
action,” which incorporates the individual values of freedom from censure or ridicule, 
promotion of autonomy, and promotion of mental health.181 The key underlying principle 
of the liberty value is that liberty insulates individuals from authoritarian interferences, 
such as government restraints or societal pressures, and allows individuals to challenge 
social norms in private free from pressures to conform in public.182  
The fourth individual value of privacy, emotional release, has two key functions 
for individuals.183 The first function allows an individual to escape the stress and tensions 
that result from one’s performance of various social roles “depending on his audience and 
behavioral situation.”184 That function enables individuals to relax and drop their social 
personas, which is essential for physical and emotional health.185 Westin compared the 
second function of the emotional release value to a safety valve that primarily benefits 
individuals, whereas the safety valve function of freedom of speech primarily benefits 
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society. He suggested that privacy allows individuals to voice anger and frustration at 
authority figures to friends or family “without fear of being held responsible for such 
comments.”186 That venting helps individuals process emotions in a safe context, 
reducing the risk that individuals will spout off harmful statements in a context likely to 
violate their professional or broad social roles.187 Both functions of the emotional release 
value ultimately benefit individuals’ mental and physical health.188 
Freedom to process one’s thoughts and to reflect on one’s emotions is also 
essential for the personal growth and self-evaluation value of privacy.189 Westin claimed 
that privacy helps each individual find opportunities to process the deluge of information 
encountered during daily life and “to integrate his experiences into a meaningful 
pattern.”190 Reflecting on one’s experiences is necessary for individuals to grow through 
self-discovery and self-criticism.191 Evaluating one’s thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs is 
also essential for individuals to practice and prepare how and when to present themselves 
to the general public.192 The process of self-evaluation, then, ultimately helps each person 
feel confident in herself as an autonomous being.193  
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The final individual value for privacy, self-preservation and emotional health, is 
closely related to the individual values of personal autonomy, self-evaluation, and 
emotional release. For example, Westin described a function of limited and protected 
communication as “the means of psychic self-preservation for men in the metropolis.”194 
In other words, individuals use reserve and discretion to decide which conduct and 
communications to share only within the parameters of trusted relationships because 
exposure to the general public would cause psychological pain. The value of psychic-self 
preservation has been associated with privacy for more than a century. When Warren and 
Brandeis called for a legal right of privacy, they asserted, “[M]odern enterprise and 
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and 
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”195 They argued that the 
underlying value for individual privacy, which allowed individuals to prevent the press 
from disclosing their information, is “peace of mind.”196  
In sum, privacy is instrumental for individuals to achieve numerous personal 
goals.197 The primary individual values of privacy are personhood, autonomy, liberty, 
emotional release, self-evaluation, and psychic self-preservation. Several of those values 
are synergistically related, and, at times, may even overlap. Nonetheless, each value has 
at least one unique primary attribute. For example, one’s conception of oneself as a 
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unique human being defines one’s core identity or personhood.198 Self-determination is a 
critical element for autonomy.199 Freedom to act without interference by authorities is a 
key attribute of liberty.200 The emotional release value serves two key functions: enabling 
individuals to express strong emotions without repercussions and allowing individuals to 
release the tensions experienced when donning their social personas.201 Self- reflection 
and self-criticism are essential for the self-evaluation value.202 The final value of psychic 
self-preservation promotes one’s psychological well being.203 As mentioned previously, 
no bright lines separate those individual values.  
 Key Societal Privacy Values 
While the privacy values of personhood, autonomy, liberty, and psychic self-
preservation primarily benefit individuals, those values also have secondary benefits for 
society at times. Likewise, the privacy torts may serve communitarian values that 
contribute to the wellbeing of modern democratic society as well as the individual 
privacy values. Scholars have identified those societal privacy values as maintaining 
civility and community in society,204 fostering human relationships,205 and encouraging 
evaluative decision-making and participation in a democratic society.206 
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In The Limits of Privacy, published in 1999, philosopher Amitai Etzioni claimed 
that no society could remain free for long without privacy.207 Although Etzioni’s book 
primarily focused on the constitutional right to privacy, the underlying philosophy for her 
work also is applicable to privacy recognized by the common law and statutory torts. 
Etzioni grounded her arguments in communitarian social philosophy, which presumes 
that “a good society crafts a careful balance between individual rights and the common 
good.”208 Under some circumstances, she suggested, privacy helps individuals follow 
social norms, making sure their conduct is consistent with social virtues that promote the 
good of society.209 Similarly, Professor Allen noted that scholarship has argued that 
“privacy makes us more fit for our social responsibilities and participation in group 
life.”210  
Several legal scholars have connected privacy to the societal goals of promoting 
civilized communities.211 In an article examining the significance of the Warren and 
Brandeis article between 1890 and 1990, Professor Bezanson said that the nineteenth-
century conception of privacy “protected the individual’s right to enjoy an identity forged 
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by the existing social institutions of family and community, which embodied chosen 
social standards and morality.”212 Bezanson suggested that the nineteenth-century 
conception of privacy was based on communitarian values, and the right was asserted to 
protect the social institutions of family and community from pressures imposed by the 
culture of nineteenth-century mass media and society.213 In The Social Foundations of 
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, published in 1989, Robert Post 
proposed that modern privacy law “safeguards the rules of civility” that define the social 
norms, or standards of propriety, each community member is expected to follow.214 Post 
claimed that privacy law generally addresses violations of social rules that cause 
psychological injuries, including mental anguish or dignitary harms. He described the 
latter type of harms, dignitary injuries, as degradations of individuals and society that 
arise when one community member fails to extend to another a basic form of respect that 
standards of decency, which are social standards that may vary from community to 
community, suggest any member of a community deserves.215 Such displays of disrespect 
demean the individuals involved and society by defying the fundamental level of moral 
treatment essential for individuals to coexist in a community that values personal growth, 
autonomy, and meaningful human relationships.216  
                                                 
 
212 Randall P. Bezanson, supra note 34, at 1133. 
 
213 Id. at 1138-39 (“The concept of privacy represented an attempt to protect the functioning of those 
discrete social institutions from the monolithic, impersonal, and value-free forces of modern society by 
channeling that which is personal to these discrete institutions and foreclosing it to society at large.”). 
 
214 Post, supra note 148, at 963. 
 
215 Id. at 967. 
 
216 Fried, supra note 141, at 475  (“It is my thesis that an essential part of the morality which underlies 
these realizations is the constraint of respect for the privacy of all, by the state and citizen alike.”); Gavison, 
supra note 148, at 445; Post, supra note 148, at 985 (“The civility rules which delineate information  
 45 
 Several scholars also have connected the value of promoting and maintaining 
human relationships to a well functioning civil society, as well as to the mental health and 
personal growth of individuals.217 Westin claimed, “The greatest threat to civilized social 
life would be a situation in which each individual was utterly candid in his 
communications with others, saying exactly what he knew or felt at all times. The havoc 
done to interpersonal relations by children, saints, mental patients, and adult ‘innocents’ 
is legendary.”218 Fried has argued that privacy is a means of promoting fundamental 
human relations of respect, love, friendship, and trust. He wrote, “[W]ithout privacy they 
are simply inconceivable.”219 He suggested that privacy is a condition necessary for 
individuals to create and maintain levels of intimacy—sharing information about one’s 
conduct, beliefs, thoughts, or feelings—that facilitates trust, respect, and the relations 
essential for civil interactions and, in turn, promotes the individual values of personhood, 
psychic self-preservation, and personal development. 220   
 The final societal privacy value is encouraging participation in the democratic 
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process, which includes discussion of political issues and voting.221 Professor Emerson 
argued:  
 In its social impact a system of privacy is vital to the working of the  
 democratic process. Democracy assumes that the individual citizen will  
 actively and independently participate in making decisions and in operating  
 the institutions of the society. An individual is capable of such a role only  
 if he can at some points separate himself from the pressures and conformities  
 of collective life.222 
 
Ken Gormley said that the first vision of privacy law in America, which related privacy 
to maintaining control over information about oneself, was essential for democratic 
society.223 Gormley explained, “[C]ontrol of information about oneself is critical in 
determining how and when (if ever) others will perceive us, which is in turn essential to 
maintaining our individual personalities.”224 That is essential for maintaining the 
American democratic society’s emphasis on individuality, autonomy, and liberty.225   
In a law review article published in 2004, Solove wrote that much important 
discussion of political matters occurs within the bonds of trusted relationships, which 
allow individuals to frankly state and evaluate their opinions without fear of reprisal from 
the general public.226 In an article published in 2006, Solove argued that privacy, which 
enables individuals to act anonymously, enables individuals to vote according to their 
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consciences without fearing retaliation from individuals with other political biases.227 
Such arguments recognize that privacy enables individuals to act autonomously, allowing 
each person to reflect on the democratic process, evaluate conflicting opinions, and vote 
on political matters.228  Thus, when privacy serves the societal privacy value of 
participation in self-government, privacy also facilitates the individual privacy values of 
autonomy and liberty.   
In sum, privacy serves the key societal goals of maintaining civility and 
community in society, fostering human relationships, and encouraging evaluative 
decision-making and participation in a democratic society. Applying Etzioni’s 
communitarian philosophy, privacy primarily serves those values by stressing the 
common good of society. In a democratic society that emphasizes the importance of 
individual autonomy and liberty, some of the societal values of privacy inherently 
overlap with individual privacy values. For example, the societal goal of maintaining 
civility and community also promotes the individual value of mental health; promoting 
relationships also enhances the individual values of mental health and personal growth; 
and encouraging evaluative decision-making and participation in a democratic society 
also advances the individual values of personal autonomy and liberty. Although 
individual and societal values may intertwine at times, privacy theorists have recognized 
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each as a distinct value worthy of legal protection through the tort of appropriation or 
disclosure of private facts.   
 Publication-Based Privacy Torts and Key Values They Protect 
 This section explores how scholars have indicated the publication-based privacy 
torts protect the individual privacy values — autonomy, liberty, emotional release, 
personal growth and self-evaluation, and psychic self-preservation —and the societal 
privacy values — promoting civility and community, fostering human relationships, and 
encouraging participation in a democratic society. The publication-based torts that are the 
subject of this study—disclosure of private facts and appropriation—are discussed 
individually.  
The disclosure of private facts tort protects the individual values of personality, 
autonomy, liberty, emotional release, mental health, self-evaluation, and reflection. 
Prosser initially proposed that the disclosure tort protected one’s interest in reputation, 
but Professor Bloustein argued, “The gravamen in the public disclosure cases is 
degrading a person by laying his life open to public view,” which injures a person’s 
individuality and personal dignity.229 Professor Gerety claimed that Warren and Brandeis 
intended for privacy law to protect individual autonomy, which would be violated by 
disclosures of private, true facts “that embarrass or humiliate us.”230 And Professor Post 
suggested that courts have treated the disclosure tort as a means of redress for "indecent 
and vulgar" communications that cause a reasonable person to feel emotional distress.231 
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When mass media reports disclose private facts, Professor Gerety claimed the resulting 
harm makes autonomy and intimacy impossible.232  
 The disclosure tort also enables individuals to relax and to exercise what Westin 
called the “safety-valve” function of privacy by venting to friends or family members 
without judgment or retaliation.233 Westin claimed, “Without the aid of such release in 
accommodating the daily abrasions with authorities, most people would experience 
serious emotional pressure.”234 Losing control over the revelation of such information 
would sear through one’s liberty by searing through the insulation that is also necessary 
for one to experiment, reflect, and develop one’s personality without fear of censure.235  
 The disclosure tort also protects each of the societal privacy values. Professor 
Post suggested that the disclosure tort fosters rules of civility that “delineate information 
preserves” essential for members of a community to convey forms of respect that 
represent the basic moral obligations shared by each member of a community.236 He 
argued that respecting those social norms, which define contexts in which disclosing 
private information to a third party would harm the subject of the disclosure, also 
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safeguards “the ‘ritual idiom’ through which such respect finds social expression.”237 
Conveying respect for each person is essential for individuals to form meaningful 
relationships and to willingly participate in society.238  
The disclosure tort also encourages participation in a democratic society that 
emphasizes independence, plurality, tolerance, and self-governance.239 Professor Westin 
asserted, “Such independence requires time for sheltered experimentation and testing of 
ideas, for preparation and practice in thought and conduct, without fear of ridicule or 
penalty, and for the opportunity to alter opinions before making them public.”240 
Recognizing social expectations that enable individuals and even groups to shield 
sensitive information from public disclosure, the tort ultimately helps individuals prepare 
to participate in public life by participating in political discussions,241 enables individuals 
to associate with other persons or groups that share their political ideologies,242 and 
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increases one’s willingness to run for public office.243  
The Restatement describes an invasion of privacy under the appropriation theory 
as using “the name or likeness of another” for one’s own benefit, either commercial or 
non-pecuniary.244 A comment on the Restatement section on appropriation suggests that 
the interest protected by appropriation is a person’s “exclusive use of his own identity” 
and that protecting a person “against mental distress is an important factor leading to 
recognition of the rule.”245 Those interests clearly are related to the individual values of 
personality or identity, autonomy, and psychic self-preservation or mental health.246 
Bloustein claimed that every person has a right to control whether his name or likeness is 
used for the commercial benefit of another because “it would be demeaning to human 
dignity to fail to enforce such a right.”247 Bloustein argued that human dignity, a value 
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that overlaps with autonomy, identity, and individuality, is the key value protected by 
privacy.248  
The appropriation tort also protects the individual values of mental health and 
liberty.249 Bloustein wrote, “The use of a personal photograph or a name for advertising 
purposes has the same tendency to degrade or humiliate as has publishing details of 
personal life.”250 Bloustein connected the emotional harms to a loss of liberty as the use 
of one’s identity without one’s consent diminishes “personal freedom.” 251 In fact, the 
first state high court ruling to recognize invasion of privacy by appropriation described 
the harm from misappropriation as a “loss of liberty.”252 Losing control over the social 
presentation of one’s personality, then, may diminish the individual’s sense of 
individuality, identity, autonomy, and liberty.253    
The appropriation tort also protects forms of respect that are essential for the key 
societal value of maintaining civility and community. 254 In an article published in 1991, 
Post suggested that emotional or dignitary harms resulted from misappropriation because 
the use of another’s identity undermined “socialized expectations of respect.”255 As 
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mentioned previously, expectations of respect are grounded in norms of propriety 
determined by members of a common community.256 Post claimed, “Personality is 
violated when these forms of respect are transgressed.”257 Thus, the appropriation tort 
helps maintain community “by enforcing norms of propriety,” which preserve “the 
community instantiated by those norms.”258 In 2001, Post clarified that such conceptions 
of privacy assume that social norms “constitute the decencies of civilization” and 
“govern” social interactions.259 
 In sum, scholars have argued that the widely accepted mass publication-based 
privacy torts protect all of the individual and societal values of privacy. Scholarship from 
law, philosophy, psychology, and sociology suggests the appropriation tort protects most 
of the individual privacy values—personality, identity, autonomy, mental health, and 
liberty260 —as well as one societal value—maintaining civility and community. 261 The 
literature associates each of the individual privacy values—personality, 262 which 
overlaps with autonomy 263 and liberty, 264 mental health, 265 and emotional release, 266 
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which can promote self-evaluation and reflection267—with the disclosure of private facts 
tort. The disclosure tort also protects each of the societal privacy values—fostering 
civility and community,268 enabling individuals to maintain the mental distance necessary 
to display the forms of respect essential to form and maintain relationships,269 and 
providing individuals with the reserve necessary to participate in public life.270   
Reconciling Conflicts between Free Expression and Privacy Values 
In addition to identifying and explicating the values served by freedom of 
expression and privacy, scholars have explored clashes between certain First Amendment 
values and several of the privacy values protected by the appropriation and disclosure 
torts, suggesting how such conflicts should be resolved. Literature also has examined 
how courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have reconciled conflicts between press 
freedom and privacy values. Some of that scholarship suggests court rulings have favored 
freedom of expression.271 Yet, as mentioned previously, Jane Kirtley has claimed courts 
have favored privacy.272 This section first examines how scholars have suggested courts 
should weigh privacy and free expression values when they come into conflict. Then it 
reviews commentators’ assessments of courts’ applications of the newsworthiness or 
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public interest defense to privacy invasion claims as a means of resolving conflicts 
between privacy and freedom of expression.  
 Weighing Select Free Expression and Privacy Values 
Thomas Emerson proposed that conflicts between freedom of expression and 
privacy should be resolved by examining the values of freedom of expression and privacy 
in a well-functioning system of freedom of expression.273 He claimed the system would 
allow only “a very narrow” exception to the general rule of protection of speech.274 
Emerson said speech that is proscribed by the privacy torts, and thus is outside First 
Amendment protection, must harm the individual privacy value of “inner personality”275 
by “assaulting the dignity of the individual by depicting matters of a wholly personal and 
intimate nature . . . .”276 That type of speech would harm personal autonomy, which the 
system presumes is essential for the development and maintenance of democratic society. 
Emerson proposed that in clashes among the societal freedom of expression values—
discovery of truth, participation in decision making, and social change—and the 
individual privacy value of autonomy, the individual privacy value would prevail over 
the societal free expression values.277 When the individual expression values of self-
fulfillment or discovery of truth conflict with the autonomy value of privacy, Emerson 
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claimed “privacy would prevail over freedom of expression.”278 He proposed the 
“guiding principle would be that the exercise of an individual right which injures another 
person would not be favored.”279 Still, Emerson said that invasions of privacy that caused 
only emotional injuries generally would not outweigh First Amendment protection for the 
expression.280 Under Emerson’s system, privacy would only trump freedom of expression 
values that clashed with the autonomy value of privacy..281 In all other instances, free 
expression values would prevail. 
C. Edwin Baker proposed a method for reconciling conflicts between the 
autonomy value of freedom of expression and privacy. That method is grounded in the 
presumption that freedom of expression and privacy serve two distinct types of 
autonomy: meaningful autonomy and formal autonomy.282 The central premise of 
meaningful autonomy is that each person should be free to make the choices she 
desires.283 That means each individual ought to have opportunities to make choices about 
her own life without unnecessary interference by others.284 While meaningful autonomy 
suggests that each person should have the moral right to control whether her personal 
information is disclosed, formal autonomy assigns each person the agency to control 
whether such information is disclosed. Baker said formal autonomy “centers on the agent 
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being the final authority over decisions about herself or, in the case of speech, about her 
speech.”285 He described formal autonomy as the “liberty of choice” that shields each 
individual from regulations that would prevent an individual from having the ultimate 
ability to determine what to disclose about herself.286 While one individual’s exercise of 
meaningful autonomy value may inhibit another person’s meaningful autonomy, Baker 
claimed that one individual’s exercise of the formal autonomy value would not inhibit 
another person’s meaningful or formal autonomy. He declared that privacy serves 
meaningful autonomy and freedom of expression serves formal autonomy. Thus, Baker 
proposed freedom of expression should prevail over privacy when the autonomy value 
underlying freedom of speech or press collides with the autonomy value underlying 
privacy.287   
Other scholarship has focused on reconciling conflicts between privacy values 
and the individual freedom of expression value of discovering truth or the societal 
freedom of expression value of the marketplace of ideas.288 For instance, Frederick 
Schauer has claimed the very development of defamation and privacy torts implies that 
some individual or social interests might outweigh the value of acquiring knowledge, 
which underlies the freedom of expression values of discovery of truth and the 
marketplace of ideas.289 Schauer compared the privacy interest likely to be harmed by a 
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disclosure to the public interest likely to be served when audiences receive the 
information.290 He noted that disclosures of information about a person’s private life 
likely would harm more than the emotional health of the subject. Such disclosures, he 
wrote, would infringe on a private person’s “interest in controlling certain aspects of his 
life” and, in turn, would undermine the individual privacy values of autonomy and 
liberty.291 The public interest defense, however, recognizes the public benefit from 
receiving such information about a public figure, such as a celebrity, or a public official, 
a person elected to public office might override the individual’s privacy interests. 
Schauer suggested that a public official or figure may relinquish some control over his 
social personality, decreasing his reasonable expectation of privacy “by placing his 
personality before the electorate for scrutiny” or by otherwise seeking to “benefit from 
publicity about [his] life.”292 That approach seeks to reconcile the individual privacy 
values of autonomy and liberty with the societal free expression values of self-
governance and the marketplace-of-ideas. 
Edward Bloustein published a pragmatic approach for reconciling speech-privacy 
conflicts. Bloustein asserted that Meiklejohn’s audience-based free expression theory 
would provide a practical framework for reconciling collisions between tort-based 
privacy claims and the constitutional right of the public to receive information.293 
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Bloustein relied on Meiklejohn’s premise that the First Amendment protects the right of 
the public to hear information relevant to self-governance. Bloustein wrote, “[T]he 
weight to be given ‘the public interest in obtaining information’ should depend on 
whether or not the information is relevant to the public’s governing purposes.”294 That 
would assign strong First Amendment protection to the disclosure of information about 
government officials, public issues, or other matters of governing importance.295 The free 
expression value associated with society’s right to learn information that enhances self-
governance then would prevail over individual privacy interests, but the individual 
privacy value of dignity could trump a speaker’s expression of information lacking 
governing importance.296 
Another legal commentator, Eric B. Easton, wrote that the Supreme Court has 
reconciled clashes between freedom of press and privacy by creating tests that suggest 
audience members’ rights to receive matters of “public importance” should trump 
individual privacy interests.297 He suggested the Court’s rulings in Cox Broadcasting v. 
Cohn and subsequent cases expanded First Amendment protection for the media to cover 
the publication of truthful information about matters of public significance, which 
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includes matters of public importance,298 “public interest,” “legitimate public concern,” 
and “newsworthiness.”299 Easton reasoned, “The public must know what is happening 
within official quarters, not only to maintain the ability to participate effectively but also 
for the purifying effect public scrutiny has on the decision-making process . . . .”300 That 
public importance standard includes the self-governance, participation in decision-
making, and watchdog values of freedom of expression. Easton’s proposal suggests those 
audience-based freedom of expression values could prevail over individual privacy 
values as long as privacy is not considered essential to preserve freedom of speech and 
press.301 
In summary, relevant scholarship has reached some conflicting conclusions as to 
whether certain free expression values should trump certain privacy values. Baker 
proposed the freedom of expression values of autonomy, which he associated with liberty 
and self-fulfillment, should prevail over the privacy value of autonomy.302 On the other 
hand, Emerson argued the individual privacy value of personhood or autonomy should 
prevail over the free expression values of self-fulfillment and discovery of truth.303 
Emerson would allow individual privacy values to outweigh the societal free expression 
values of participation in decision-making and stability and change, but Bloustein and 
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Easton claimed that freedom to express matters related to self-governance, or of public 
importance, should prevail over privacy.304  
 Applying the Newsworthiness or Public Interest Defense  
 Much of the literature on privacy and freedom of expression focuses on the 
constitutional defenses developed by U.S. Supreme Court rulings as a means of balancing 
the individual and societal values at stake. This section briefly examines how scholarship 
suggests the newsworthiness or public interest defense might resolve conflicts between 
the values served by free expression and the appropriation or disclosure tort. 
 In their groundbreaking 1890 law review article, Warren and Brandeis suggested 
that disclosures of newsworthy information could not be considered actionable invasions 
of privacy: “The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of 
public or general interest.”305 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis grounded that 
exemption in the premise that privacy laws should protect individuals in “whose affairs 
the community has no legitimate concern from being dragged into an undesirable and 
undesired publicity . . . .”306 They claimed that privacy laws would not apply equally to 
those individuals and to “others who, in varying degrees, have renounced the right to live 
their lives screened from public observation.”307 For example, they suggested that an 
ordinary individual’s “peculiarities of manner and person” would be matters 
inappropriate to discuss publicly, but those same peculiarities could become “matters of 
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public importance” if that person were seeking a political office or other public 
position.308 They also suggested that publishing matters related to the proceedings of 
courts, government bodies, or other organizations formed to serve the general interest of 
society would be exempted from liability.309 Those suggestions provided a basis for 
courts and commentators to recognize a public interest, or newsworthiness, exemption 
from liability for the appropriation and disclosure torts. 
 Rodney Smolla contended the First Amendment provides a direct and a derivative 
right for news organizations to use a person’s name or likeness in connection with a 
newsworthy event. Freedom of speech or press, he said, “overrides the law of torts” that 
would otherwise make the unauthorized use of one’s name or likeness for another 
person’s commercial benefit a tortious invasion of privacy by appropriation.310 The direct 
First Amendment newsworthiness exception protects the use of one’s identity in 
connection with a report on a newsworthy event in which members of society are likely 
to express interest. The derivative First Amendment right extends to a secondary use of 
that report to advertise the news item or entity. In both instances, the newsworthiness 
exception would prevent the publisher from being held liable for appropriation and would 
promote the free flow of information.311 The free expression value of the marketplace of 
ideas, then, would prevail over the individual privacy values of autonomy and liberty. 
The newsworthiness exception, however, would not exempt a publisher from 
liability for an exploitative use of one’s name or likeness for commercial purposes. For 
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example, Smolla proposed the actual malice standard of liability would be applied when a 
magazine printed a celebrity’s picture on its cover in connection with a false news story. 
If the magazine published the celebrity’s image and the associated news report with 
knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity, the publisher would be liable for invasion of 
privacy by appropriation. Under those circumstances, the individual privacy values of 
autonomy and liberty would prevail over the freedom of expression value of the 
marketplace of ideas. 
 Several commentators have claimed the U.S. Supreme Court’s development of a 
public significance defense for disclosure of private facts cases has allowed courts to 
favor press freedom over privacy.312 They suggested the Court’s ruling in Florida Star v. 
B.J.F. in 1989 signaled the inevitable demise of the disclosure tort.313 The Court held: 
“[W]here a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, 
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state 
interest of the highest order . . . .”314 For example, Peter Edelman claimed that ruling 
continued the Court’s tendency to avoid the collision between press and privacy rights 
“by finding that the disclosed information was lawfully obtained.”315 He suggested the 
Court favored a free expression value of liberty in the Florida Star ruling and failed to 
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acknowledge the privacy values protected by the disclosure tort.316 Edelman proposed the 
Court should have weighed the public’s interest in learning about information held in 
government records against the privacy values of autonomy, emotional health, and 
forming meaningful relationships.317 He and other commentators have even argued that 
courts’ reliance on defenses that favor freedom of expression threatens the viability of the 
disclosure tort.318 Communications law scholar Deckle McLean wrote in 2000 that the 
Florida Star ruling “makes success in a public disclosure suit even more unlikely than it 
was prior to the ruling.”319 McLean concluded that a subsequent Michigan appeals court 
ruling, which “frankly admitted the importance of balancing privacy interests against 
First Amendment interests,” provided a more effective approach than was provided by 
the Florida Star ruling.320 Such an approach would encourage courts to give greater 
consideration to privacy and free expression values. 
 While scholarship has focused primarily on U.S. Supreme Court rulings, defenses, 
or legal theory, two articles provided valuable analysis of how select lower court rulings 
have weighed privacy and free expression values. Those articles, published by Professor 
McLean and by Professor Dianne Zimmerman, suggest that systematic analysis of lower 
court rulings may illustrate alternative approaches to reconciling privacy and free speech 
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values.321 This dissertation provides a systematic review of state high court and federal 
appellate court rulings to determine if and how courts address free expression and privacy 
values when deciding cases involving the disclosure of private facts and appropriation 
torts. 
As the above review of the literature has shown, many scholars have identified 
and described individual and societal values served by both freedom of expression and 
privacy. How to reconcile the two sets of values when they come into conflict has drawn 
some, but considerably less, scholarly attention, with a couple authors looking at 
individual or small samples of cases to describe how courts undertake this difficult 
task.322 This dissertation seeks to begin filling a void in the literature by providing a 
broader, more systematic investigation of judicial efforts to balance free expression and 
privacy values in two decades of cases involving the publication-based disclosure of 
private facts and appropriation torts. 
 
C. Research Questions: 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze if and how state high courts and 
federal appellate courts have balanced free press values and privacy values when those 
sets of values have conflicted in privacy tort cases. Specifically, this dissertation 
examines cases involving two of the two most widely accepted publicity-based privacy 
torts—disclosure of private facts and appropriation—in an effort to identify how courts 
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have reconciled these two sets of values considered fundamental in our democratic 
society. To do so, this dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
1. In invasion of privacy cases filed under the disclosure of private facts tort, have 
courts explicitly attempted to balance free expression and privacy values? If so, 
how? 
2. In invasion of privacy cases filed under the appropriation tort, have courts 
explicitly attempted to balance free expression and privacy values? If so, how? 
3. When balancing free expression and privacy values, have courts assigned greater 
weight to certain types of free expression values? 
4. When balancing free expression and privacy values, have courts assigned greater 
weight to certain types of privacy values? 
 
D. Method and Limitations 
 This dissertation reviews disclosure of private facts and appropriation cases 
decided by U.S. Courts of Appeals and state high courts between 1989 and 2009 to 
determine whether and, if so, how courts identify and attempt to reconcile individual free 
expression values — autonomy, self-fulfillment, self-realization, discovery of truth, and 
participation in the social and political decision-making process—societal free expression 
values—effective self-governance, check on government, marketplace of ideas, balance 
between societal stability and change, and toleration—and the individual and social 
privacy values associated with each tort.  
 Chapter two examines disclosure of private facts cases for discussion of freedom 
of expression values and the individual privacy values—autonomy,  liberty, and 
 67 
emotional health—and social privacy values —fostering civility and community, helping 
individuals maintain relationships, and providing individuals with the reserve necessary 
to participate in public life — associated with disclosure. 323 Chapter three examines 
appropriation cases for discussion of the individual and social freedom of expression 
values and the individual privacy values—personality, autonomy, liberty, and emotional 
health — and the social privacy value—maintaining civility and community  — 
underlying the appropriation tort.324  
 The case analysis focused on state high courts’ rulings and U.S. Courts of 
Appeals’ rulings because state high courts have binding authority over all courts within 
their respective states and federal circuit courts of appeals have binding authority over all 
courts within their respective circuits. State courts have subject-matter jurisdiction on 
state law claims such as disclosure of private facts under state common law or 
appropriation under state statutory law.325 But federal courts have subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear federal issues, including conflicts between the First Amendment and 
privacy law. Federal courts also have diversity jurisdiction to hear cases involving 
disputes between residents from different states when the claimed damages exceed 
$75,000.326 In any cases that do not involve federal issues, federal courts are 
constitutionally required to apply and to interpret state law.327  
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  Cases for analysis were identified by searching the online versions of three 
reporting services: Westlaw, LexisNexis Academic, and Media Law Reporter. Westlaw is 
a collection of databases in which editors at West Publishing Company organize legal 
documents for storage and searching by topic. The LexisNexis Academic legal database 
is organized and maintained by editors at LexisNexis. Media Law Reporter publishes and 
indexes case law and legal news that editors at the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) 
consider relevant to mass communication law. All three databases were used to minimize 
the likelihood of missing relevant cases. Searches were limited to disclosure of private 
facts cases and appropriation cases reported between June 21, 1989, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in Florida Star v. B.J.F., and January 21, 2010. After Florida Star, 
some scholars criticized the Court’s method of analysis for focusing on speech interests 
without adequately considering countervailing privacy interests.328 For example, Paul 
Gewirtz wrote: “The Court gives only token recognition to the value of implementing 
legal protections of privacy. This extreme solicitude for the one and sharply limited 
solicitude for the other is what should be reversed.”329  
 Cases were identified by using the Westlaw Key Number system and Key Cite 
function. Westlaw editors assign “key numbers” to legal terms or phrases commonly 
mentioned in the headnote summaries that Westlaw editors add to each case. 
Appropriation cases were identified by searching the Key Number  379IV(C), “Use of 
Name, Voice or Likeness; Right to Publicity.”330 Disclosure cases were identified by 
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searching Key Number 379IV, “Privacy,” and Key Number  379IV(B), “Privacy and 
Publicity.” Relevant cases also were identified by performing a Key Cite search, which 
identified all cases that have cited the Restatement (Second) Sections 652C 
“Appropriation of Name or Likeness” or 652D “Publicity Given to Private Life” 
Appropriation cases also were identified by performing a Key Cite search for all rulings 
that cited state appropriation statutes. 
 Relevant case law was found by using the topic search function in the LexisNexis 
Academic databases of U.S. Courts of Appeals’ rulings and rulings by the highest courts 
in all states. Appropriation cases were identified by using two search strings. The first is 
“privacy AND appropriation.” The second search string is “(privacy AND (“use of 
name” OR “use of likeness” OR “use of image”)).” Disclosure cases were found by 
searching for “privacy AND (“public disclosure” OR “public disclosure of private 
facts”).”  
 The index term of privacy was used to limit the search in Media Law Reporter’s 
indexed weekly case digests online. Media Law Reporter’s case annotations were used to 
identify relevant rulings by U.S. circuit courts of appeals and state high courts.  
 The aforementioned searches yielded a universe of 691 court rulings involving 
disclosure of private facts and 297 court rulings involving appropriation. The cases then 
were read to determine which cases did not actually discuss the disclosure or 
appropriation tort. Cases that involved freedom of information laws, false light invasion 
of privacy, or other claims unrelated to disclosure or appropriation were excluded from 
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the sample. That left approximately 70 disclosure cases and 40 appropriation cases for 
analysis. 
 Traditional textual analysis was used to assess if and how courts discussed free 
expression values and/or privacy values when explaining the rationales for their holdings, 
concurrences, or dissents. Opinions were categorized as 1) discussing free expression 
values and privacy values; 2) discussing free expression values but not privacy values; 3) 
not discussing free expression values but discussing privacy values; 4) discussing neither 
free expression values nor privacy values. When values were discussed in the opinions, 
those values were categorized as individual or social free expression values or individual 
or social privacy values found in the literature on free expression and privacy theory.  
 Identifying discussions of freedom of expression values 
 The freedom of expression values are autonomy, self-realization or self-
fulfillment; attainment of truth; participation in social and political decision-making; self-
governance; check on government; marketplace of ideas; stability and change; and 
toleration. Following are explications of each of those values that will guide the analysis: 
The autonomy value is assigned to discussion of an individual’s or autonomous 
press’s personal agency or self-determination, individuality, ability to choose what to 
communicate or publish, or liberty from authoritarian pressure to publish particular 
information.331 The self-realization or self-fulfillment value also overlaps with autonomy. 
Thus, the value of autonomy includes discussion of the individual sphere of life Mill 
described as 1) “the inward domain of consciousness,” 2) “liberty of conscience, in the 
most comprehensive sense,” 3) “liberty of thought and feeling,” and 4) “absolute freedom 
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of opinion and sentiment on all subjects.”332 That value also includes writings that tie 
freedom of speech to personal growth, personal salvation, personal dignity, and the equal 
worth of individuals.333 
The individual value of attainment of truth includes discussions tying freedom to 
communicate to liberty to express opinions, to seek true information, to test one’s 
opinions, or to engage in discussions to seek greater personal understanding.334 
Descriptions that grounded freedom of expression with freedom to discuss or debate 
information or to seek greater truth or personal understanding are categorized under the 
individual value of attainment of truth when rulings emphasized the personal benefit to 
individual communicators.  
The individual value of participation in decision-making includes discussions 
connecting freedom to communicate to one’s ability to form judgments about 
government and society, to evaluate political decisions, and to contribute to culture. As 
Thomas Emerson explained, the principle also “includes freedom of expression in 
religion, literature, art, science, and all areas of human learning and knowledge.”335  
The societal value of the marketplace of ideas includes discussions connecting 
audiences’ freedom to receive information, to listen to discussions, or even to take part in 
debate that allows individuals to receive multiple points of view. The value also includes 
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writings that declare a free flow of information is essential for audiences to receive the 
information needed for speech to remedy other harmful speech.  
The societal value of balance between change and stability includes discussion 
indicating freedom of expression serves as a safety valve, facilitating stable political or 
social change, or serves as a general mechanism for society to address matters likely to 
cause violence or social unrest if not debated or discussed.336 
The self-governance value is assigned to discussions that connect freedom of 
expression to the benefits to democracy that result from audiences receiving information 
necessary to cast informed votes, to evaluate information and opinions about political or 
public life, or to debate political issues. In other words, this value is assigned to rationales 
that recognize Alexander Meiklejohn’s argument tying freedom of expression to 
audiences’ need to receive speech on matters of governing importance that advance 
society’s sovereignty over its governors.337  
The checking value, or watchdog value, is applied to references to the role that 
freedom of speech or press plays in alerting the public to corruption, incompetence, 
malfeasance or other abuses of power by government or other powerful entities in 
society.338 
The final free expression value, toleration, includes discussions tying freedom of 
expression to message recipients’ abilities to respect the equal worth of all individuals, to 
receive information relevant to a broad range of intellectual values, to encourage societies 
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to allow extreme views to challenge social norms, and to consider messages that 
challenge common fears, biases, beliefs, and assumptions. 339 In other words the 
toleration value considers freedom of expression, as Lee C. Bollinger explained, as “a 
social context in which basic intellectual values are developed and articulated, where 
assumptions about undesirable intellectual traits are offered and remedies proffered.”340 
 Identifying discussions of privacy values 
The privacy values are autonomy, emotional release or emotional health, liberty, 
civility and community, forming relationships, and promoting democratic processes. 
Following are explications of each of those values that will guide the analysis: 
References to protection of a person’s inner personality, personal identity, 
individuality, dignity, or integrity are categorized as discussion of the autonomy value of 
privacy.341 The privacy value of autonomy also includes references to self-determination, 
personal agency, individuality, or the ability to avoid being controlled by others.342  
The emotional health value includes references to an individual’s emotional well 
being, emotional release, and peace of mind. The emotional health value is assigned to 
descriptions of privacy as a means of facilitating emotional self-preservation, providing 
opportunities to reflect on emotions, overcoming psychic harms, and growing as an 
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emotionally mature individual. 343  Emotional release benefits individuals by encouraging 
relaxation, which includes releasing stress and escaping from social pressures to conform 
one’s conduct or persona to others’ expectations. Emotional release also serves a safety 
valve function that allows individuals to vent strong opinions or emotions in an 
environment he controls.344  
The liberty value includes mentions of control over information about one’s self 
and freedom to choose if and how sensitive information is disclosed without undue 
pressure from government or social interference. Liberty promotes autonomy and mental 
health, but it is unique because it focuses on the individual’s ability to make decisions 
without fear of censorship or even social pressures intended to coerce individuals to 
conform to social expectations. That individual value stresses personal freedom. 
The civility and community value include discussion of social norms or standards 
of decency intended to promote harmony and participation in collective life. That value 
includes discussions of social virtues, such as respect for others as members of a 
community of individuals, considered essential for individuals to engage in collective 
life.345 
A closely related value, forming and maintaining relationships, includes mentions 
of friendship, intimacy, trust, and respect for individual persons. Whereas the civility and 
community value emphasizes collective life, the latter value focuses on forming 
individual relationships with friends, co-workers, or family. The value of forming and 
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maintaining relationships includes references to personal actions or attributes that 
promote one person’s ability to connect with at least one other person in a meaningful, 
perhaps even intimate, manner.346  
The final privacy value, promoting democratic processes, includes discussions 
that tie privacy to individuals’ willingness to vote, engage in debates on public issues, 
discuss political issues, evaluate information relevant to self-governance and public life, 
or to run for public office.347  
Of course, the analysis of case law reveals language that at times simultaneously 
relates to more than one of the aforementioned values. When that occurred in a case, each 
of the appropriate values is assigned to that case.  
 Limitations 
This dissertation has several limitations. First, the purpose of the dissertation is to 
examine how courts with binding authority over lower state courts or federal district 
courts in their circuits have identified free expression and/or privacy values when 
attempting to reconcile clashes between freedom of speech or press and privacy. Thus, 
the case analysis excluded cases that involved solely the right of publicity, as opposed to 
the right of privacy.  Publicity is viewed as a property right, the right to profit or not from 
commercial uses of one’s identity and, thus, involves significantly different values than 
the personal right of privacy.  
Second, this dissertation was restricted to cases reported by Westlaw, LexisNexis 
Academic, or the Media Law Reporter using the search tools described above. It is 
                                                 
 
346 Gavison, supra note 149, at 45; Rachels, supra note 157, at 326. 
 
347 EMERSON, supra note 64, at 546; Gormley, supra note 15, at 1356-57. 
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possible that some relevant cases were not included in one of those databases or were not 
associated with the key numbers assigned to the disclosure or appropriation torts in 
Westlaw, categorized under the LexisNexis Academic torts database, annotated by 
LexisNexis editors in a manner that lists privacy as key points of law from each ruling, or 
connected to the privacy terms indexed by Media Law Reporter editors. Also, limiting 
state cases to those decided by state high courts and federal cases to those decided by the 
circuit courts of appeals may have resulted in the study missing some significant 
discussions of how to reconcile competing values by lower courts. The sheer volume of 
cases, however, precluded including trial courts and state intermediate appellate courts in 
the analysis. 
Third, textual analysis inherently introduced subjectivity into this dissertation. 
Even though key values were explicated on preceding pages, deciding which language 
fits in which category requires interpretation and judgment. It is possible that another 
person who reads the cases analyzed for this study would place language from key cases 
in different categories.  
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 Writing for a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Florida Star v. B.J.F., Justice 
Thurgood Marshall acknowledged that there is “tension between the right which the First 
Amendment accords to a free press, on the one hand, and the protections which various 
statutes and common-law doctrines accord to personal privacy against the publication of 
truthful information, on the other . . . .”1 In that opinion, Justice Marshall described 
privacy and free expression interests as sufficiently sensitive and significant to “counsel 
relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of 
the instant case.”2  The Court has refrained from determining whether truthful publication 
“is automatically constitutionally protected” or whether there is a “zone of personal 
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press.”3  
When ruling on conflicts between press freedom and privacy, the Court has “without 
exception upheld the press’ (sic) right to publish” by focusing on the conflict “only as it 
arose in a discrete factual context.”4 This area of law, according to Justice Marshall, 
remains “somewhat uncharted.”5   
                                                        
 
1 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989). 
 
2 Id. at 533. 
 
3 Id. at 541. 
 
4 Id. at 530. 
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 Again in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that “‘the sensitivity and the 
significance of interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy 
rights’” require case-by-case analysis of those interests.6 That ruling in Bartnicki v. 
Vopper indicates that important interests may be found “on both sides of the 
constitutional calculus.”7 Nonetheless, the Court refrained from seriously discussing the 
privacy interests at issue in the case. Rather, the Court stated, “privacy concerns give way 
when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”8 
Imposing sanctions on “the publication of truthful information of public concern,” 
according to the Supreme Court, “implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment.”9 
Thus, the majority found that the public’s interest in learning about a matter of public 
debate must supersede the privacy interests at issue when information was lawfully 
obtained and truthfully reported. 
 Despite lingering constitutional questions about the disclosure tort, most states 
and the District of Columbia have recognized that branch of invasion of privacy law 
either under common law or statutory law.10  During the past two decades, appellate 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
5 Id. at 530 n.5 (“The somewhat uncharted state of the law in this area thus contrasts markedly with the 
well-mapped area of defamatory falsehoods, where a long line of decisions has produced relatively detailed 
legal standards governing the multifarious situations in which individuals aggrieved by the dissemination of 
damaging untruths seek redress.”). 
 
6 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (quoting Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532-33). 
 
7 Id. at 532. 
 
8 Id. at 534. 
 
9 Id. at 533-34. 
 
10 Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 377 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) ("It is generally recognized by a majority of 
jurisdictions that the right of privacy may be invaded . . . by unreasonable publicity given to another's 
private life . . . ."). 
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courts in New Hampshire, Minnesota, and Colorado have indicated for the first time that 
their respective states recognize the disclosure of private facts tort.11 To prevent 
confusion about the status of the disclosure tort in Washington, that state’s supreme court 
declared, “[W]e explicitly hold the common law right of privacy exists in this state and 
that individuals may bring a cause of action for invasion of that right.”12  
 On the other hand, the highest courts in three states have either questioned or 
rejected outright the disclosure of private facts branch of privacy law.13 Almost a year 
before the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Florida Star, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
declined to recognize the tort under state common law.14 Calling the tort “constitutionally 
suspect,”15 the court reasoned that adopting the disclosure branch of privacy law “would 
add to the existing tensions between the First Amendment and the law of torts and would 
be of little practical value to anyone.”16  In 1993, the New York Court of Appeals 
affirmed that its state common law did not recognize a right to privacy and that the state 
legislature had only recognized misappropriation under the state’s statutory law.17 In 
                                                        
 
11 Ozer, 940 P.2d at 379; Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); 
Karch v. Baybank, 794 A.2d 763, 774 (N.H. 2002).  
 
12 Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339 (Wash. 1998). The First Circuit Court of Appeals also 
indicated that the state of New Hampshire likely would recognize the tort. Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282, 298 
(1st Cir. 2002). 
 
13 Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997) (plurality); Howell v. New York Post Co., 
Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 716 (N.C. 1988). 
 
14 Hall, 372 S.E. 2d at 716. 
 
15 Id. 
 
16 Id. at 715. 
 
17 Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703 (“[W]e have no common law of privacy. Balancing the competing policy 
concerns underlying tort recovery for invasion of privacy is best left to the Legislature, which in fact has 
rejected proposed bills to expand New York law . . . .”).  
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1997, a plurality of the Indiana Supreme Court cast considerable doubt on whether 
Indiana ever has or will recognize the disclosure tort.18 The plurality said that permitting 
recovery for the disclosure of true information could conflict with a provision in the 
Indiana Bill of Rights recognizing truth as a defense to libel.19 Reasoning that reputation 
is one of the interests protected by the disclosure tort, and, therefore, “disclosure 
sometimes serves as an alternative action for truthful defamation,” Chief Justice Randall 
Shepard wrote, “[T]he truth-in-libel provision . . . commands real caution about proposals 
to recognize a civil cause of action for libel that impose liability for truthful 
statements.”20  
 Approximately seventy state high court and federal appellate court rulings issued 
after June 1989, when the Supreme Court decided Florida Star, involving claims of 
invasion of privacy by disclosure of private facts were identified by this study.21 In only 
one of those cases did the court uphold a ruling that a plaintiff’s privacy was invaded by 
the disclosure of private facts.22 A few courts reversed trial courts’ awards of summary 
judgment to defendants,23 and a few decided cases on procedural grounds.24 Other                                                         
 
18 Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997) (plurality). 
 
19 IND CONST. art.1, § 10. 
 
20 Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d at 687, 691. 
 
21 Searches for the key words of “privacy” and “disclosure of private facts” in LexisNexis, Westlaw and the 
Media Law Reporter found 691 court rulings from June 1989 through December 2009. Most of those 
rulings are not considered relevant to this study because they were handed down by state courts at the 
intermediate appellate level, involved other invasion of privacy torts, or involved statutory claims unrelated 
to the disclosure of private facts tort.  
 
22 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002)(affirming the award of $2 in 
compensatory damages and remanding for a new trial on punitive damages.).  
 
23 E.g., Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1142 (Idaho 1998); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 
231, 232 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Karch v. Baybank, 794 A.2d 763, 774 (N.H. 2002); Reid v. Pierce 
County, 961 P.2d 333, 342 (1998).  
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appellate courts that addressed the substantive issues crafted narrow rulings, following 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s example of how to handle clashes between privacy and 
freedom of expression.25 Slightly more than half of the rulings examined lower courts’ 
summary judgment awards by focusing on the elements of the tort or the newsworthiness 
defense.26 Several of the rulings, especially those examining whether the tort is 
recognized under a state’s common law, referred to either individual or societal values 
underlying freedom of expression.27 Some opinions also made reference to individual 
values that the literature has suggested underlie invasion of privacy law.28 
 This chapter examines if and how state high court and federal appellate court 
decisions filed after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Florida Star ruling have analyzed clashes 
between free expression and privacy arising in disclosure of private facts cases. Section A 
discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Florida Star and its progeny. Section B 
explores how courts have defined the elements of the tort and applicable privileges. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
24 E.g., Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 589-91 (8th Cir. 2008)(asserting that Steinbuch had not 
established personal jurisdiction and Steinbuch failed to state a claim against Home Box Office and Time 
Warner Cable because no publicity had occurred); Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 32 F.3d 953, 963 
(5th Cir. 1994) (finding the disclosure of private facts claim was time-barred); Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 
937 S.E.3d 653 (Ark. 1997) (“[T]he Milams do not state which theory of privacy invasion applies to their 
case. . . .  [W]e will not develop this claim for the Milams. That was their responsibility.”); Foncello v.  
Amorossi, 931 A.2d 924, 928 (Conn. 2007) (asserting that the plaintiff’s claim on appeal for disclosure of 
private facts had little to do with the original claims for identity theft and intrusion upon seclusion). 
 
25 E.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, 492 F.3d 1210, 1219-21 (10th Cir. 2007); Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 
F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208-09 (Cal. 2007); Gates v. Discovery 
Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 553, 562-63 (Cal. 2005); Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 
(Cal. 1998) (plurality); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (Fla. 1989); Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 6 S.E.2d 655, 657 (Ga. 1993); 
Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 34-6 (Idaho 2003). 
 
26  See infra notes 74-127 and accompanying text.  
 
27 See infra notes 131-176 and accompanying text. 
 
28 See infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text. 
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Section C reviews if and how courts have discussed individual-based free expression 
values—autonomy, self-realization or self-fulfillment, attainment of truth, and 
participation in decision-making—or society-based free expression values—marketplace 
of ideas, balance between stability and change, self-governance, the checking value, and 
toleration. Section D reviews if and how courts have identified individual-based privacy 
values—autonomy, emotional health, and liberty—or society-based privacy values—
civility and community, forming and maintaining relationships, and promoting 
democratic processes. Section E discusses how courts sought to reconcile clashes 
between the two sets of values and is followed by a summary and conclusion. 
 
A. Florida Star v. B.J.F. and Its Progeny 
 In June 1989 in Florida Star, the U.S Supreme Court established a constitutional 
privilege for mass media disclosures of matters of public significance.29 The Court 
grounded that privilege with its rationales from three previously decided cases. This 
section discusses Florida Star in relation to that trilogy of cases and a later case in which 
the Court discussed Florida Star. The Court’s Florida Star ruling, and its subsequent 
Bartnicki v. Vopper ruling,30 applied a First Amendment principle established in Smith v. 
Daily Mail, which incorporates First Amendment principles from the Court’s 1975 ruling 
in Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn31 and 1977 ruling in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District 
Court.32                                                           
 
29 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989). 
 
30 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 
31 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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 In 1984, B.J.F., a sexual assault victim, sued the Florida Star, a weekly 
newspaper, for publishing her full name in its description of crimes reported to the Duval 
County, Florida, Sheriff’s Department.33 B.J.F. sought damages for the newspaper’s 
violation of a Florida statute that stated, ““No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or 
cause or allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass 
communication the name, address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim 
of any sexual offense.””34 The newspaper, however, argued that sanctioning the press 
was unconstitutional because its trainee-reporter had found B.J.F.’s name in an incident 
report available for public viewing in the sheriff’s department.35 In 1986, in a per curiam 
opinion, the District Court of Appeals for the First District of Florida found a lower court 
properly had awarded damages to B.J.F. because “the information published, the rape 
victim’s name, was of a private nature and not to be published as a matter of law.”36 
Almost a year later, the Florida Supreme Court declined to review the case.37  
 In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s assessment that 
the statute was constitutional because “it reflected a proper balance between the First 
Amendment and privacy rights” and was only applied to a sensitive category of criminal 
offenses.38 Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that imposing damages on the Florida Star                                                                                                                                                                      
 
32 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
 
33 Id. 
 
34 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So.2d 883, 84 n.2 (1098) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 794.03 (1974)). 
 
35 Id. 
 
36 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 
37 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 509 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 1987). 
 
38 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 528 (1989).  
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for publishing B.J.F.’s name violates the First Amendment.39 He reasoned that the 
reporter truthfully reported lawfully obtained information relevant to a matter of public 
significance,40 a principle that combined key principles from the Court’s rulings in 
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,41 Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court,42 and Smith v. Daily 
Mail.43  
 In 1975 in Cox Broadcasting, the Court had ruled that a broadcast station could 
not constitutionally be sanctioned for publishing the name of a deceased 17-year old rape 
victim when the name was obtained from court records open to public inspection.44 In 
that ruling, Justice Byron White recognized the potential for press freedom and privacy to 
conflict in a disclosure of private facts case. He wrote: 
     Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information,  
     whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise  
     painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront  
     the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.45   
 
White continued, “In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of the 
free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant 
concerns of our society.”46 The Court was limited to focusing on the narrow question 
raised by the controversy at issue in the case—whether a state may sanction a news outlet                                                                                                                                                                      
 
39 Id. at 532. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 
42 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
 
43 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
 
44 Cox, 420 U.S. at 471-72. 
 
45 Id. at 489. 
 
46 Id. at 491. 
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for accurately broadcasting the name of a rape victim when that name was obtained from 
judicial records open to public inspection. It held that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbid a state from sanctioning the press for “truthfully publishing 
information released to the public in official court records.”47 Justice White reasoned that 
judicial proceedings resulting from the commission of crime “are without question events 
of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the 
press to report the operations of government.”48 
 Although Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star both involved the disclosure of rape 
victims’ names, Justice Marshall indicated in the latter ruling that the facts at issue in 
those cases were sufficiently distinct to prevent Cox Broadcasting from being read as 
controlling in Florida Star.49 Cox Broadcasting involved the broadcast of a deceased rape 
victim’s name when that information was available from judicial records.50 The 
information in Florida Star was obtained from a law enforcement record reporting the 
occurrence of a crime.51 Because B.J.F.’s name was obtained and published before 
judicial proceedings commenced, Justice Marshall asserted that the rationale for Cox 
Broadcasting that recognized the press served an important function by exposing judicial 
proceedings to public scrutiny was not applicable to Florida Star.52 
                                                        
 
47 Cox Broad v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975). 
 
48 Id. at 492. 
 
49 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (citing 420 U.S. at 494-95). 
 
50 420 U.S. at 494-95. 
 
51 491 U.S. at 532. 
 
52 Id. (citing 420 U.S. at 494-95). 
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 Two years after Cox Broadcasting, the Court relied on that ruling when 
considering in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court whether the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state court from prohibiting “the publication of 
widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact open 
to the public.”53 That case arose after an Oklahoma District Court enjoined members of 
the news media from publishing or disseminating the name or picture of a minor in 
connection with a juvenile court proceeding, although an 11- year old boy accused of 
killing a railroad switchman appeared in a detention hearing journalists were allowed to 
attend.54 The Court held that a state court could not enjoin members of the news media 
from publishing the name or photograph of a juvenile when the information was lawfully 
obtained and publicly available.55 
  Cox Broadcasting and Oklahoma Publishing both shaped the First Amendment 
principle established in 1979 in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,56 the principle that 
Justice Marshall used to analyze Florida Star. In Daily Mail, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a West Virginia statute violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments by allowing the state to impose criminal sanctions on any newspaper that 
published the name of a youth charged as a juvenile offender, unless the newspaper had 
obtained the prior written approval of the juvenile court. That case arose after two 
newspapers published the name of a 14-year-old student accused of shooting and killing a 
15-year-old at a junior high school. As was true in Cox Broadcasting and Oklahoma                                                         
 
53 430 U.S. 308, 309-10 (1977) (citing Cox Broad.. 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)).  
 
54 Id. at 308-09. 
 
55 Id. at 311-12. 
 
56 443 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1979) (citing 420 U.S. at 495 and 430 U.S. 380 (1977)). 
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Publishing Co., the government had made the identity available to the public prior to the 
news media’s disclosure. In Daily Mail, the Court reasoned, “[I]f a newspaper lawfully 
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may 
not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state 
interest of the highest order.”57 Thus, the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not allow 
the government to impose liability for the newspapers’ publication of the juvenile 
defendant’s identity. 
  In Florida Star, Justice Marshall asserted that the Daily Mail principle required 
the Court to reverse lower courts’ rulings for B.J.F.58 First, the Court reasoned that 
neither party contended the newspaper had reported inaccurate information nor did the 
reporter-trainee violate the law by finding information erroneously made available to the 
public by the government.59 And the reported matter pertained to a matter of public 
significance, meaning the article generally pertained to “a matter of paramount public 
import: the commission, and investigation, of a violent crime which had been reported to 
authorities.”60 Second, the Court found that imposing liability for violating the Florida 
statute was not essential for furthering three highly significant interests, which might be 
considered interests of the highest order in some cases.61 Finally, Justice Marshall 
indicated that the state law failed to serve the asserted interest because it was 
                                                        
 
57 Id. at 103. 
 
58 491 U.S. 524, 531-32 (1989) (citing 443 U.S. at 103). 
 
59 Id. at 536. 
 
60 Id. at 536-37. 
 
61 Id. at 537-38. 
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underinclusive, targeting only instruments of mass communication.62 The court held, 
“[T]hat where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, 
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state 
interest of the highest order.”63 
 In a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor 
joined, Justice White asserted that neither Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing, nor 
Daily Mail required “the harsh outcome.”64 Justice White argued that Florida Star 
involved the disclosure of a rape victim’s name from being released in an incident 
report,65 but Cox Broadcasting involved the release of a victim’s name in judicial 
proceedings that were open to the public, which “made public disclosure of the victim’s 
name almost inevitable.”66 Second, Justice White argued that Daily Mail involved the 
disclosure of the name of a person accused of committing a crime, which does not raise 
the same privacy concerns involved when a crime victim’s name is released.67 He 
asserted that the Daily Mail ruling states that “there is no issue here of privacy,” thus the 
privacy issue in Florida Star places that case “outside of Daily Mail’s “rule.””68 He 
argued that the Florida statute did precisely what the Court required in Cox 
Broadcasting—requiring the state to avoid releasing sensitive information to the public                                                         
 
62 Id. at 541. 
 
63 Id. 
 
64 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 543 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Cox Broad., 420 U.S. 496 
(1975); Oklahoma Publ’g, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); and Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).  
 
65 Id. at 546-47.  
 
66 Id. at 543-44.  
 
67 Id. at 545-47. 
 
68 Id. at 546-47. 
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rather than sanction news media for publishing information the state made available to 
the public.69 And he reasoned, “[I]t is not too much to ask the press, in instances such as 
this, to respect simple standards of decency and refrain from publishing a victim’s name, 
address, and/or phone number.”70 
 The dissenting opinion warned that the majority’s holding in Florida Star accepts 
the appellant’s invitation to obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 
20th century: the tort of the publication of private facts.”71 Justice White claimed that the 
majority’s conclusion made obliteration of the tort inevitable. He faulted the Court for 
failing to attempt to balance the right to privacy and “the public’s right to know about 
matters of general concern.”72 Justice White indicated the bright line between disclosures 
of private information and disclosures of matters of public interest should be drawn in a 
manner that would protect a rape victim’s “peace-of-mind.”73 
 Despite that powerful dissent, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the First 
Amendment principle established in Florida Star again in Bartnicki v. Vopper in 2001.74 
In that case, which was filed after a radio station broadcasting a recording of an 
intercepted telephone conversation, the Court limited its focus to the First Amendment 
protections for the disclosure of truthful information of public concern. The majority held                                                         
 
 
69 Id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 794.03 (1983); 420 U.S. at 496).  
 
70 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 547 (1989) (White, J., dissenting). 
 
71 Id. at 550. 
 
72 Id. at 551. 
 
73 Id. at 553. 
 
74 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (citing 491 U.S. 524 (1089)). 
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that a radio talk show host could not be held liable for invasion of privacy because the 
host merely broadcast truthful information on a matter of public import after the host 
lawfully obtained that information. The Court asserted, “In these cases, privacy concerns 
give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”75  
 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that press freedom and privacy both 
serve important societal interests.76 Those rulings have indicated that free expression 
interests should trump privacy interests when disclosed information pertains to matters of 
public importance or public significance, which are more stringent standards than the 
common principle that exempts disclosures of matters of public interest from liability for 
invasion of privacy. 77 The following section explores how state high courts and federal 
circuit courts of appeals have applied the elements of the disclosure tort and key 
defenses. 
 
B. Elements of the Disclosure of Private Facts78 
 During the past twenty years, most state high court and federal circuit courts of 
appeal rulings on disclosure of private facts cases focused primarily on whether the facts 
at hand satisfied at least one element of the tort as a matter of law. Analysis of each                                                         
 
75 Id. at 534. 
 
76 Id. at 533. 
 
77 Id. at 534. 
 
78 Most state high courts have recognized the disclosure of private facts under state common law, adopting 
the elements recorded in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652D (1977). Most states that have 
recognized the disclosure tort under statutory law have adopted at least the first three of the four elements 
described in Section 652D of the Restatement.  
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element usually was guided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D. The 
Restatement says that a disclosure may be an actionable invasion of privacy when 1) 
widespread publicity is given to 2) a true, private fact 3) the disclosure of which would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person 4) and that is not a matter of legitimate public 
concern.79 Most of the rulings turned on the courts’ interpretation of one or two elements, 
implicating privacy values in relation to the publicity and private facts elements and free 
expression values in relation to the matter of legitimate public interest element.80  
 More than one-fourth of the rulings turned on whether the plaintiff satisfied the 
requisite level of publicity.81 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states publicity “means 
that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many 
persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public 
knowledge.”82 In 2000, for example, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex parte The 
Birmingham News, Inc. called publicity the threshold element for a disclosure of private                                                         
 
79 A few rulings, however, discussed a fifth element: whether the disclosure was reckless. For example the 
Supreme Court of Colorado has indicated, “A person acts with reckless disregard if, at the time of the 
publicity, the person knew or should have known that the fact or facts disclosed were private in nature.” 
Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 379 (Colo. 1997) (en banc). 
  
80 See infra notes 81-127 and accompanying text. 
 
81 Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 591 (8th Cir. 2008)(stating that Steinbuch failed to state a claim 
against Home Box Office and Time Warner Cable because no publicity had occurred); Karraker v. Rent-A-
Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2005); Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 
2002); Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 313 (6th Cir. 2000); Roe v. Cheyenne 
Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1236 (10th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 127 F.3d 
879 (10th Cir. 1999); McNewmar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 622 (3rd Cir. 1996); S.B. v. St. James 
Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 91-92 (Ala. 2006); Rosen v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So.2d 735, 739 (Ala. 
2001); Ex parte The Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So. 2d 814, 818-19 (Ala. 2000); Johnston v. Fuller, 706 
So. 2d 700, 703 (Ala. 1997); Ozer, 940 P.2d at 377-79; Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C. 
1993); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 551-58 (Minn. 2003); Hadnot v. Shaw, 
826 P.2d 978, 986 (Okla. 1992); Burger v. Blair, 964 A.2d 374, 380 (Pa. 2009); Swinton Creek Nursery v. 
Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131-32 (S.C. 1999); Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 
558 (Utah 2000).  
 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §652D cmt. a. (1977). But see Pontbriand v. Sundland, 699 A.2d 856, 
864 (R.I. 1997) (explaining that Rhode Island has adopted the publication standard commonly applied in 
libel and slander claims). 
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facts claim.83 That case arose after a male employee of the newspaper made a comment to 
the plaintiff about a sexual harassment complaint she had filed that involved another 
employee. He also made a similar comment to one other employee. The court reasoned, 
“To comment to the plaintiff about the plaintiff's private life is not to give publicity to her 
private life; to give publicity to one's private life, a person has to make a communication 
to third persons.”84 Because the information was not conveyed to the public at large, the 
court determined, “[w]e need not address the other elements of the tort of invasion of 
privacy by ‘giving publicity to private information’ because the absence of the publicity 
element is dispositive.”85 
 Three state high courts considered the vitality of a broader interpretation of the 
publicity element, which would be met by disclosing a matter to a small number of 
people who have a special relationship with the plaintiff.86 The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota and the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected that special relationship 
rationale.87 A 1997 plurality opinion by the Supreme Court of Indiana, however, applied 
a “particular relationship” rationale in its evaluation of whether one postal worker’s 
communication of a colleague’s HIV status to two people could be an actionable invasion 
of privacy. 88 The plurality said that none of the facts indicated the plaintiff and a second                                                         
 
83 778 So. 2d at 818-19. 
 
84 Id. at 818-19. 
 
85 Id. at 819. 
 
86 Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997) (plurality); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, 
Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553-54 (Minn. 2003); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 
126, 131-32 (S.C. 1999). 
 
87 Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 553-54; Swinton, 514 S.E.2d at 478-81. 
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letter carrier, who was previously unaware of the plaintiff’s health condition, had “a 
special relationship . . . such that the disclosure would be particularly damaging.”89 
Recognition of the particular relationship rationale hinges on the likelihood that the 
plaintiff would endure the severe type of emotional harm that typically results from 
disclosing information to the general public. 
 A few of the relevant post-Florida Star rulings turned on whether the disclosed 
information was factual.90 Courts have found that rhetorical hyperbole and falsehoods 
cannot be considered actionable private facts.91 For example, in a 1992 ruling the 
Supreme Court of Delaware treated the true private facts element as dispositive.92 In 
Barker v. Huang, which arose from a newspaper’s publication of false statements 
originally made during a deposition, the court explained that the appellant’s “pleadings 
complain only of false accusations by Huang and therefore fail to state a cognizable claim 
under the ‘unwanted publicity’ variety of the tort of invasion of privacy.”93 That ruling 
affirmed the superior court’s award of summary judgment to the defendant.94 
                                                                                                                                                                     
88 Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d at 693 (citing McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112-13 (D.C. Cir.); 
Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); and Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 
(Mich. 1977)). 
 
89 Id.  
 
90 Campbell v. Lyon, 26 Fed. App’x 183, 186 (4th Cir. 2001)(unpublished per curiam); Barker v. Huang, 
610 A.2d 1341, 1350 (Del. 1991); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 303 (Mo. 1993) 
(stating that the plaintiff filed a disclosure of private facts claim, but the disclosed information was not 
true). 
 
91 Finebaum v. Coulter, 854 So. 1120, 1129 (Ala. 2003); Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 303. 
 
92 Barker, 610 A.2d at 1350 (1991). 
 
93 Id. 
 
94 Id. 
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 More rulings discussed whether the disclosure at issue actually revealed private 
information that included intimate, intensely personal, or embarrassing details of an 
individual’s private life.95 Two considered whether the disclosed information was so 
intimate that its disclosure would cause embarrassment, shame, or humiliation.96 For 
example, in 1995, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc and applying Texas 
law found that a press release IRS agents sent to newspapers did not include private facts 
about a man who pleaded guilty to tax evasion. The release included the man’s middle 
name and home address—information often available from public records—which the 
court did not consider “highly intimate or embarrassing material.”97 In another 2007 
ruling, the Supreme Court of California found that information disclosed at an academic 
conference during discussion of an article on repressed memories of childhood abuse was 
not private information. 98 That discussion revealed that a woman, who was the unnamed 
subject in several studies, engaged in destructive behavior and later worked for the U.S. 
Navy. The court held those facts “were not of an ‘[i]ntensely personal or intimate’ 
                                                        
 
95 E.g., Showler v. Harper's Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 764 (10th Cir. 2007); Dasey v. 
Anderson, 304 F.3d 148 (1st Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 731-33 (5th Cir. 1995)(en banc); 
Merlo v. United Way of Am., 43 F.3d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1994); Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 
1222, 1232-35 (7th Cir. 1993); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 719 (4th Cir. 1991); S.B. 
v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 92 (Ala. 2006); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208-09 (Cal. 2007); 
Steele v. Spokesman-Review Publ’g Co., 61 P. 3d 606, 607 (Idaho 2002); Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County, 106 P.3d 548, 553 (Mont. 2005); Steele v. Spokesman-Review Publ’g Co., 61 P. 3d 606, 607 
(Idaho, 2002); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (stating that a 
corporation does not have a right to privacy).  
 
96 Johnson, 47 F.3d at 732-33; Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232-35. 
 
97 Johnson, 47 F.3d at 732-33. The court applied Texas common law, which requires “the plaintiff to prove 
(1) that the publicized information ‘contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts about a person’s private 
affairs, such that its publication would be highly objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities.’”  
 
98 Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208-09. 
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nature.”99  Thus, courts have suggested that private information comprises very personal, 
sensitive, or intimate details of a person’s life.100  
 Other rulings determined whether information was private by focusing on whether 
the information was available to the public through widespread knowledge or public 
sources.101 In 2006, the Alabama Supreme Court found discussions of sexually explicit 
photographs of female high school students were not private facts.102 The court reasoned 
that “knowledge of the photographs was pervasive” among the students and faculty prior 
to the faculty members’ disclosures: thus “the matter was no longer private.”103 Likewise, 
the Supreme Court of Idaho held in Steele v. Spokesman Review that facts readily 
observable or “readily available from public sources,” such as that Edgar J. Steele was a 
licensed attorney who used a post office box for his representation of the Aryan Nations, 
were not private information. 104 The court concluded that Steele failed to satisfy the 
elements of a prima facie disclosure case against the newspaper because the information 
at issue was not private.105  
                                                        
 
99 Id. (quoting Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998)(plurality)). 
 
100 E.g., Steele v. Spokesman-Review Publ’g Co., 61 P. 3d 606, 607 (Idaho 2002); Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998).  
 
101 E.g., Campbell v. Lyon, 26 Fed. App’x 183, 186 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curiam); Johnson v. 
Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 731-32 (5th Cir. 1995)(en banc); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 
719 (4th Cir. 1991); Steele, 61 P.3d at 610. 
 
102 S.B. v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 93 (Ala. 2006). 
 
103 Id. at 93. 
 
104 Steele, 61 P.3d at 610. 
 
105 Id.  
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In 1999, the Supreme Court of Idaho assessed whether plaintiffs had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy pertinent to facts disclosed by Robert Howard, a deputy sheriff, 
and his wife, Linda, who had monitored and recorded telephone conversations between 
their neighbor, Sandy Hoskins, and her friend.106 Alleging that Hoskins threatened to kill 
his wife in a recorded phone call, the deputy took a copy of the recording to work and 
placed it in an investigation file. The Howards contended that the conversation was not 
private, in part, because the alleged “murder-plot” was a “matter of public concern.”107 
Idaho’s high court said plaintiffs’ disclosure of private facts claim, as well as their 
intrusion upon seclusion claim, would turn on whether a reasonable person would find a 
privacy interest in the conversation. The court said this required a two-step analysis: 1) 
whether the speaker engaged in the conversation had an expectation that the information 
would remain private and 2) whether society would consider that expectation 
reasonable.108 In other words, the court held that a trial court must determine whether a 
subjective and an objective expectation of privacy existed.109  
 Few rulings focused on whether the disclosure at issue would be highly offensive 
to a person of ordinary sensibilities.110 In 2007 in Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of 
Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that “a plaintiff in Alabama must 
show that the defendant’s conduct was so outrageous that it caused the plaintiff mental                                                         
 
106 Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1136-41 (Idaho 1998). 
 
107 Id. at 1140. 
 
108 Id. at 1141. 
 
109 Id.  
 
110 Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2007); Zaffuto v. 
City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 2002); Pontbriand v. Sundland, 699 A.2d 856, 866 (R.I. 
1997). 
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suffering, shame, or humiliation.”111 Nearly a decade earlier, the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island had found that a trier of fact could determine that the state’s governor, who 
disclosed the names of people who deposited money in several financial institutions, was 
liable for invasion of privacy. The court reasoned: “[F]or liability to exist, ‘the fact which 
has been made public must be one which would be offensive or objectionable to a 
reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities.’ This requirement ensures that any disclosure be 
of the sort that could be expected to inflict harm on the person whose private affairs are 
made points of public discussion.”112 Those discussions clearly relate to the emotional 
harm value underlying privacy.  
 A few courts have used tests of reasonableness to determine whether the matter 
disclosed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.113 For instance, the 
aforementioned 1997 Rhode Island ruling treated the unreasonableness of the disclosure 
as “the gravamen of the tort.”114 That standard requires plaintiffs first to demonstrate that 
they expected the disclosed information would remain private and second that individuals 
from the community would consider that expectation “reasonable and would be willing to 
respect it.”115 The case arose after the governor of Rhode Island sent a newspaper a list 
including the account balances and names of people who had deposited more than 
$100,000 in closed financial institutions. The state supreme court remanded the case for                                                         
 
111 480 F.3d 1287, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2007).  
 
112 Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 865 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1(a)(3)(A)(ii)).  
 
113 Zaffuto, 308 F.3d at 486; Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 866. 
  
114 Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 866. The court ruled the claim should go to trial to determine whether a 
disclosure “could be expected to inflict harm on the person whose private affairs are made points of public 
discussion. This issue, of course, involves a factual determination of what would be offensive or 
objectionable in the context of this case.”  
 
115 Id. at 864. 
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trial in which a jury could determine whether the facts disclosed “would be offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities.”116 Similarly, the state of 
Louisiana applies a reasonableness test that balances a plaintiff’s privacy interest “with 
the defendant’s interest” in disclosing the information at issue.117 In 2002 the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s award of $2 in compensatory damages 
for disclosure of private facts because the defendant’s “only interest was apparently to 
embarrass” the plaintiff and to “curry favor” with his peers.118 
About one-third of the state high court and federal circuit court of appeals rulings 
in the disclosure of private facts cases focused on whether the information disclosed was 
a legitimate matter of public interest.119 Some courts have found that matters of public 
concern or significance include the use of taxpayers’ dollars,120 acts of law enforcement 
officers,121 activities of courts or public officials,122 reports of crime,123 reports of public                                                         
 
116 Id. at 871. 
 
117 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 2002).  
 
118 Id. at 491. 
 
119 Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1235-37 (10th Cir. 2007); Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417 
(4th Cir. 2003); Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 132-33 (1st Cir. 2000); Cinel v. Connick, 15 
F.3d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1994); Thomas v. Pearl, 998 F.2d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1993); Haynes v. Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232-35 (7th Cir. 1993); Purnell v. Smart, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24313, at *4 
(7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1992) (unpublished); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc. 925 F.2d 703, 713 (4th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991); Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991); Taus v. 
Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207-08 (Cal. 2007); Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Fla. 
1989); Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655, 679 (Ga. 1993); Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 
822 N.E.2d 667, 682-84 (Mass. 2005); Mulgrew v. City of Taunton, 574 N.E.2d 389, 393 (Mass. 1991); 
Gauthier v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 557 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1990); Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 
600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991); Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 859 (R.I. 1998); Doe v. Berkeley 
Publishers, 496 S.E.2d 636, 637 (S.C. 1998); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473-74 (Tex. 
1995).  
 
120 Loe, 600 A.2d at 1093. 
 
121 Gauthier, 557 N.E.2d at 1376. 
 
122 Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 421; Purnell, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24313, at *7-8. 
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records,124 reports of public controversies,125 or matters ““called to public attention.””126 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that “the commission of a violent 
crime between inmates of a county jail is a matter of public significance,” even when that 
crime is a sexual assault.127 In 2005 in Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that disclosure of information about 
the professional performance of a doctor responsible for an experimental chemotherapy 
protocol under which two patients received chemotherapy overdoses, one of which was 
fatal, was a matter of “public scrutiny and interest.”128  
 Notably, some courts that found the disclosed information pertained to public 
concerns specifically stated that they did not need to consider constitutional questions 
about the disclosure tort because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the disclosures were not 
of legitimate public concern.129 For instance, in Veilleux v. National Broadcasting Co., 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
123 Macon Telegraph, 436 S.E.2d at 679. 
 
124 Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 732 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 
495 (1975)). 
 
125 Purnell v. Smart, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24313, at *8 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1992) (unpublished) (stating 
that allegations of racial discrimination are a matter of public interest); Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 
822 N.E.2d 667, 682-84 (Mass. 2005).  
 
126 Merlo v. United Way of Am., 43 F.3d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Prosser, LAW OF TORTS § 117 
(5th ed. 1984)).  
 
127 Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 496 S.E.2d 636, 636 (S.C. 1998). 
 
128 Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 683 (Mass. 2005).  
 
129 E.g., Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 442 (4th Cir. 2003); Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 
F.3d 92, 107 (1st Cir. 2000); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1346 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Because we find 
the broadcast of the materials a legitimate matter of public concern, we need not address whether the media 
is entitled to immunity from liability under the First Amendment for the public disclosure of lawfully 
obtained truthful facts.”); Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Fla. 1989).  
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     The constitutional validity of the unreasonable publication tort is unclear. To  
     date, the Supreme Court has declined to decide “whether truthful publications  
     may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First  
     and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it another way, whether the State may  
     ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the  
     press . . . .” We need not consider whether this tort is constitutionally viable,  
     because we conclude that plaintiffs did not establish its state law elements.130  
 
Applying Maine common law, that court assessed whether NBC invaded the privacy of a 
professional truck driver by broadcasting that one of his drug tests was positive for 
amphetamines and marijuana. The court found that the general subject matter of the 
report, highway safety and regulations pertinent to truck drivers, was of public interest. 
The court concluded that the identity of the driver was newsworthy because discussing 
his experience illustrated the subject of the broadcast.131   
 In a 1993 ruling in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals suggested the matter of public interest element is related to the offensiveness 
element under Illinois common law. Writing for the majority, Judge Posner stated, “An 
individual, and more pertinently perhaps the community, is most offended by the 
publication of intimate personal facts when the community has no interest in them 
beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a 
stranger.”132 The court defined the line between a newsworthy and an offensive 
disclosure by clarifying the link between the disclosed information and the author’s 
                                                        
 
130 Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 132 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). 
 
131Id. at 133. The majority wrote:  
        We think defendants were entitled to illustrate their messages about highway safety and  
         regulation with new information about the individual subject of their report. Simply  
         reporting statistics about truckers who use drugs, or discussing the details of Kennedy's  
         case without mentioning him by name, would have substantially less impact. (footnote omitted) 
 
132 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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purpose for a book about black migration to the North. Luther Haynes claimed that the 
author and publisher of the book invaded his privacy by disclosing information about the 
dissolution of his marriage to one woman and later marriage to another woman. The 
majority, however, found the information was a matter of public interest because it 
clearly related to at least one of the major themes of the book, “the transposition” of 
sharecropper morality to a “matriarchal and elastic” family structure.133 Because the 
details about Haynes’ relationships were relevant to the sociological transformation 
explored in the book, the details disclosed were “not only of legitimate but of 
transcendent public interest.”134  
 In sum, most rulings examined whether summary judgment was properly granted 
on the grounds that the plaintiff could not prove that widespread publicity was given to 
information that was not a matter of legitimate public interest.135 Fewer cases turned on 
whether the information disclosed was truly private or whether the disclosure would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.136 When reviewing the publicity, private facts 
                                                        
 
133 Id. at 1232. 
 
134 Id. at 1232-33. 
 
135 E.g., Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 591 (8th Cir. 2008); Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1235-
37 (10th Cir. 2007); Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2005); Willan v. 
Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 2002); Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 371-72 (8th 
Cir. 2001); Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 313 (6th Cir. 2000); Roe v. 
Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1236 (10th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 
127 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Pearl, 998 F.2d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1993); Lee v. Calhoun, 948 
F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991); S.B. v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 91-92 (Ala. 2006); Rosen v. 
Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So.2d 735, 739 (Ala. 2001); Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala. 
1997); Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C. 1993); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 
N.W.2d 550, 551-58 (Minn. 2003); Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 859 (R.I. 1998); Swinton Creek 
Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131-32 (S.C. 1999); Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 
P.3d 555, 558 (Utah, 2000).   
 
136 E.g., Showler v. Harper's Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 764 (10th Cir. 2007); Baldwin v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2007); Merlo v. United Way of Am., 43 
F.3d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1994); Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232-35 (7th Cir. 1993); S.B. 
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and offensiveness elements, some courts’ discussions implicated privacy values, which 
will be discussed in Section D and Section E. When reviewing the matter of public 
concern element, some courts’ rationales mentioned free expression values, which will be 
discussed in Section C and Section E.137   
 
C. Free Expression Values 
 Since June 1989, state high court and federal circuit courts of appeals primarily 
have discussed audience-based free expression values and rarely discussed liberty-based 
free expression values.138 One unpublished ruling implicated the liberty-based value of 
autonomy for individual speakers.139 Most cases, however, focused more specifically on 
audience-based values for freedom of expression, namely the marketplace of ideas, self-
governance, and check on government values, or some combination of those values.140 
Regardless of which values were mentioned in courts’ rationales, most of the decisions 
followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s tendency to issue narrow holdings rather than 
categorical rules of law. 
 In a 2003 unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court of Idaho discussed the 
importance of individuals having the freedom to express themselves to the public without 
                                                                                                                                                                     
v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 92 (Ala. 2006); Steele v. Spokesman-Review Publ’g Co., 61 P. 3d 606, 
607 (Idaho 2002); Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, 106 P.3d 548, 553 (Mont. 2005); Pontbriand v. 
Sundland, 699 A.2d 856, 866 (R.I. 1997).  
 
137 See infra text accompanying notes 137-183, 227-278. 
 
138 Doe v. Haw, No. CV-OC-0205441D, 2003 WL 21015134, at *3-4 (Idaho Feb, 5 2003) (unpublished). 
 
139 Id. 
 
140 E.g., Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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censorship.141 Jane Doe and her husband claimed that Tarek Haw and The Idaho 
Statesman invaded their privacy by printing a letter that Doe wrote to the executive 
director of the Board of Medicine at the request of her psychiatrist, Dr. Haw. Her doctor 
included the letter in advertisements he placed in the newspaper to express grievances 
against the Board of Medicine.142 Idaho’s high court affirmed a trial court’s summary 
judgment finding for Dr. Haw and the newspaper because a different conclusion could 
deter newspapers from publishing issue or editorial advertisements relevant to 
newsworthy matters.143  
     Issue or editorial advertisements are commonly used by members of the public to  
     give direct voice to their views on issues of public concern and are a long recognized      
     tool for the expression of free speech. The issue or editorial advertisement gives its  
     maker the opportunity to speak directly to the general public, not filtered through a  
     particular reporter or lost in a broader story in which other views are expressed. The 
     choice of words, the form of the advertisement belongs to its maker.144 
 
Thus, the court emphasized the liberty-based value of autonomy for individuals 
addressing matters of legitimate public interest.145  
 A 1997 ruling by the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals incorporates elements from 
the liberty-based model and audience-based model.146 In that ruling, Coplin v. Fairfield 
Public Access Television Committee, the court applied an autonomy-based rationale that 
incorporated the Millian principle associated with liberty model.147 Applying Iowa law,                                                         
 
141 Haw, 2003 WL 21015134 at *2-3. 
 
142 Id. at *2-3. 
 
143 Id. at *6. 
 
144 Id. 
 
145 Id.  
 
146 Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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the court held that “speech that reveals truthful and accurate facts about a private 
individual can, consistently [sic] with the First Amendment, be regulated because of its 
constitutionally proscribable content,” but only “in the ‘extreme case.’”148 That case 
arose from Randy Coplin’s claim that the committee violated his First Amendment rights 
by sanctioning him for broadcasting sensitive information during a “Sex Survey” call-in 
show.149 The court explained that exposing the sexual habits of a private person to 
“public ridicule” typically would be highly offensive and not a matter of legitimate public 
interest.150 The court implicated the audience-based self-governance value by stating a 
different conclusion could be reached if the individuals discussed were public officials.151 
That tied the press’s editorial freedom to its ability to inform audiences about public 
officials.  
 Another group of rulings linked press freedom to a form of liberty-based editorial 
autonomy and either a general audience-based right to know or a specific audience-based 
checking value.152 For instance, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Lowe v. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
147 Id. at 1403. Thomas Scanlon explained that principle by quoting Mill: “‘The only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.’” Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213 
(1972) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1956). 
 
148 Id. at 1404.  
 
149 Id. at 1400-01. 
 
150 Id. at 1405. 
 
151 Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access Television Committee, 111 F.3d 1395, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1997). 
Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul in turn quoting Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, the Eighth Circuit wrote, “‘[O]ur society, like other free civilized societies, has permitted 
restrictions on the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.’”” Id. at 1401-02 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992), quoting 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).  
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Hearst noted that court had declined to evaluate “the newsworthiness of specific details 
in a newsworthy story,” preserving the editorial control of the press.153 Applying Texas 
law, the court refused “to circumscribe the paper’s coverage in this case by imposing 
judicial rules on what is relevant and appropriate in a story that is based on very 
personal” details that “became newsworthy by their connection to the alleged crimes.”154  
 A few rulings have tied a general right to know or to receive information to the 
audience-based marketplace of ideas value.155 For instance, in Young v. Jackson, the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that Jackson did not invade Young’s privacy by 
revealing to Young’s colleagues that she collapsed and was hospitalized because of 
complications from a hysterectomy—not from radiation poisoning, which her colleagues 
feared also could affect them.156 The majority reasoned that under those circumstances, it 
is “‘more important that information should be given freely than that a man should be 
protected from what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.’”157 In 
other words, that ruling indicated that Young’s co-workers’ interest in learning about 
their potential health risks outweighed Young’s privacy interest, even when the matter 
                                                                                                                                                                     
152 E.g., Lowe v. Hearst Newspapers P'ship L.P., 497 F.3d 246, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2007); Howell v. Tribune 
Entm't Co., 106 F.3d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1997); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, 925 F.2d 703, 719-21 (4th 
Cir. 1991); Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, 106 P.3d 548, 552-53 (Mont. 2005); Young v. 
Jackson, 572 So.2d 378, 384-85 (Miss. 1990). 
 
153 497 F.3d at 251-52 (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 
154 Id. at 251. 
 
155 Howell, 106 F.3d at 220; Reuber, 925 F.2d at 719-21; Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 552-53; Young, 572 So.2d at 
384-85. 
 
156 Young, 572 So.2d at 383-85. The court found that a qualified privilege defense, which provides that 
employees with a mutual interest may share certain information without being liable for invasion of 
privacy, protected Jackson.  
 
157 Id. at 382 (quoting Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897)). 
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disclosed involved intimate details about Young’s reproductive health. That ruling 
favored the free flow of information to individuals, but the limited holding ultimately 
provides little guidance on how much gravity that court would assign to the marketplace 
of ideas value for freedom of expression under different circumstances. 
 Another ruling provides a more classic conception of the marketplace of ideas 
value by discussing the importance of allowing an audience to receive more than one side 
of a debate.158 In Howell v. Tribune Entertainment Co., Tammy Howell claimed that the 
Tribune Company invaded her privacy by broadcasting her stepmother reading from a 
police report during a television talk show on how stepparents and their stepchildren 
“have had trouble getting along.”159 Howell, who was 16 at that time, and her older sister 
had first accused their stepmother of adultery.160 Applying Wisconsin law, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned, “Tammy may not hide behind Wisconsin’s privacy 
law and from that shelter pelt her stepmother with defamatory accusations with impunity. 
Such a privilege would distort the terms of public debate by giving an unjustified 
advantage to the juvenile contestant.”161 Adding that Howell waived her right to privacy 
by volunteering to appear on the talk show, the court found that the show’s producer 
broadcast that material “to prevent the audience from obtaining a one-sided view of the 
quarrel.”162 Writing for the majority, Judge Posner suggested that finding the company 
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liable for broadcasting the stepmother’s rebuttal “would place quite a damper on the 
media’s taste for public controversy, in rather clear violation of the free speech clause of 
the First Amendment.”163 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s rationale in Reuber v. Food 
Chemical News, which was decided in 1991, involved both the marketplace of ideas and 
checking values for freedom of expression.164 Melvin Reuber claimed that the publication 
invaded his privacy by publishing a letter of reprimand his supervisor at the National 
Cancer Institute wrote criticizing Reuber for publishing his own research on whether the 
Institute had changed its position on the carcinogenic nature of a pesticide.165 Applying 
Maryland law, the court reversed the district court award of damages to Reuber. The 
appeals court alluded to the marketplace value when it stated that the First Amendment 
“protects the public’s right to learn about both sides of the controversy through the 
press,”166 and to the checking-value when it declared, “To uphold Reuber’s manifold 
claims would be to disable the government from rebutting charges by employees that the 
positions taken by government agencies were ill-founded, ill-motivated, or even corrupt.” 
The court added, “We think the First Amendment protects the right of persons both 
within and without government to challenge vigorously the conclusions of public 
agencies.”167 Connecting free expression to the ability of individuals and the press to 
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challenge potential government ineptitude or malfeasance implicates the need to keep the 
power assigned to government agencies in check through the potential for public 
exposure and debate.168  
 A few rulings, which examined whether the disclosure of information relevant to 
criminal justice proceedings was privileged from liability for invasion of privacy, 
implicated the audience-based self-governance and checking values for free 
expression.169 When discussing the public’s right to know about judicial proceedings, 
those opinions primarily referred to the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationale in its 1975 ruling 
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.170 In that case, the Court held that a television station 
could not be held liable for invasion of privacy resulting from the broadcast of a rape 
victim’s name obtained from the open judicial records of a public prosecution. The 
interest in privacy fades for information that is available to the public, the Court said.171 
Writing for the majority, Justice White asserted: 
      Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our  
      representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the 
      administration of government generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in  
      particular, the function []the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to  
      bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of  
      justice.172 
                                                         
 
168 Id. at 719-21. 
 
169 E.g., Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 
101 P.3d 553, 562-63 (Cal. 2005); Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (Fla. 1989); 
Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 34-36 (Idaho 2003). 
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Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)); Uranga, 67 P.3d at 34-36. 
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State high court and federal circuit courts of appeals rulings have tied similar reasoning to 
brief discussions of the importance of exposing government agents and agencies to public 
scrutiny.173 
 In one of the earliest relevant rulings, decided in October 1989, the Florida 
Supreme Court recognized the self-governance and government watchdog values of the 
First Amendment.174 The court, however, discussed a more general right to know when 
reviewing precedent under state common law. In that case, Cape Publications v. 
Hitchner, the court found that a newspaper could not be held liable for invasion of 
privacy “for publishing lawfully obtained and confidential child abuse information in a 
story on a related child abuse trial.”175 The court suggested that Cox Broadcasting 
indicated that the public’s right to receive information “assumes special importance 
where judicial proceedings are concerned,"176 and reasoned that Cape Publications was 
serving the checking function by publishing an article the purpose of which was “to 
scrutinize the judicial function.”177  
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Avalardo v. KOB-TV 
primarily relates to the self-governance and checking values.178 Applying New Mexico 
law in 2007, that court found the First Amendment protected a New Mexico news station 
from liability for publishing the identities of two undercover police officers allegedly                                                         
 
173 E.g., Gates, 101 P.3d at 562-63; Cape Publ’ns, Inc., 549 So. 2d at 1378-79; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 34-36. 
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involved in sexual assault when they were off duty.179 Refusing to provide an exception 
for undercover police officers, the court reasoned that such action would “run afoul of the 
First Amendment” because allegations of “police misconduct” and commentary on the 
qualifications of police officers are matters of public interest protected by the First 
Amendment.180 The court stated, “To be sure, any rule of law adopted in this area would 
implicate core and vital First Amendment values, and it is far from clear whether and 
how such a law might coexist with the freedom of the press.”181 The court’s discussion 
relates to the self-governance and checking values, although the opinion does not 
explicitly name those values. 
 In sum, since 1989, state high court and federal appellate court rulings on 
disclosure of private facts claims primarily involved the audience-based marketplace of 
ideas, self-governance and checking values.182 A couple of rulings also implicated the 
liberty-based autonomy value for free expression.183 Those decisions include brief 
discussions of free expression values with little or no discussion of privacy values. 
Another group of rulings, which Section E reviews, mentioned the importance of 
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balancing free expression interests and privacy interests at issue in specific cases.184 First, 
Section D explores how key privacy values appeared in other disclosure of private facts 
rulings issued by state high courts and federal appellate courts since 1989. 
 
D. Privacy Values 
 Privacy literature indicates that individual-based privacy values—liberty, 
autonomy, and emotional health—and society-based privacy values—civility and 
community, forming and maintaining relationships, and promoting democratic 
processes—underlie the privacy torts. Since June 1989, most relevant appellate court 
opinions in disclosure cases did not include specific discussion of privacy values. A few 
appellate rulings on disclosure of private facts have recognized the right to privacy as the 
“right to be let alone,”185 sometimes linking that phrase to the famous Warren and 
Brandeis article.186 Such statements could be interpreted as linking privacy to most of the 
individual or societal values of privacy, especially the liberty and autonomy values. More 
obvious connections to privacy values primarily arose when courts discussed key 
elements of the plaintiff’s case, mentioned the type of harm addressed by the tort, or 
compared the disclosure tort to intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of 
confidentiality, or defamation. Those rulings primarily implicated the individual values of 
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185 Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 417-21 (4th Cir. 2003); Foncello v. Amorossi, 931 A.2d 924, 
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liberty, autonomy, or emotional health with little or no discussion of the societal values of 
promoting civility and community or forming and maintaining relationships.  
 Rulings that connected the general right to be let alone to a right to be free from 
undue pressure or “unwarranted publicity” typically suggested that a liberty value 
underlies privacy,187 for instance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ 2005 
ruling in Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute.188 Quoting the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, the court said “‘[E]very individual has some phases of his life and his activities and 
some facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to 
himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close personal friends.’”189 Using that 
comment in its interpretation of the state’s privacy statute, the court said the statute 
protected plaintiff against interference with her right to control the disclosure of sensitive, 
highly personal, or intimate information, such as “matters concerning her health or her 
lifestyle.”190 Connecting privacy to control over the publicity given to one’s personal 
information and freedom from interference with that control implicates the liberty value 
for privacy. 
 Because the autonomy and liberty values may overlap, it is not surprising to find 
some descriptions of privacy relate to both individual values.191 The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota’s commentary on the disclosure of private facts tort suggested an autonomy                                                         
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and a liberty value for privacy.192 When the court first recognized the disclosure tort in 
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in 1998, it wrote: “[T]he right to privacy is an integral part 
of our humanity; one has a public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, 
guarded and preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall 
become public and which parts we shall hold close.”193 The first part of that statement 
relates to personal agency and identity, which are part of the autonomy value.194 The 
second part of that statement suggests individuals have freedom to choose if and how 
personal information is exposed to others.195 That statement, however, clearly identifies 
the liberty value by name as well as description.  
 In 2009, the federal D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that the individual 
personal liberty, autonomy, and emotional health values underlie privacy.196 In Randolph 
v. ING Life Insurance and Annuity Co., the court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
that widespread publicity was given to private facts.197 Quoting prior cases, the court 
said, “‘[A] cause of action for the invasion of privacy “represents a vindication of the 
right of private personality and emotional security.’””198 The disclosure branch protects 
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individuals “‘from undue and unreasonable publicity.’”199 The court mentioned emotional 
security when responding to the defendant’s assertion that the District of Columbia 
Consumer Personal Information Security Breach Notification Act of 2006, which 
excluded pain and suffering from the actual damages plaintiffs could recover for a 
violation of that Act, was incongruous with the common law invasion of privacy tort.200 
 Some discussions of the elements of the disclosure tort clearly have connected 
privacy to the emotional health of individuals. In fact, the common law in a few states 
requires that a plaintiff must demonstrate likelihood for a disclosure to cause emotional 
harm.201 For example, in 1999, the South Carolina Supreme Court wrote that the elements 
of the tort require the disclosure be of such a kind that would “bring shame or humiliation 
to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”202 Nine years earlier, the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi reasoned that a defendant cannot be held liable for disclosure of private facts 
“unless he should reasonably have foreseen that the person would be likely offended.”203 
Of course, some states incorporate that more general description of emotional harm by 
requiring the disclosure be highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, a 
requirement that relates to emotional harm.204  
                                                        
 
199 Id. (quoting Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D.D.C. 1948)). 
 
200 Id. at 711 n. 12 (citing D.C. CODE § 28-3852 (2009)). 
 
201 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1308-09 (11th. Cir. 2007); 
Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 
S.E.2d 126, 131 (S.C. 1999).  
 
202 Swinton Creek Nursery, 514 S.E.2d at 131. 
 
203 Young, 572 So. 2d at 382. 
 
204 See, e.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007) (stating the court doubted information about 
the plaintiff’s destructive behavior “constitutes disclosure of the kind of sufficiently sensitive or intimate 
private fact ‘which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person.’”); Ozer v. Borquez,  
   
   115 
 A couple of rulings have discussed the mental health value for privacy when 
attempting to distinguish the harm redressed by the disclosure of private facts tort from 
the harm redressed by the tort of defamation.205 In 2009, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania found that a medical clinic’s release of confidential medical information to 
the plaintiff’s employer did not constitute the level of widespread publicity necessary for 
the disclosure to be actionable.206 As the level of publicity required for the tort of 
defamation is distinct from the level of publicity required for the tort of disclosure, the 
court indicated that the primary harm addressed by each of those torts differs. The court 
wrote, “[A] libel claim primarily involves damage to reputation, while in an action for 
invasion of privacy, the central harm to be redressed is mental suffering due to public 
exposure.”207 The court acknowledged that damages for invasion of privacy torts may 
include harm to personal reputation. That ruling, however, emphasized emotional harm, 
suggesting emotional health is the primary value underlying the disclosure tort. 
 In an aforementioned plurality opinion suggesting that Indiana does not recognize 
the disclosure of private facts tort, the state supreme court’s comparison of the disclosure 
and emotional distress torts emphasized the emotional health value for privacy.208 Chief 
Justice Randall Shepard wrote that the tort protects an individual’s “interest in mental                                                                                                                                                                      
940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) (“The term ‘highly offensive’ has been construed to mean that 
the disclosure would cause emotional distress or embarrassment to a reasonable person.”); Pontbriand v. 
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well-being, in avoiding the emotional distress that could result from disclosures.”209 But 
the plurality was not convinced that a disclosure tort was necessary to protect individuals’ 
emotional health in the 1990s as it had been in the 1890s.210 The plurality reasoned that 
that American society had grown “more open and tolerant,” leaving individuals with 
modern sensibilities less susceptible to devastation than were individuals with Victorian 
sensibilities.211 Even if modern individuals were likely to become devastated by 
disclosures, Shepard suggested the tort of outrage provided remedies for severe emotional 
distress.212 Because the tort of outrage includes more stringent requirements for the 
plaintiff than disclosure, the plurality rejected the need to accept the disclosure of private 
facts tort, which it called “outrage ‘lite.’”213  
 Another state high court’s comparison of the disclosure tort and the breach of 
confidentiality tort implies the individual emotional health value relates to disclosure of 
private facts and the societal value of maintaining relationships relates to breach of 
confidentiality.214 In Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina affirmed an intermediate court of appeals’ conclusion that invasion of 
privacy and breach of confidentiality address distinct harms. The supreme court reasoned: 
“Warren and Brandeis envisaged a privacy right that would occupy ground not already 
covered by contract and confidentiality theories. In this sense, if a plaintiff has a claim for                                                         
 
209 Id. at 686. 
 
210 Id. at 691-92. 
 
211 Id. at 692. 
 
212 Id. at 691. 
 
213 Id. 
 
214 Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131-33 (S.C. 1999). 
   
   117 
breach of contract or confidentiality, there is no justification for reviving an otherwise 
invalid invasion of privacy claim.”215 In the explanatory footnote following that 
statement, the court suggested that breach of confidentiality focuses on the harm resulting 
from betrayal by the source of the disclosure rather than the emotional harm resulting 
from the disclosure of the information itself.216 That note concluded, “[I]t is irrelevant in 
a breach of confidentiality claim whether the disclosure of the information would bring 
shame to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”217 Thus, whereas the breach of 
confidentiality tort relates to maintaining healthy relationships, the disclosure tort 
primarily relates to individual emotional health. 
 Comparing the disclosure and defamation torts, however, the Indiana Supreme 
Court plurality opinion discussed above suggests the disclosure tort may relate to the 
societal values of promoting civility and community or forming and maintaining 
relationships.218 Discussing a reputational interest for the disclosure tort, the plurality 
claimed: “Truthful disclosures can be socially disruptive and personally dangerous. In 
many real-life situations, the maintenance of a social organization—such as a 
workplace—sometimes depends upon the ability of individuals to censor themselves and 
minimize internecine strife.”219 Focusing on the potential for discordant relations to 
disrupt those organizations, or micro-communities, the court’s description implicates the 
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societal value of promoting civility and community.220 In that case, Chief Justice Shepard 
suggested the disclosure tort acted as a libel law for truthful information because libel law 
addresses similar interests. He reasoned that recognizing disclosure, therefore, would 
contradict the Indiana Constitution.221 
 The Washington Supreme Court focused primarily on individual privacy values 
although it also implicated relational privacy values when it reaffirmed the state’s 
recognition of the disclosure tort under common law.222 The court’s quotation of a 1988 
decision implicates the individual values of liberty and emotional health by mentioning 
control over the dissemination of information when the disclosure would cause offense:  
     every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some facts  
     about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to  
     himself or at most reveals to his family or to close friends. . . . When these  
     intimate details of his life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly 
     offensive to a reasonable man, there is an actionable invasion of privacy . . . .223 
 
The court implied that releasing intimate details about the decedent harmed survivors 
precisely because decedents and their surviving relatives had formed special 
relationships, making intimate details about decedents’ intimate details for the 
survivors.224 The court held “the immediate relatives of a decedent have a protectable 
privacy interest in the autopsy records of the decedent. That protectable privacy interest is 
grounded in maintaining the dignity of the deceased.”225 The court’s finding suggests that 
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survivors have an interest in protecting the integrity of individuals for whom they care, an 
interest grounded in the societal value of forming relationships as well as individual 
liberty and emotional health. 
 In sum, disclosure rulings primarily have discussed individual values rather than 
societal values for privacy. Most rulings have indicated that a liberty, autonomy, or 
emotional health value underlies privacy.226 Only two rulings implied that privacy serves 
the societal values of maintaining civility and community or forming and maintaining 
relationships.227  
 
E. Reconciling Free Expression and Privacy Values 
 Although both freedom of expression and privacy are highly valued in a 
democratic society, appellate court rulings suggest that disclosure of private facts 
plaintiffs should expect to prevail only in “extreme cases.”228 Rulings that attempt to 
reconcile potential conflicts between freedom of expression and privacy primarily have 
implicated select societal free expression values—marketplace of ideas, self-governance,                                                                                                                                                                      
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and the checking function—and the individual privacy value of liberty. Most rulings that 
acknowledge a clash between freedom of speech or press and privacy have focused on 
the applicability of the common law newsworthiness defense or a similar First 
Amendment privilege. The balancing test applied to assess the newsworthiness of the 
facts at issue in each case generally has resulted in the public’s interest in learning 
information outweighing the individual privacy interest.229  
The 1993 Georgia Supreme Court opinion in Macon Telegraph v. Tatum indicates 
that the clash between privacy and press freedom necessitates weighing “the individual’s 
right to privacy against the public’s right to know and the press’s right to publish.”230 The 
opinion does not identify any specific privacy values, but it clearly implicates three 
freedom of expression values. Quoting its own 1905 ruling that first recognized a 
common law right to privacy, the Georgia Supreme Court wrote that privacy “‘is limited 
by the right to speak and print.”’231  That quotation and text, included in a footnote, 
implicate a liberty-based autonomy value for individuals and the institutional press.232 
The opinion also ties press freedom to the audience-based self-governance and checking 
values for free expression: “A free press is necessary to permit public scrutiny on the 
conduct of government and to ensure that government operates openly, fairly, and 
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to speak, write, and publish as a “liberty” for each individual person or publisher. Id. 
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honestly.”233 Extending that rationale to the facts of the case, the court found that Tatum 
could not prevail in her disclosure of private facts claim against the newspaper that  
published articles identifying her as the sexual assault victim found to have acted in self-
defense when she shot and killed a man who broke into her home and exposed himself to 
her.234  
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Texas also found that a newspaper could 
not be held liable for invasion of privacy for disclosing information that would identify a 
rape victim.235 That court's examination of the newsworthiness of the disclosed matter 
implicated individual privacy and audience-based free expression values. The majority 
opinion grounded the right to privacy in personal liberty pertaining to one's self and one's 
property,236 and it assessed whether Doe’s right to privacy was violated by asking if a 
“logical nexus” existed between the information disclosed about Doe and the subject of 
the news report—her rape.237 The court explained that private details might not be 
newsworthy if they “are not uniquely crucial to the case” or are just related to “a general, 
sociological issue.”238 But Doe’s identifying information, including the general area in 
which she lived and the fact that she had a security alarm, was sufficiently relevant to the 
                                                        
 
233 Id. at 658. 
 
234 Id. 
 
235 Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995). 
 
236 Id. at 473-74. The court asserted that “the ‘right to be let alone’ is as much a part of personal liberty as 
the right to be free from physical restraint and the right to possess property.”  
 
237 Id. at 474. 
 
238 Id. 
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reported crime, the subject of the news report, for the published information to be of 
public concern.239 
Despite that conclusion, the court warned in dictum that it might find the 
publication of identifying information about a sexual assault victim to be an actionable 
invasion of privacy under other circumstances. The court wrote: 
     Newspapers and other media should take precautions to avoid unwarranted  
     public disclosure and embarrassment of innocent individuals who may be  
     involved in otherwise newsworthy events of legitimate public interest. . . . 
     Facts which do not directly identify an innocent individual but which make  
     that person identifiable to persons already aware of uniquely identifying  
     personal information, may or may not be of legitimate public interest.240  
 
That court indicated that statement was a warning rather than a legal rule because 
requiring the media to assess the “individual and cumulative impact (of facts) under all 
circumstances” could have a “chilling effect” on press freedom.241 The liberty-based 
value of autonomy for the institutional press clearly relates to that statement. Audience-
based values also underlie the court’s rationale that such a requirement “foreseeably 
could cause critical information of legitimate public interest to be withheld until it 
becomes untimely and worthless to an informed public.”242 That statement connects the 
disclosure of newsworthy information to a public right to receive information, 
implicating the audience-based marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking 
values for freedom of expression.                                                         
 
239 Id. 
 
240 Id. at 475. 
 
241 Id. The court wrote: “[I]t would be impossible to require  them to anticipate and take action to avoid 
every conceivable circumstance where a party might be subjected to the stress of some unpleasant or 
undesired notoriety without an unacceptable chilling effect on the media.” Id. 
 
242 Id. 
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In 1997, the Colorado Supreme Court wrote that balancing must be used when an 
individual’s right to privacy clashes with the free expression rights guaranteed by the 
Constitutions of the United States and Colorado.243 Guided by earlier rulings by the U.S. 
Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, the state high court applied a newsworthiness 
test to balance press freedom and privacy.244 The court described newsworthy 
information as information the public has a legitimate interest in learning.245 The court 
wrote, “In determining whether a subject is of legitimate public interest, ‘[t]he line is to 
be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is 
entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own 
sake.’”246 That rationale implicates the audience-based values for freedom of expression 
and the individual liberty value for privacy. 
A 1998 plurality opinion by the Supreme Court of California focused on 
audience-based values for free expression by drawing the boundary between privacy and 
press freedom where Warren and Brandeis drew the line in 1890.247 Warren and Brandeis 
indicated that disclosing matters of public and general interest would not constitute an 
invasion of privacy.248 More than a century later, California’s high court wrote in 
Shulman v. Group W. Productions, Inc.:                                                         
 
243 Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I; COLO. 
CONST., art. II, §10.). 
 
244 Id. at 378 (citing Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981) and Virgil v. Time, 
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
 
245 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1976)).  
 
247 Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 474 (Cal. 1998) (plurality) (citing Warren & Brandeis, 
Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)). 
 
248 Id. (citing Warren & Brandeis, 4 HARV. L. REV. at 214). 
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     The sense of an ever-increasing pressure on personal privacy notwithstanding, it  
      has long been apparent that the desire for privacy must at many points give way  
      before our right to know, and the news media’s right to investigate and relate facts    
      about the events and individuals of our time.249 
 
The court asserted that courts historically determined whether an invasion of 
privacy was actionable by “balancing privacy interests against the press’s right to report, 
and the community’s interest in receiving, news and information.”250 It indicated that 
privacy interests could outweigh the public’s right to know when disclosed details “bear 
only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public concern.”251 Rather than discussing 
specific privacy values or free expression values, the opinion focuses on whether the 
disclosed information was newsworthy or “of legitimate public concern.”252 The court 
conceded that the analysis of newsworthiness requires courts to engage “to some degree 
in a normative assessment of the ‘social value’” of a publication.253 The analysis also 
requires courts to compare the extent to which the information revealed is private in 
nature and “the extent to which the plaintiff played an important role in public events.”254 
That connects the editorial autonomy for the press to the general right for the public to 
receive information, which could incorporate any values from the audience-based 
model.255 
                                                        
 
249 Id.  
 
250 Id. at 478. 
 
251 Id. at 486. 
 
252 Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998) (plurality). 
 
253 Id. at 484. 
 
254 Id. at 484. 
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 One unpublished opinion, which was subsequently vacated and superseded, 
applied a similar balancing method and suggested that a plaintiff's individual liberty-
based privacy interest in the context of the case was sufficient to merit a trial.256 In 2001 
in Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc., the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that a trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment for a newspaper corporation based on the 
newsworthiness of information contained in a photograph of a forty-year-old statement. 
The court found that the published information did not implicate the public's right to 
scrutinize judicial proceedings because the statement that Uranga had engaged in a sexual 
liaison with his homosexual cousin, Fred, was not the subject of any judicial 
proceedings.257 That sensitive information was only “tangentially” related to the subject 
of the newspaper's report.258 Thus, the court concluded that a reasonable person might 
disagree with the trial court's assessment that Fred Uranga lacked a “legitimate 
expectation of privacy in a statement regarding his sexuality contained in a forty-year-old 
court file.”259 The court's rationale indicated the disclosure was not protected because the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
255 Id. at 474. “Also clear is that the freedom of the press, protected by the supreme law of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, extends far beyond simple accounts of public 
proceedings and abstract commentary on well-known events.” Id. 
 
256 Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, No. 27118, 2001 LEXIS 71 at *26-27 (June 21, 2001) (unpublished), 
vacated and superseded on rehearing by 67 P.3d 29, 35 (Idaho 2003). The court explained: 
          [C]onstruing the record liberally in favor of Uranga, and drawing all inferences in his favor,  
          we find reasonable people could reach different conclusions from the evidence in determining     
         whether Uranga has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a statement regarding his sexuality  
          contained in a forty-year-old court file. Uranga has also presented evidence establishing  
          genuine issues of disputed material fact on the other elements of a claim for invasion of privacy  
          by intrusion. Therefore, we find the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the  
          Statesman on Uranga's claims for invasion of privacy by publication of private facts . . ..  
 
257 Id. at *29-31. 
 
258 Id. at *16-17. 
 
259 Id. at *31. 
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disclosed statement was not used in any judicial proceedings that would implicate the 
checking value for freedom of expression.260  
 In the 2003 published opinion that superseded the 2001 Uranga ruling, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho focused solely on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression without balancing free speech and privacy values.261 In that ruling, Idaho's 
high court held that the First Amendment as applied to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not permit a court to hold the newspaper liable for “accurately 
publishing a document contained in a court record open to the public.”262 The court 
reasoned that the age of the documents and the lack of a significant public interest in 
Uranga’s identity did not sufficiently distinguish the facts of Uranga’s case from those in 
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn263 to merit finding the newspaper liable for invasion of 
privacy.264 The court asserted that the U.S. Supreme “was concerned about the chilling 
effect upon the freedoms of speech and press if liability for invasion of privacy could be 
based upon the reporting of information contained in records open to the public.”265 It 
also applied the Supreme Court's recognition that reports on crime, prosecutions, and                                                         
 
260 Id. 
 
261 Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Statesman, 67 P.3d 29, 33 (Idaho 2003). The state's highest 
court wrote: 
          The issue before us in this case is whether, consistently (sic) with the First and Fourteenth  
          Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, a person can have a cause of action  
          for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of embarrassing private facts caused by the  
          accurate publication of information in a court record open to the public. 
 
262 Id. at 35. 
 
263 420 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1975). 
 
264 67 P.3d at 35 (“There is no indication that the First Amendment provides less protection to historians 
than to those reporting current events.”). 
 
265 Id. at 34 (citing Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496).  
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judicial proceedings are of “significant public interest.”266 The court indicated that the 
unique circumstances in the case “certainly evoke sympathy for Uranga,” but it did not 
discuss the privacy interests at issue.267 Rather, the ruling turned on the constitutional 
issues that implicate a liberty-based autonomy value and audience-based checking value 
for freedom of speech and of the press. 
 In 2003, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a broad definition of 
newsworthiness to determine whether disclosing a sexual abuse victim’s name was an 
invasion of privacy or a matter of public concern under South Carolina law.268 In Doe 2 v. 
Associated Press, the court stated, “[T]here is some justification for the complaint” 
arising from a reporter’s public identification of a sexual abuse victim, information the 
reporter learned during a sentencing hearing, but courts “do not sit as censors of the 
manners of the Press.”269 Although the ruling suggests that the AP might have exercised 
bad judgment,270 the court found the news service did not invade Doe’s liberty-based 
privacy, or “right to be let alone,” by reporting a fact Doe voluntarily disclosed in an 
open court proceeding.271 The court wrote: 
     Without some indication from South Carolina courts to the contrary, we  
     cannot understand how the voluntary disclosure of information in an  
     unrestricted open court room setting could be anything but a matter of public  
     interest. The nature of the information disclosed here does not change our  
     legal analysis: “if a person, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an                                                          
 
266 Id. at 35 (citing Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 492).  
 
267 Id. 
 
268 Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 420-22 (4th Cir. 2003). 
  
269 Id. at 422. 
 
270 Id.  
 
271 Id. at 420-21. 
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     event of public or general interest, then the publication of his connection  
     with such occurrence is not an invasion of his right to privacy.”272  
 
The court connected the reporter’s presence in an open court proceeding to the public’s 
interest in learning about the administration of justice.273 Thus, identifying the victim of a 
crime in that case related to the checking value for freedom of expression, which 
outweighed the liberty value for privacy in this case. 
 Four years later, a California Supreme Court ruling relied on the Shulman 
newsworthiness test when weighing freedom of speech against an individual’s privacy 
interests.274 The majority opinion balanced the public’s right to know information about 
“Jane Doe,” the subject of a child maltreatment study, and the individual’s privacy 
interest.275 As mentioned in section A, the court reasoned that the disclosed information 
was connected to a matter of public interest and was not of an “[i]ntensely personal or 
intimate” nature such that disclosing it “would be offensive and objectionable to the 
reasonable person.”276 Rather than discuss the potential for the disclosure to cause 
emotional harm that could be redressed by the disclosure tort, the court focused on the 
rights of academics to receive information on the subject matter.277 The court indicated 
                                                        
 
272 Id. at 422 (quoting Doe v. Berkeley Publ'rs, 496 S.E.2d 636, 637 (S.C. 1998)). 
 
273 Id. at 421 (4th Cir. 2003) (“‘[O]ur criminal law tradition insists on public indictment, public trial, and 
public imposition of sentence. Transparency is essential to maintaining public respect for the criminal 
justice system, ensuring its integrity, and protecting the rights of the accused.’”) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84, 99 (2003)). 
 
274 Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208 (Cal. 2007) (citing Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 
479 (Cal. 1998) (plurality)). 
 
275 Id. 
 
276 Id.  
 
277 Id. 
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that articles discussing the original study had shown “it would be important and of 
interest from an academic standpoint to learn the effects of the events described in the 
case study upon Jane’s future development.”278 The majority decided that a researcher’s 
subsequent statements that Jane Doe “‘engaged in ‘destructive behavior’” as a teenager 
and later joined the Navy were relevant to academic analysis of a prominent case study 
on memories of childhood sexual abuse.279 Notably, that rationale implicates a 
marketplace of ideas value for freedom of expression and an emotional health value for 
privacy by recognizing a limited right for academics to learn information that is not 
sufficiently sensitive to cause extreme emotional harm. 
 In sum, most of the courts that mentioned a balancing of interests test or a clash 
 between freedom of expression and privacy issued rulings suggesting audience-based 
free expression values outweighed the individual privacy values at issue.280  If those 
rulings implicated privacy values, the discussion related primarily to the individual 
liberty or emotional health values for privacy.281 Most relevant rulings focused on 
whether disclosed information was a matter of legitimate public concern, with 
discussions of newsworthiness that implicated audience-based values for freedom of 
expression.282 The majority opinions from a few of those cases assessed whether the                                                         
 
278 Id. at 1208-09. 
 
279 Id. at 1208-09. 
 
280 E.g., Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2003); Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208; Shulman v. 
Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998) (plurality); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 
1997) (en banc); Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 32-3 (Idaho 2003); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. 
Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473-84 (Tex. 1995). 
 
281 E.g., Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 4203-21; Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208-09; Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479; Ozer, 940 P.2d 
at 378; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32-3; Star-Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473-84. 
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disclosed information related to the public’s right to learn or scrutinize criminal justice 
proceedings, which relates to the self-governance and checking values for freedom of 
expression.283 Only one ruling involving a balancing of interests test suggested that a 
reasonable person could find that a plaintiff’s privacy was invaded by the disclosure of 
information,284 and that ruling, the Supreme Court of Idaho’s unpublished opinion in 
Uranga v. Federated Publications, was vacated and superseded by a published ruling.285 
In all of the aforementioned binding rulings, freedom of speech or press outweighed the 
privacy interests at issue in the cases.286  
 
F. Conclusion 
 Although one prominent commentator has argued that “it is probably time to 
admit defeat, give up the efforts at resuscitation, and lay the noble experiment in the 
instant creation of common law to a well-deserved rest,”287 four states’ high courts have 
clarified that their states’ common law does recognize invasion of privacy by the 
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S.W.2d at 472. 
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285 Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32-33. 
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disclosure of private facts in the past twenty years.288 On the other hand, during the 
1990s, two states’ high courts suggested their states’ common law did not recognize the 
disclosure branch of invasion of privacy.289 The courts in those six states reached 
different conclusions about the constitutionality of the tort.290 Most state supreme and 
federal appellate courts that have considered disclosure cases since 1989, however, have 
focused on lower courts’ interpretations and applications of at least one of the elements of 
a plaintiff’s case.291 Almost half of the relevant rulings focused on the failure of 
disclosure of private facts plaintiffs to demonstrate that defendants gave widespread 
publicity to matters not of legitimate public concern.292  
                                                        
 
288 Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P. 2d 371, 379 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 
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Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc. 925 F.2d 713, 703 (4th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991); 
Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991); S.B. v. St. James Sch., 959 So.2d 72, 91-92 (Ala. 
2006); Rosen v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So.2d 735, 739 (Ala. 2001); Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.2d 
700, 703 (Ala. 1997); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207-08 (Cal. 2007); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 
377-79 (Colo. 1997); Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C. 1993); Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 
436 S.E.2d 655, 679 (Ga. 1993) (en banc); Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 682-84 
(Mass. 2005); Mulgrew v. City of Taunton, 574 N.E.2d 389, 393 (Mass. 1991); Gauthier, 557 N.E.2d 1374, 
1376 (Mass. 1990); Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991); Bodah v. Lakeville 
Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 551-58 (Minn. 2003); Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 986 (Okl. 
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 Two federal circuit courts of appeals pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not answer the question about the constitutionality of the disclosure of private facts tort 
because it was not necessary when considering the facts at issue in each appeal.293 
Quoting an earlier Seventh Circuit decision, the Eighth Circuit noted, “[T]he Court was 
not ‘being coy in Cox or Florida Star in declining to declare the tort of publicizing 
intensely personal facts totally defunct.’”294 Indeed, some courts have indicated that the 
newsworthiness test separates disclosures that are actionable invasions of privacy from 
disclosures protected by the First Amendment.295 Notably, one court even quoted a Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision issued almost eight years prior to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Florida Star ruling to assert that adopting a newsworthiness privilege or 
legitimate public interest element “‘properly restricts liability for public disclosure of 
private facts to the extreme case, thereby providing the breathing space needed by the 
press.’”296  
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 Courts have discussed the liberty-based autonomy value for freedom of 
expression, 297 at least one audience-based value for freedom of expression,298 or a 
combination of those values.299 Discussion of the autonomy value arose in two cases 
involving freedom of speech.300 Courts tied the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, 
and checking function values to freedom of speech and to freedom of the press.301 When 
courts mentioned the autonomy value and at least one of the audience-based values, their 
rationales related to freedom of speech or press.302  
 When courts discussed the autonomy value undergirding freedom of expression, 
their discussions of the liberty-based value related to John Stuart Mill’s connection of 
freedom of speech to freedom from censorship. The Supreme Court of Idaho emphasized 
the individual benefits associated with communicating “to the public without 
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at 384-85; Svaldi,106 P.3d at 552-53. 
 
300 Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395, 1403 (8th Cir. 1997); Haw, 2003 
WL at *2-3.  
  
301 E.g., Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 421; Howell v. Tribune Entm't Co., 106 F.3d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1997); Coplin, 
111 F.3d at 140; Reuber v. Chem. News, 925 F.2d 703, 719-21 (4th Cir. 1991); Gates, 101 P.3d at 562-63; 
Cape Publ’ns, Inc., 549 So. 2d at 1378-79; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 34-6; Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 
384-85 (Miss. 1990); Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County,106 P.3d 548, 552-53 (Mont. 2005). 
 
302 E.g., Lowe v. Hearst Newspapers P'ship L.P., 497 F.3d 246, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2007); Howell, 106 F.3d at 
220; Coplin, 111 F.3d at 1405-06; Reuber, 925 F.2d at 719-21; Young, 572 So.2d at 384-85; Svaldi, 106 
P.3d at 552-53.  
 
   
   134 
censorship,”303 describing issue advertisements as a “tool for the expression of free 
speech” by individuals, speech that is free from others’ filtering.304 The U.S. Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in a case that involved another important venue for 
individuals’ unfiltered speech, public television, also implied that freedom of speech for 
individuals is very important, and thus can only be proscribed in “the extreme case.”305  
 Some rulings discussed a general audience-based right to know information, a 
concept that implicated the marketplace of ideas or checking function values. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court mentioned another aspect of the marketplace ideas value for 
freedom of speech when it discussed the importance of allowing individuals to receive 
information “freely.”306 The U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed another 
attribute of the classic marketplace of ideas value, allowing audiences to receive more 
than one side of a debate or argument.307 And, the Fourth Circuit related press freedom to 
the marketplace of ideas value when it discussed “the public’s right to learn about both 
sides of a controversy” involving a research institute’s response to a researcher’s claims 
that the institute changed its position on a potential carcinogen.308 That court also tied 
press freedom to the checking value when it identified a right “to challenge” public 
agencies. 
                                                        
 
303 Doe v. Haw, No. CV-OC-0205441D, 2003 WL 21015134, at *6 (Idaho Feb, 5 2003) (unpublished). 
 
304  Id. 
 
305 Coplin, 111 F.3d at 1404. 
 
306 Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990).  
 
307 Howell v. Tribune Entm’t Co., 106 F.3d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
308 Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 720-21 (4th Cir. 1991).  
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  Several rulings implied the audience-based self-governance and checking values 
for freedom of expression when discussing the public’s right to receive information about 
alleged crimes or judicial proceedings.309 A few cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationale 
from Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, tying freedom of expression to “the beneficial 
effects of public scrutiny of the administration of justice.”310 The Florida Supreme Court 
mentioned the self-governance and check-on-government values when it discussed the 
First Amendment protection for a newspaper that published “lawfully obtained and 
confidential child abuse information” in an article related to a criminal trial on that 
topic.311 The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ discussion of a television station’s 
broadcast of the identities of two undercover police officers accused of sexual assault 
also related to the self-governance and checking values for press freedom.312 That ruling 
provided one of the most explicit discussions of First Amendment values and 
acknowledged the conflict between privacy law and press freedom.313 
  Courts primarily provided implicit discussion of privacy values, which might 
explain why more than one individual value for privacy related to courts’ mentions of the 
individual privacy values of liberty, autonomy, and emotional health.314 Courts rarely 
                                                        
 
309 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 
310 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)); Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 
553, 562-63 (Cal. 2005); Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (Fla. 1989); Uranga v. 
Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 34-6 (Idaho 2003). 
 
311 Cape Publ’ns Inc., 549 So.2d at 1378-79.  
 
312 Alvarado v. KOB-TV, 492 F.3d 1210, 1219-21 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 
313 Id. at 1222. 
 
314 E.g., Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A. 2d  702, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Doe 2 v. 
Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417-20 (4th Cir. 2003); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007); Ozer 
v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind.  
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discussed societal values for privacy, and if they did, their discussion only implicated the 
values of promoting civility and community or forming and maintaining relationships.315  
 Courts mentioned the liberty and autonomy values for privacy when discussing 
the history of the disclosure tort or the publicity element.316 When discussing the 
development of the legal right to privacy in America, one even quoted Warren and  
Brandeis’ definition of privacy as “‘the right to be let alone.’”317 In some cases, courts’ 
discussion of the plaintiff’s loss of control over sensitive information implicated the 
liberty value and the autonomy value.318 The Supreme Court of Minnesota wrote, “The 
heart of our liberty is choosing which parts of our lives shall become public and which 
parts we shall hold close.”319 The court connected that interest to one’s control over her 
“private persona” and her “public persona,” which implicates the autonomy value for 
privacy.320 It is not surprising that a court’s discussion of individuals’ loss of control over 
the exposure of intimate aspects of their lives would implicate the liberty value and the 
autonomy value for privacy, considering that both values relate to personal agency.                                                                                                                                                                      
1997) (plurality); Baldwin, at 1308-09; Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 681-82 (Mass. 
2005); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553-54 (Minn. 2003); Lake v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 
1990); Burger v. Blair, 964 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. 2009); Pontbriand v. Sundland, 699 A.2d 856, 864 (R.I. 
1997); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131 (S.C. 1999); Star-Telegram, Inc. 
v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995); Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339-40 (Wash. 1998). 
 
315 Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d at 686; Swinton Creek Nursery, 514 S.E.2d at 131-33; Reid, 961 P.2d at 
339-40. 
 
316 Doe 2, 331 F.3d at417-21; Foncello v. Amorossi, 931 A.2d 924, 929 (Conn. 2007); Ayash, 822 N.E.2d 
at 682-83; Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 553-54; Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235; Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 866; Swinton 
Creek Nursery, 514 S.E.2d at 126; Star-Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473.  
 
317 Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Warren & Brandeis, Right To 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1980)). 
 
318 E.g., Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 682-83; Bodah, 663 N.W. at 553-54; Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235. 
 
319 Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235. 
 
320 Id. 
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 Courts primarily discussed the emotional health value undergirding privacy when 
indicating disclosures of private information cause emotional harm.321 The South 
Carolina Supreme Court stated that the elements of the tort require that a disclosure of 
private facts would “bring shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”322 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals quoted earlier case law when it described privacy as a 
right of “emotional security.” 323 Although a broad conception of emotional security 
could relate to the emotional release and emotional injury aspects of the emotional health 
value, the court’s mention of emotional security responded to the defendant’s assertion 
that a D.C. statute that excluded pain and suffering from the actual damages plaintiffs 
could recover for breaches of electronic security contraindicated the ability for a plaintiff 
to collect damages for emotional harm resulting from a disclosure of private facts.324  
 If courts implied a societal significance for privacy, their discussions of privacy 
also involved at least one individual privacy value.325 The South Carolina Supreme 
Court’s comparison of the disclosure of private facts and breach of confidentiality torts 
related to the forming and maintaining relationships value.326 But that ruling indicated 
that an emotional health value undergirded privacy and the value of forming and 
                                                        
 
321 E.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) 
(en banc); Pontbriand v. Sundland, 699 A.2d 856, 864 (R.I. 1997). 
 
322 Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131 (S.C. 1999). 
 
323 Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A. 2d 702, 711 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 
324 Id. (citing D.C. Code § 28-3852 (2009).  
 
325 Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind. 1997) (plurality); Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 
333, 342 (Wash. 1998).  
 
326 Swinton Creek Nursery, 514 S.E.2d at 131-33. 
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maintaining relationships undergirded breach of confidentiality.327 The societal value of 
forming and maintaining relationships and the individual values of liberty and emotional 
health were implied by the Supreme Court of Washington’s conclusion that individuals 
have a privacy interest that may be invaded by the disclosure of autopsy records of their 
immediate relatives.328 No discussion was found of the other societal privacy values. 
Few courts suggested that they attempted to reconcile conflicts between freedom 
of expression and privacy, or even acknowledged the tension between First Amendment 
interests and privacy interests that Justice Marshall mentioned in Florida Star.329 In one 
sense, courts followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s practice of relying on principles “that 
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the case.”330 But most state high 
courts and federal courts of appeals did not balance free expression and privacy interests. 
They did not apply the limited First Amendment privilege from Florida Star that protects 
the trutfhful reporting of lawfully obtained information on matters of public significance. 
Nor did many quote the limited First Amendment principle from Bartnicki v. Vopper that 
stated, “privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance.”331 But a few applied the First Amendment privilege from 
Cox Broadcasting, which prevents states from sanctioning the press for truthfully 
reporting matters of public interest that are available from publicly available judicial 
                                                        
 
327 Id. 
 
328 Reid, 961 P.2d at 342.  
 
329 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989). 
 
330 Id. 
 
331 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001). 
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records.332 The latter standard, in addition to the common law privilege for matters of 
public interest or general interest, provide much broader protection for free expression. 
Rather, they relied on a common law public interest privilege that provides much broader 
protection for free expression than the aforementioned limited First Amendment 
privileges. 
Several rulings referred to at least one individual value undergirding privacy 
law—most commonly the liberty value— and the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, 
and checking values for freedom of expression.333 Some suggested the free expression 
interests outweighed the privacy interests at issue, but only gave lip-service to the 
traditional concept of balancing competing interests. Most of those rulings engaged in 
definitional balancing, suggesting that publishing information on a matter of public 
interest automatically outweighed any privacy interests at stake. Those rulings practically 
provided absolute protection for the free expression interests associated with the broad 
common law privilege that exempts matters of public or general interest from liability for 
disclosure of private facts. 
In a few cases the courts’ reasoning implicated key free expression values and 
privacy values.334 Those opinions identified either the liberty-based autonomy value or 
audience-based marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking values for free 
                                                        
 
332 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). 
 
333 Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 420-21 (4th Cir. 2003); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208-
09 (Cal. 2007); Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 474 (Cal. 1998) (plurality); Ozer v. 
Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 34-5 
(Idaho 2003); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473-74 (Tex. 1995). 
  
334 E.g., Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 420-21; Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208-09; Ozer, 940 P.2d at 378; Star-Telegram, Inc., 
915 S.W.2d at 473-74. 
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expression.335 After mentioning at least one of those values undergirding freedom of 
expression, most courts did not discuss any of the values scholars tie to privacy. Some 
cases related to at least one free expression value and the individual liberty, autonomy, or 
emotional health values for privacy.336 Nonetheless, courts did not truly balance the 
competing free expression and privacy interests.337 Their discussions focused on freedom 
of expression without actually weighing free expression values against privacy values 
when they concluded that members of the public had a right to receive information at 
issue in that case.338 
During the past two decades courts have crafted rulings that almost always found 
invasion of privacy claims failed on the basis of the elements or the common law 
newsworthiness defense.339 A few courts remanded cases for trial.340 But only one of 
                                                        
 
335 E.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, 492 F.3d 1210, 1219-20 (10th Cir. 2007); Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 420-21; 
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approximately seventy rulings upheld a jury’s finding for the plaintiff. 341 In that case, the 
U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Louisiana law, which allowed a plaintiff’s 
privacy interests to prevail when no public interests were served by the disclosed 
“embarrassing” private information.342 In three cases remanded for trial, the disclosure of 
private information also did not serve any public interests, but the disclosures harmed 
individual privacy interests associated with the liberty, autonomy, and emotional health 
values.343 That suggests the disclosure of private facts tort is limited to providing redress 
for exploitative disclosures that harm individual liberty, autonomy, and emotional health 
without serving any public interests. In that respect, courts provided some consistent 
charting in this area of law, charting that allows constitutional free expression rights to 
limit successful disclosure claims to “extreme cases.”344   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
340 Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1142 (Idaho 1998); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 
232 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Karch v. Baybank, 794 A.2d 763, 774 (N.H. 2002); Reid v. Pierce County, 
961 P.2d 333, 342 (1998). 
 
341 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002)(affirming the award of $2 in 
compensatory damages and remanding for a new trial on punitive damages.). 
 
342 Id.  
 
343 Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 232; Karch, 794 A.2d at 774; Reid, 961 P.2d at 342. 
 
344 E.g., Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395, 1404 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 
CHAPTER 3
Appropriation, the first privacy tort, was recognized by state statute in 1903 in
New York1 and then under common law in 1905 in Georgia.2 More than 60 years later,
the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the conflict between freedom of expression and
privacy in a false light case filed under the New York privacy law, originally passed in
1903 to provide a remedy for appropriation but subsequently applied to false light
claims.3 Because that case, Time, Inc. v. Hill,4 involved the claim that publication of non-
defamatory falsehoods constituted an invasion of privacy, the opinion provided little
guidance for courts attempting to reconcile conflicts between freedom of expression and
the privacy interests affected by the commercial exploitation of one’s name, image, or
likeness.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on only one case involving misappropriation of
identity.5 In 1977 in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court held that
the First Amendment did not protect a broadcast station from liability for appropriation
when a newscast presented a performer’s entire act, which was protected by the right of
                                                      
1 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (LEXIS 2010).
2 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69-70 (Ga. 1905).
3 See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966).
4 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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publicity under Ohio law.6 A narrow majority of the Court focused on the individual’s
right of publicity, a property-based right related to economic harm, not a privacy-based
right related to emotional harm.7 The Court described that right as “the right of the
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors, and having little to do with protecting
feelings or reputation.”8 This chapter does not address right of publicity cases unless they
also involve invasion of privacy claims because the right of publicity is distinct from the
right to privacy. As one legal scholar argued, the publicity-based tort of appropriation
“has nothing to do with protecting personal privacy.”9
In fact, the conflict between freedom of expression and the right to privacy was
only implied in the Zacchini ruling by dissenting justices.10 In one dissenting opinion,
Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall criticized the majority for providing insufficient
clarity and inappropriate “sensitivity to the First Amendment values at stake.”11 Those
dissenting justices indicated that they would have granted greater deference to press
freedom than was granted by the majority.12 Writing for all three, Justice Powell argued
that the First Amendment should protect news media against an appropriation suit
“absent a strong showing by the plaintiff that the news broadcast was a subterfuge or
                                                      
6 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Andrew McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in
Public Places, 73 N.C.L. REV. 988, 1003 n.61 (1995).
10 433 U.S. at 579-80 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 579-80. It is worth noting that Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
which recognized that press freedom and privacy both are significant interests. 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
12 433 U.S. at 581.
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cover for private or commercial exploitation.”13 His rationale involved the right to
privacy as well as the right of publicity, but he indicated that free expression rights are
paramount.14 In the other Zacchini dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens suggested the
majority did not show “proper sensitivity to First Amendment principles” because it
focused on the “reach of the common-law tort” rather than the limits imposed by the First
Amendment.15
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Florida Star v. B.J.F. in June 1989, the
starting point for this dissertation, state high courts and federal circuit courts of appeals
have discussed key freedom of expression and privacy values in a number of rulings
involving privacy-based appropriation claims.16 However, in only one case, in which an
appellant claimed that the privacy-based appropriation tort violated the freedom of
expression provisions of the First Amendment, did a court explicitly engage in ad hoc
balancing of interests.17 Also, only one post-1989 ruling identified by this study has
hinted that a state might decline to recognize the appropriation tort. That ruling contained
no discussion at all of privacy or free expression values, merely noting that the North
                                                      
13 Id.
14 Id. at 581-82 (“I emphasize that this is a ‘reappropriation’ suit, rather than one of the other varieties of
‘right of privacy’ tort suits identified by Dean Prosser in his classic article.”) (citing William Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960)).
15 Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 583 (U.S. 1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 Searches for the key words of “privacy” and (“appropriation” or “use of name” or “use of image” or “use
of likeness”) in LexisNexis, Westlaw, and the Media Law Reporter found 297 court rulings from June 1989
through January 2010. Most of those rulings are not relevant to this study because they were handed down
by state courts at the intermediate appellate level, involved other invasion of privacy torts, involved right of
publicity claims, or involved statutory claims unrelated to the appropriation tort. Only forty-five rulings
involved privacy-based appropriation claims.
17 Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 828-30 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam).
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Dakota Supreme Court had had opportunities to recognize the privacy torts but had failed
to do so.18
In the cases identified in this study, the highest courts in four states recognized the
appropriation branch of invasion of privacy for the first time after June 1989.19 In
addition, in 1998, the Supreme Court of Washington clarified that the common law of its
state recognizes the privacy tort of appropriation.20 Three years later, the U.S. Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that it expected Mississippi would recognize invasion
of privacy by appropriation under the state’s common law if a suitable case arose.21
Although recognition of the privacy-based appropriation tort has expanded during the
past twenty years, little is known about if and how state high courts and federal circuit
courts of appeals have attempted to reconcile conflicts between free expression rights and
privacy rights in privacy-based appropriation claims. This chapter examines that
question.
More than one third of forty-five relevant rulings evaluated whether summary
judgment awards were properly granted.22 Most focused on whether the use of the
                                                      
18 Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1998).
19 Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 997 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009-
10 (N.H. 2003); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 269 (Vermont 1990).
20 Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
21 Am. Guar. & Liability Ins. Co. v. 1906 Co., 273 F.3d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the
Supreme Court of Mississippi would find that an employee of the 1906 Co. committed invasion of privacy
by under the intrusion and appropriation torts by secretly recording women in the dressing room at a store
owned by Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Company and the insurance company).
22 E.g., Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App'x 755, 759 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished);
Zarrilli v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 231 Fed. App’x 122, 123-25  (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(unpublished); Meadows v. Hartford life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 2007); Am. Guar. & Liability
Ins. Co., 273 F.3d at 615; Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1998); Matthews v.
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1994); Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.
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plaintiff’s name or likeness constituted an actionable invasion of privacy.23 Three
decisions reversed summary judgment awards or judgment notwithstanding verdict and
remanded appropriation claims for trial. 24 Fifteen rulings upheld summary judgments
because the alleged appropriation was a privileged publication pertinent to a matter of
public concern25 or failed to satisfy the elements of the tort.26 In four cases the courts
upheld jury awards for plaintiffs who claimed their names or likenesses were exploited.27
And one court upheld a permanent injunction to prevent appropriation.28 The rationales
for some rulings reviewed for this chapter clearly tied the analyses of the facts to key
individual privacy values—liberty, autonomy, and emotional health—one key
communicator-based free expression value—autonomy—and key audience-based free
                                                                                                                                                               
2d 178, 179 (Ala. 1993); Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 997 (Colo. 2001) (en banc);
Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 599 (Ind. 2001); Tannenbaum v. Grady, 604 N.E.2d 16, 16
(Mass. 1992); Simpson v. Central Maine Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me. 1996); Lake v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d
699, 701(N.Y. 1993); Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ctr, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 279 (N.Y. 1991);
Leddy v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 843 A.2d 481, 490-91 (R.I. 2004); Sloan v. South Carolina Dept. of
Pub. Safety, 586 S.E.2d 108, 108 (S.C. 2003); Staruski, 581 A.2d at 273; Reid, 961 P.2d at 335.
23 Zarrilli, 231 Fed. App’x at 123-25; Am. Guar. & Liability Ins. Co., 273 F.3d at 608; Tannenbaum, 604
N.E.2d at 16; Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689; Schifano, 624 So. 2d at 179; Felsher, 755 N.E.2d at 599;
Simpson, 669 A.2d at 1326; Sloan, 586 S.E.2d at 108; Staruski, 581 A.2d at 273; Reid, 961 P.2d at 335.
24 Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 694; Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236; Staruski, 581 A.2d 273-74.
25 Showler, 222 Fed. App'x at 759; Matthews, 15 F.3d at 436; Lusby v. Cincinnati Magazine, No. 89-3854,
1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9144, 7 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished); Joe Dickerson & Assoc., 34 P.3d at 997;
Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 701; Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490-91; Reid 961 P.2d at 335.
26 Zarrilli, 231 Fed. App’x at 123-25; Meadows, 492 F.3d at 637; Am. Guar. & Liability Ins. Co., 273 F.3d
at 615; Schifano, 624 So. 2d at 179; Tannenbaum, 604 N.E.2d at 16; Simpson, 669 A.2d at 1326; Sloan,
586 S.E.2d at 108; Reid, 961 P.2d at 335.
27 King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming a judgment for King
that included an award of damages in the amount of $57,672); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th Cir.
2000) (finding the jury did not err in awarding $100,000 for misappropriation); Bowling v. Bowling, No.
91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992)(unpublished) (per curiam) (affirming a
judgment for Bowling that included an award of $1000 for the appropriation of his likeness); Town &
Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 1995) (affirming a judgment for Riggins that
included a $2 award of compensatory damages).
28 Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 599 (Ind. 2001).
147
expression values—the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and the checking
function.29
Section A of this chapter reviews how courts have defined and applied the
elements of the appropriation tort. Section B explores how courts have addressed key free
expression values in privacy-based appropriation cases. Section C examines court
discussions of key privacy values, and Section D analyzes how relevant rulings have
sought to reconcile conflicts between freedom of expression and privacy.
A. Elements of Appropriation and Key Defenses
Most states have adopted the invasion of privacy by appropriation tort.30 Many
states have recognized appropriation under the common law by adopting language from
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.31 A few states have appropriation statutes, often
modeled on the New York Right of Privacy Law adopted in 1903.32 All the states have
recognized substantially similar elements and privileges for invasion of privacy under the
appropriation theory. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states, “One who appropriates to
                                                      
29 E.g., Showler, 222 Fed. App’x at 759; Solano, 292 F.3d at 1081; Matthews, 15 F.3d at 436; Joe
Dickerson & Assoc., 34 P.3d at 997; Felsher, 755 at 593; Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 234-35; Howell, 612 N.E.2d
at 704; Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 279; Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490-91; Sloan, 586 S.E.2d at 110-11; Staruski, 581
A.2d 269-70; WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 (Va. 2002).
30 Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 999 (Colo. 2001).
31 E.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994); Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound
Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178, 181 (Ala. 1993); Dickerson, 34 P.3d at 999; Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755
N.E.2d 589, 593 (Ind. 2001); Simpson v. Central Maine Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me. 1996);
Nemani v. St. Louis Univ., 33 S.E.3f 184, 187 (Mo. 2000); Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001,
1009-10 (N.H. 2003); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 269 (Vermont 1990).
32 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 1995); FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1998); MASS. ANN. LAWS. Ch. 214 §
3A (LexisNexis 2009); NEB. REV. ST. § 20-201 (1943) (West 2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS §§ 50-51
(LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 9-1-28.1 (1956);
VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-40A (LexisNexis 2009); WIS STAT. § 895.50 (1997).
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his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy.”33 Similarly, statutory law in New York and Virginia allows
liability to be assigned to anyone who uses “for advertising purposes or for the purposes
of trade” the name, image, or likeness of a person “without having first obtained the
written consent of such person . . . .”34 This section will first review how courts have
defined and applied each of the appropriation tort’s three key elements — commercial
use; name, likeness, or identity; and lack of consent.
  In determining whether a particular use constitutes a commercial use, some courts
have used the concept of exploitation.35 In two of those cases, both involving Texas’s
invasion of privacy law, the U.S. Fifth Circuit considered whether the uses at issue
constituted “excessive exploitation” that reduced the value of the plaintiff’s “property
rights in his name or likeness.”36 In another case, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reasoned that an attorney did not exploit the identity of a Massachusetts
Institute of Technology professor of toxicology when the attorney included the
professor’s name in a list of experts he expected to call as witnesses in a trial.37 The court
acknowledged that an expert’s name might be used to provide an attorney with the
perception of an advantage, but the court explained that the attorney’s truthful response
that he had consulted with the professor did not constitute an actionable exploitative use
                                                      
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
34 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-51 (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40A (LexisNexis 2009)
35 Zarrilli, 231 Fed.App’x  (3d Cir. 2007); Meadows v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir.
2007); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1994); Schifano v. Greene County
Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 179-181 (Ala. 1993); Tannenbaum v. Grady, 604 N.E.2d 16, 17
(Mass. 1992); Wilkinson v. Methodist, 612 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Neb. 2000).
36 Meadows, 492 F.3d at 639; Matthews, 15 F.3d at 438-39.
37 Tannenbaum v. Grady, 604 N.E.2d 16, 17 (Mass. 1992).
149
of the expert’s name “for purposes of trade” to benefit the attorney.38 That suggests an
exploitative use must unfairly help an individual in his or her business or profession.
In 2007 in Zarrilli v. John Hancock Life Insurance Company, the U.S. Third
Circuit Court of Appeals found that James Zarrilli and his wife, Carol, did not have an
actionable misappropriation claim against John Hancock Life Insurance Company
because the exploitation was not intentional under New Jersey common law.39 The
Zarrillis claimed James's identity was used to the defendant’s advantage when the
company kept his voice mail message active and included his name in correspondence
after his employment was terminated.40 The court’s unpublished, per curiam opinion
stated, “[T]he Zarrillis presented no evidence that John Hancock acted with a commercial
purpose or sought some other benefit from what it claimed had been a mistake.”41
Other courts have questioned whether analysis of an exploitative use should require
a plaintiff to prove that his or her identity had value that could be exploited.42 In 1991,
the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Larry Lusby failed to demonstrate
Cincinnati Magazine had appropriated his identity by publishing an article explaining he
had been married and divorced six times.43 The court ruled that summary judgment was
properly granted for the magazine because the plaintiff's likeness was used in relation to a
                                                      
38 Id.
39 Zarrilli, 231 Fed.App’x at 125.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 E.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 661-62 (5th Cir. 2000), rehearing denied, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
5632 (2000); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994); Schifano, 624 So.2d at181;
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009-10 (N.H. 2003); Lusby v. Cincinnati Magazine, No.
89-3854, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9144, 7 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished).
43 Lusby, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS at 7.
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news article. The court reasoned that under Ohio law, Lusby failed to show “that the
defendant appropriated something of value beyond the value each person places on his
own name or likeness.” 44 The court continued, “The only complaint Lusby can make is
that the use of his wedding photograph with six paper doll brides damages his name and
reputation . . . ."45 Two years later, the Supreme Court of Alabama applied a similar
rationale when it held that several individuals could not prevail on an appropriation claim
because they failed to demonstrate their identities had unique qualities or values that
would result in a commercial profit.46
Almost a decade later, however, the Supreme Court of Colorado rejected the idea
that a plaintiff had to prove his or her identify had value in order to prevail in a privacy-
based appropriation lawsuit, suggesting that a commercial value requirement was more
appropriate when the claim was based on a right of publicity, an exploitation of a
property value, rather than an invasion of privacy. 47  In Joe Dickerson & Associates v.
Dittmar, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
 It appears illogical to require the plaintiff to prove that her identity has value in
          order for her to recover for her personal damages. The market value of the
          plaintiff’s identity is unrelated to the question of whether she suffered mental
          anguish as a result of the alleged wrongful appropriation.48
Rather than analyze whether a plaintiff’s identity had value worth exploiting, some
courts have focused more directly on what constitutes commercial purposes that would
                                                      
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 179-81 (Ala. 1993).
47  Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1002 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
48 Id.
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benefit a defendant.49 In 2002, the Supreme Court of Virginia indicated that “a name is
used 'for advertising purposes' when 'it appears in a publication which, taken in its
entirety, was distributed for use in, or as part of, an advertisement or solicitation for
patronage of a particular product or service.’”50 Any such unauthorized use “'has almost
uniformly been held actionable.'”51 In WJLA v. Levin, the court found that use of Dr.
Levin's name and image was not an unauthorized use for advertising purposes. Rather,
his name and image were used in promotional announcements on "a newsworthy event
and a matter of public interest."52 That case involved a news station’s use of a physicians
name in advertisements for a news story reporting that several of Levin’s patients alleged
he performed unnecessary “inappropriate” vaginal procedures.53
Courts have found that using an individual’s name and/or picture in various types
of promotional materials constitutes advertising purposes.54 For example, in 1991 in
Beverley v. Choices Women’s Medical Center, the Court of Appeals of New York applied
a test to determine whether the use of plaintiff’s name and photo in a medical facility’s
calendar qualified as “advertising purposes.”55 The court explained that a person’s
                                                      
49 E.g., King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 592-93 (10th Cir. 2007); Beverley v. Choices
Women’s Med. Ctr, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 276-77 (N.Y. 1991); WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 388 (Va.
2002); Town & Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362 (Va. 1995).
50 WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 388 (Va. 2002) (quoting VA. CODE § 8.01-40A)).
51 Id. at 395 (citing Town & Country Props., Inc., 457 S.E.2d at  362).
52 WJLA, 564 S.E.2d at 388.
53 Id. at 387.
54 E.g., King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 592-93 (10th Cir. 2007); Beverley v. Choices
Women’s Med. Ctr, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 276-77 (N.Y. 1991).
55 Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 276-77.
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identity “is used ‘for advertising purposes’ if it appears in a publication which, taken in
its entirety, was distributed for use in, or as part of, an advertisement or solicitation for
patronage of a particular product or service.”56 The court asserted that the medical
center’s calendar, which included the facility’s name, logo, telephone number, and
services provided, in addition to the plaintiff’s image, “is an advertising medium and
promotional publication.”57 The court reasoned that sending a targeted audience a
calendar with “laudatory references” about the center was “plainly designed to preserve
existing patronage and to educate and solicit new clients.”58 Thus, including the
plaintiff’s name and photograph in a product designed to solicit customers was an
actionable use.59
In another case, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether a use could
serve a public interest rather than solely serving the defendant’s commercial interests.60
In Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins the majority concluded that a former
football star’s name was used in a flier to promote a sale, not to benefit consumers.61
Referring to the distinction between uses protected by the First Amendment and
actionable uses for trade or advertising purposes, the court asserted that constitutional
                                                      
56 Id. at 278.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 E.g., Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ctr, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991); Town &
Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 1995).
61 Town & Country Props., Inc., 457 S.E.2d at 362-64.
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protection for speech “‘is based on the informational function of advertising.’”62 The
majority wrote:
      The use was not relevant to dissemination of information to consumers about the
      physical condition, architectural features, or quality of the home . . . . Rather, the
      plaintiff's name was used strictly in a promotional sense to generate interest in the
      sale of real estate.63
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia found the trial court properly had awarded
damages to Riggins because the football star’s name was used primarily to benefit Town
& Country financially rather than to provide information beneficial to the public.64
A few courts have focused on the second element of the appropriation tort,
whether a plaintiff’s identity was used.65 The Restatement (Second) of Torts refers to this
element as the use of a plaintiff’s “name or likeness,” which can mean different things in
different jurisdictions.66 For instance, using a plaintiff’s first and last names without
including other identifying attributes was not considered a use of identity in Botts v. New
York Times Company in 2004 under New Jersey law.67 The U.S. Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found The New York Times, an advertising agency, and the United Negro
College Fund did not appropriate the identity of Lawrence Botts III by using the name
“Larry Botts” “as a generic placeholder for the prototypical underprivileged African-
                                                      
62 Id. at 362-63 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980)).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 E.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1998); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15
F.3d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1994); Simpson v. Central Maine Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me.
1996); Botts v. New York Times, 106 Fed. App’x, 109, 110 (3d. Cir., 2004) (unpublished).
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). See also Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 690; Matthews, 15
F.3d at 437; Simpson, 669 A.2d at 1326; Botts, 106 Fed. App’x at 110.
67 Botts, 106 Fed. App’x at 110.
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American youth” in an advertisement.68 The court reasoned that using the identity of
Lawrence Botts III, a “college-educated Caucasian,” actually would have hindered the
advertisement’s effectiveness as a fundraising tool for the United Negro College Fund.69
Thus, Botts’s identity was not appropriated in the ad.70
However, courts have found that using a name or image with an individual’s other
readily identifiable characteristics could be sufficient to constitute use of identity.71 In
1998, in Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that a question of material fact remained about whether a beer advertisement
featuring a sketch of a baseball pitcher had appropriated the identity of Donald
Newcombe, who played major league baseball in the 1940s.72 It reversed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment for the defendant in favor of Newcombe.73 The appeals court
found that “it would not be unreasonable for a jury to conclude” that the advertisement
used Newcombe’s identity to sell beer.74 The appeals court asserted a jury could
reasonably find Newcombe's likeness was used because the sketch included a pitcher
with a dark complexion, similar to Newcombe’s complexion, who assumed Newcombe’s
                                                      
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 E.g., Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 273 (Vt. 1990). (holding that a telephone
company appropriated plaintiff’s identity when it published a photograph of her, which was accompanied
by her name, job description, and an endorsement of her employer).
72 157 F.3d 686, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1998).
73 Id. at 694.
74 Id.
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pitching stance.75 Although an artist drew another player’s number on the pitcher’s
jersey, the combination of other unique attributes was sufficient for a jury reasonably to
believe Newcombe was identified, the appeals court reasoned.76
Merely describing events from a person’s life, however, may not constitute an
actionable use of one’s likeness, especially when the events are used in a book, movie, or
other non-commercial venue.77 The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined
that describing “general incidents from a person’s life” or life story does not appropriate
the unique value associated with an individual’s identity.78 Applying Texas law, that
court reasoned that the tort of appropriation is intended to protect unique values, such as
reputation or prestige, associated with a plaintiff’s identity.79 The court wrote:
      The term “likeness” does not include general incidents from a person’s life,
      especially when fictionalized. The narrative of an individual’s life, standing
      alone, lacks the value of a name or likeness that the misappropriation tort protects.
      Unlike the goodwill associated with one’s name or likeness, the facts of an
      individual’s life possess no intrinsic value that will deteriorate with repeated use.80
When a similar question arose in a recent publicity-based appropriation claim, the
Supreme Court of Florida indicated that a First Amendment privilege prevented the
fictionalized use of an individual’s life story in a book or movie from being considered an
                                                      
75 Id. at 693.
76 Id.
77 E.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994); Tyne v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 901
So.2d 802, 809-810 (Fla. 2005), aff'd, 425 F.3d 1363, 1364 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
78 Matthews, 15 F.3d at 437 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Wozencraft
“because Texas law does not recognize a cause of action for appropriation of one’s life story and because if
it did, there would be an exception for biographies and ‘fictionalized biographies.’”).
79 Id. at 437 (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, cmt. d (1977)).
80 Id. at 438.
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actionable appropriation of identity.81  The Florida case involved a book and film that
provided a  dramatized story about members of a fishing vessel crew who died when their
ship was lost at sea during a severe storm.82
The final element commonly applied in privacy-based appropriation claims
assesses whether the plaintiff’s name or likeness was used without proper authorization.83
Courts have found that individuals may waive the right to privacy associated with using
their identities through implied consent or explicit consent.84 For instance, in 1993, the
Supreme Court of Alabama reasoned that individuals could not prevail on a privacy-
based appropriation claim against a Greyhound Park for including a picture of the
plaintiffs at the park in a promotional brochure.85 The court suggested the individuals
essentially consented to the use because the plaintiffs would have seen their picture being
taken after hearing announcements that the park was taking photographs for a
promotional brochure.86 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that a
university’s use of a researcher’s name in a federal grant application was an authorized
use because the researcher and plaintiff, Rama K. Nemani, worked for the university
                                                      
81 Tyne v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 901 So.2d 802, 809-810 (Fla. 2005); 425 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).
82 Id.
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
84 Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir., 2008) (per curiam); Christian
Broad. Network, Inc. v. Busch, 254 Fed. App’x 957, 958 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished);
Schifano v. Greene County. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 179 (Ala. 1993); Nemani v. St. Louis
Univ., 33 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 981 (2001); Miller v. Am. Sports Co., Inc.,
467 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Neb. 1991).
85 Schifano, 624 So.2d at 179-181.
86 Id.
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when the grant application was prepared.87 The court overturned a $300,000 jury verdict
for Nemani because the business relationship between the university and Nemani at that
time constituted implied consent.88
Courts consistently have found that consent is a strong defense against a claim of
misappropriation when the use does not exceed the scope of explicit consent granted in a
contract or other written agreement. 89 Nebraska’s privacy law states that any use that
“does not differ materially in kind, extent, or duration from that authorized by the consent
as fairly construed” is not actionable.90 In a 1991 ruling in Miller v. American Sports Co.,
Inc., the Supreme Court of Nebraska found that publishing a promotional brochure with
the word sex above a photograph of a female model was not an actionable invasion of
privacy because the model “agreed to the unremunerated and unrestricted use of her
photographs to sell products . . . .”91 On the other hand, an U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals per curiam ruling in Rivell v. Private Health Care Systems, Inc. found that the
existence of a contract between medical providers and a discount medical services
network did not preempt an invasion of privacy by appropriation claim under Georgia
law for the network’s use of plaintiffs’ identities for purposes not included in the
contract.92 Remanding the case for trial, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that courts in seven
                                                      
87 Nemani, 33 S.W.3d at 187.
88 Id.
89 E.g., Id. Christian Broad. Network, Inc. v. Busch, 254 Fed. App’x 957, 958 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(unpublished).
90 NEB . REV. STAT. § 20-202 (Reissue 1987); Miller v. Am. Sports Co., Inc., 467 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Neb.
1991).
91 Miller, 467 N.W.2d at 656.
92 Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir., 2008) (per curiam).
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states had “recognized that a use outside the scope of the permission granted in a contract
. . . gives rise to an action by the licensor for invasion of privacy.”93
Courts also have considered whether uses were exempt from liability because the
alleged appropriation was privileged under a First Amendment, common law, or statutory
exception for material that conveys a legitimate matter of public concern or interest.94
This, of course, is closely related to the issue of whether the use qualifies as a
commercial, trade or advertising use. When a plaintiff’s name or likeness has been used
in relation to content that addresses a matter of public interest, courts have found those
uses privileged when a real relationship exists between the use of a plaintiff’s identity and
the matter public interest or concern.95 For instance, in 2007, applying Oklahoma law, the
U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Harper’s Magazine did not violate the
privacy of Sergeant Brinlee, who was killed while serving in Iraq in the Oklahoma
National Guard, by publishing a photograph of him in an open coffin at his funeral.96 The
court explained that the soldier’s death and funeral were a matter of public interest and
clearly relevant to the photo essay on grieving deaths resulting from the U.S. military
                                                      
93 Id. at1310 (stating that courts in Georgia, New York, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, and
Illinois all have recognized that standard of law.).
94 E.g., Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 761 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished);
Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1049 (2d. Cir. 1995);  Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar,
34 P.3d 995, 1004 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Tyne v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 901 So.2d 802, 809-810 (Fla.
2005), aff'd by 425 F.3d 1363, 1364 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing,
727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Leddy v. Narragansett Television, L. P., 843 A.2d 481,
490; Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ct., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991); Finger v. Omni
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 144 (N.Y. 1991); WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 387-88 (Va. 2002).
95 Showler, 222 Fed. App’x at 763-64; Tyne, 901 So.2d at 809-810; Groden, 61 F.3d at 1049;  Joe
Dickerson & Assoc., 34 P.3d at 1004; Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552-54; Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490; Beverley,
587 N.E.2d at 278-79; Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 144; WJLA, 564 S.E.2d at 387-88.
96 Showler, 222 Fed. App’x at 763-64.
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intervention in Iraq.97 Thus, the use was privileged because a real relationship existed
between Sergeant Brinlee’s image and the matter of public interest represented in the
photo essay.98
Courts also have used a real relationship test to determine whether the use of a
plaintiff’s identity was privileged even though it served both a commercial use and a non-
commercial use.99 For instance, the Supreme Court of Colorado indicated that a private
investigation firm, Joe Dickerson & Associates, was not liable for using Rosanne
Dittmar’s name in an article about her conviction of theft.100 The article was published in
a newsletter that explained financial fraud investigations conducted by the defendants,
and the court acknowledged that the article at issue involved commercial purposes as
well as informational purposes.101 The court assessed “whether the character of the
publication is primarily noncommercial” under Colorado law by reviewing whether the
content primarily conveyed a commercial message or whether the content related to a
matter of public concern.102 Recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court had established in
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn that information about the commission of and prosecution of
crime are “matters of public concern,” the Supreme Court of Colorado found that
                                                      
97 Id.
98 Id.
99  Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Howell v. New York
Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (N.Y. 1993); Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 587
N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991).
100  Joe Dickerson & Assoc., 34 P.3d at 1003 (“[T]he defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness in
the context of an article related to her crime and conviction is newsworthy and, therefore, privileged.”).
101 Id. at 1003.
102 Id. at 999.
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summary judgment had been properly awarded to the defendant because the business’s
use of Dittmar’s name in association with her arrest and conviction was privileged.103
Courts also have found news organizations’ uses of individuals’ images in
advertisements for news to be privileged on First Amendment grounds.104 To determine
whether a use of an individual’s identity is privileged, some courts have assessed whether
a use is “an advertisement in disguise,” meaning a “real relationship” does not exist
between the plaintiff’s identity and the matter of public interest presented.105 In 2002, in
WJLA v. Levin, the Supreme Court of Virginia found a news station was not liable for
appropriating a doctor’s identity by including his image in two advertisements that
encouraged viewers to tune in to learn about allegations that Dr. Levin performed
unnecessary vaginal procedures on his patients.106 The court reasoned:
     [I]t cannot reasonably be disputed that the principal purpose of WJLA's
     announcements was to promote a report “of [a] newsworthy event[] or matter[]
     of public interest.” It is a newsworthy event and a matter of public interest
     when a physician is accused by his patients of sexually assaulting them. 107
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed a $575,000 award for Dr. Levin and held that a
reasonable relationship existed between the advertisement and the subject of the news
report. The highest state courts in Rhode Island and New York and the U.S. Tenth and
                                                      
103 Id. at 1004 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975)).
104 E.g., Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 444-46, 448 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam);
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107 Id. (quoting Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam)).
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Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals, applying Oklahoma and Ohio law respectively, also
have found that a First Amendment privilege protects news outlets’ use of individuals’
images to illustrate content pertinent to matters of public interest.108
As indicated above, more than one-half of the post-1989, privacy-based
appropriation claims identified by this study were found not actionable either because
plaintiffs failed to support each element of the tort or because defendants demonstrated
that the uses at issue were privileged as expression on matters of public interest or
concern.109 The following sections explore if and how courts discussed free expression
and privacy values when ruling on privacy-based appropriation claims.
B. Free Expression Values
Courts have mentioned free expression values primarily when issuing rulings that
consider whether an alleged appropriation of a plaintiff’s identity was protected under a
First Amendment, common law, or statutory privilege for publishing matters of public
interest.110 Autonomy is the only communicator-based free expression value discussed in
                                                      
108 Showler, 222 Fed. App’x at 763-64;  Lusby v. Cincinnati Magazine, No. 89-3854, 1990 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9144, *7 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 551-
54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703-05 (N.Y. 1993);
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Nemani v. St. Louis Univ., 33 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Mo. 2000) (en banc); Wilkinson v. Methodist, 612
N.W.2d 213, 217 (Neb. 2000); Miller v. Am. Sports Co., Inc., 467 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Neb. 1991); Sloan v.
South Carolina Dept. of Pub. Safety, 586 S.E.2d 108, 108 (S.C. 2003); Town & Country Props., Inc. v.
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the rulings reviewed for this chapter.111 When discussing free expression values, courts
focused on audience-based values in eight cases.112 Relevant rulings described at least
one of three key audience-based values—the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and
the checking function—occasionally in tandem with the autonomy value underlying
freedom of the press.113 Much of the relevant discussion was found in cases involving
state statutory torts, including the New York Right to Privacy Law and others modeled
upon the New York law.114
A few rulings that assessed whether a news outlet’s use of a plaintiff’s image or
likeness was sufficiently newsworthy to merit First Amendment protection have
discussed or suggested the autonomy value for freedom of expression.115 For instance, in
the 1993 case Howell v. New York Post Company, the New York Court of Appeals
indicated that courts in the state repeatedly had found that publishing matters of public
interest would not be considered tortious in deference to the legislative intent for the right
                                                                                                                                                               
110 Showler, 222 Fed. App’x at 759; Tyne, 901 So.2d at 809-810; Lusby, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9144 at *7;
Joe Dickerson & Assoc., LLC, 34 P.3d at 998-1001; Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 559-61; Howell, 612 N.E.2d
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P.3d at 998-1001; Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552-54; Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703; Finger v. Omni Pub. Int’l,
Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. 1991); Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490-91.
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113 Lusby, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9144 at *7; Joe Dickerson & Assoc., LLC, 34 P.3d at 998-1001;
Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552-53; Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703-04; Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 143; Leddy, 843
A.2d at 490-91; WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 (Va. 2002); Town & Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins,
457 S.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Va. 1995).
114 E.g., Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552-54; Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703; Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 143-44;
115 Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 143-44; Leddy
v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 843 A.2d 481, 490-91 (R.I. 2004).
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to privacy law and “constitutional values in the area of free speech and free press.”116 In
that case, Pamela J. Howell sought a reversal of a summary judgment award for the
defendant and support for her claim that the New York Post Company violated her
privacy by publishing a photograph of her walking with another patient at a private
psychiatric hospital.117 The photo was published in conjunction with an article about the
other patient’s recovery from being beaten almost a year earlier. Although Howell had
not consented to the newspaper’s use of her image, the court of appeals determined the
First Amendment prevented the newspaper from being found liable for invasion of
privacy when the newspaper published information clearly relevant to a matter of interest
to the public.118 The court reasoned that it had been “reluctant to intrude upon reasonable
editorial judgments in determining whether there is a real relationship between an article
and photograph.”119 The court’s rationale involved the autonomy value for freedom of the
press because it acknowledged the importance of allowing the individual news entity to
decide what constitutes news.
When courts have discussed the importance of allowing publishers or news
outlets to provide an unfettered free flow of information, the courts’ commentary has
involved the communicator-based autonomy value and the audience-based marketplace
of ideas value for freedom of expression.120 For instance, in Groden v. Random House
                                                      
116 Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703 (citing Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d at 143-44).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 704.
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Publishing, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals found summary judgment was
properly awarded to the defendant because the First Amendment protected the
publisher’s use of Robert J. Groden’s likeness in an advertisement incidental to a book
involving a matter of public interest.121 Groden’s name and photograph were published in
an advertisement for Case Closed, Gerald Posner’s book about the assassination of
President Kennedy, a matter of public interest.122 The court explained that the publication
of Groden’s name fell under the incidental use exception that recognizes a right for
“‘news disseminators to publicize, to make public, their own communications.”123 That
ruling added that the New York privacy law was designed “to protect privacy without
preventing publication of matters of public interest.” 124 The court continued, “At least
since Time, Inc. v. Hill, the New York courts have been vigilant in interpreting the right
of privacy to permit the free flow of information.”125 The court’s mention of a free flow
of information relates generally to the audience-based marketplace of ideas value,
implying the public has a right to receive and to discuss information.126
Five years later, a New York Court of Appeals per curiam ruling also implicated
the marketplace of ideas value for freedom of expression when it discussed whether a
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magazine’s alleged appropriation was a privileged publication of a matter of public
interest.127 In Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, the court found that the publishing
corporation did not invade a 14-year-old’s privacy when it used her photograph to
illustrate its “Love Crisis” column in 1995.128 Although a jury awarded Messenger
$100,000 in damages because YM’s use of her image created the false implication that
Messenger wrote the letter, the state high court asserted that the newsworthiness privilege
extended to YM’s juxtaposition of Messenger’s picture with a column about a young
woman getting drunk and having sex with multiple partners.129 The court reasoned:
     Consistent with the statutory—and constitutional—value of uninhibited discussion
     of newsworthy topics, we have time and again held that, where a plaintiff's picture
     is used to illustrate an article on a matter of public interest, there can be no liability
     under sections 50 and 51 unless the picture has no real relationship to the article
     or the article is an advertisement in disguise.130
Mentioning the “value of uninhibited discussion” connects the court’s rationale to the
audience-based marketplace of ideas value for freedom of speech and of the press.131
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruling in Leddy v. Narragansett
Television, L.P., focused on the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking
values for freedom of expression when the court found the television station’s use of
Leddy’s likeness was a privileged incidental use.132 The appropriation claim arose from
Channel 12’s use of Gerald A. Leddy’s name and image in promotions for a three-part
                                                      
127 Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 550-51 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam).
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investigative series on public employees who collected tax-free disability pensions from a
city and paychecks from the state.133 The court determined that the promotional uses were
protected under the First Amendment.134 The Rhode Island Supreme Court supported that
conclusion with quotations from U.S. Supreme Court rulings that relate to the
marketplace of ideas as well as the self-governance and checking values for freedom of
the press.135 Quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, a case involving defamation of a public
official, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island tied First Amendment protection for free
speech to the need for ‘“debate on public issues”’ to ‘“be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.’”136 Next, the court connected freedom of expression to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
‘“recognition of the fundamental importance of the free-flow of ideas and opinions on
matters of public interest and concern’” in Hustler v. Falwell, a case involving a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress by a public figure.137
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized key First Amendment
principles in Leddy, the court scolded Channel 12 for focusing its “attention on low-level
government employees and others who do not deserve to bear the brunt of such base
antics.”138 The court’s ruling related the investigative series to the “disreputable aspects
of ‘ambush journalism’” even though the subject matter presented in the Channel 12
                                                      
133 Id. at 484-85.
134 Id. at 490-91.
135 Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50
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136 Id. at 490 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
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series related directly to the self-governance and checking values for freedom of
expression.139 The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, justifying its
conclusion by stating, “[I]t is not our place to serve as the censors of journalistic
discretion.”140 In a different context, that statement could suggest the importance of
editorial autonomy rather than suggest the court’s sensitivity to injuries Leddy sustained.
In summary, when courts discussed key free expression values they primarily
found that summary judgment was awarded properly to defendants or that awards granted
to plaintiffs should be reversed.141 A few rulings tied press freedom to the communicator-
based autonomy value when courts explained their reluctance to censor content involving
a matter of public interest.142 Courts more often tied freedom of speech or press to the
audience-based marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking values.143 Section D
explores if and how courts attempted to reconcile conflicts between privacy and freedom
of expression by discussing key values at stake. First, however, Section C explores if and
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how state high courts and federal circuit courts of appeals have discussed key privacy
values in privacy-based appropriation cases.
C. Privacy Values
During the past 20 years, state high courts and federal courts of appeals have
discussed primarily individual, rather than societal, values for privacy.144 That contrasts
with the tendency to implicate audience-based free expression values that generally
benefit society.145 Almost half the relevant rulings on privacy-based appropriation claims
have implied that the appropriation tort provides redress for harm to the individual values
of autonomy, liberty, or emotional health.146  Only one ruling implicated the societal
privacy value of forming and maintaining relationships.147
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When courts have discussed the elements of invasion of privacy by appropriation,
some have mentioned the value of individual identity, or personality, associated with the
autonomy value for privacy.148 For instance, in King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit focused on the value of identity when it
affirmed a trial court's denial of the consulting firm’s request for a new trial. That ruling
allowed a jury verdict, which awarded Michael King $57,672 for invasion of privacy by
appropriation, to stand. After King resigned from the consulting firm to work for a
competitor, the firm “continued to distribute promotional materials listing King as the
contact person for PA's Wholesale Energy Markets Practice.”149 King alleged that PA
employees changed a voicemail message “to indicate King was unavailable, but that the
caller should leave a message.”150 King also claimed that his replacement had all of
King’s email messages forwarded to King’s replacement. King argued that the firm was
using his name and identity to its commercial advantage. And the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit found the firm’s misuse of King’s name constituted an invasion of
privacy under Colorado law. 151 That finding involved the diminution of King’s personal
agency for his professional identity, which harmed personal autonomy.
Similarly, when the Supreme Court of New Hampshire’s ruling in Remsburg v.
Docusearch, Inc. recognized the appropriation tort under the state’s common law, the
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court suggested an autonomy value and liberty value for privacy.152 Helen Remsburg, the
administrator of the estate of Amy Lynn Boyer, filed the appropriation case after an
information broker sold Boyer’s address, Social Security number, and other personal
information to the man who killed Boyer.153 The court explained that the interest
protected by the tort “‘is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own
identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may
be of benefit to him or to others.’”154 That description relates to an individual’s interest in
controlling the use of his or her identity through which each person expresses
individuality, the core of personal autonomy. Adding that appropriation is only actionable
if the use at issue takes advantage of the individual’s ‘“reputation, prestige or other
value’” specifically associated with the plaintiff’s identity, the court reasoned that the
investigator sold the “information for the value of the information itself, not to take
advantage of the person's reputation or prestige.”155 Thus, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire concluded that Boyer’s privacy was not invaded because her identity was not
exploited, and therefore, the autonomy and liberty interests at issue were not harmed.156
Other rulings also have discussed the autonomy and liberty values for privacy.157
For instance, when the Supreme Court of Minnesota first recognized the appropriation
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171
tort, as well as disclosure of private fact and intrusion, under the state’s common law in
1998 in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court stated, “Appropriation protects an
individual’s identity.”158 As mentioned previously, identity is related to individuality,
personality, and thus, personal autonomy. In discussing its decision to recognize the three
privacy torts, the Minnesota court added, “The heart of our liberty is choosing which
parts of our lives shall become public and which parts we shall hold close.”159 Choosing
which aspects of one’s personal life to expose to others relates to the liberty value for
privacy. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings dismissing the
appropriation, disclosure and intrusion claims and remanded the case for trial.160 Elli
Lake and Melissa Weber had charged Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. with all four types of
invasion of privacy for allowing at least one image of the women standing together naked
in a shower to circulate after the film was taken to a Wal-Mart store for processing.161
The court reasoned: “One's naked body is a very private part of one’s person and
generally known to others only by choice. This is a type of privacy interest worthy of
protection.”162 While the Minnesota court was referring to the privacy torts in general,
rather than specifically to appropriation, that rationale relates directly to an individual’s
sense of personal dignity and bodily integrity, or personal liberty, by suggesting the
distribution of the photographs revoked the individuals’ control over when and how
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others viewed their naked bodies. Losing that control harmed Lake’s and Weber’s liberty
as well as their autonomy.
Two more rulings referred to the individual privacy values of liberty and
autonomy when discussing appropriation as an exploitation of one’s identity or
personality that harms individuality and undermines one’s freedom to control the flow of
information about one’s self.163 In Sloan v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 2003 defined the right to privacy as “the right to
be let alone; the right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity.”164 Sloan
claimed her privacy was invaded when the State of South Carolina sold her driver’s
license information to Image Data. The ruling included the South Carolina common law
definition for the appropriation tort, a “wrongful appropriation of personality.”165 That
definition relates to the liberty value that is harmed when an individual loses the agency
to protect her personality from exploitation by others. The court’s explanation of the tort
also overlaps with the autonomy value, or the right to control one’s individuality, or
“personal identity.”166 After clarifying the parameters of the privacy-based appropriation
tort, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s award of summary
judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff had not demonstrated the facts were
actionable. The court explained that a 1997 act passed by the state’s legislature allowed
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driver’s license information to be sold. “Because the 1997 Act authorized the transaction
between Image Data and DPS, Image Data did not misappropriate Sloan's driver's license
information and photograph,” the court said.167
When the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized the appropriation tort under the
common law of Colorado in Dickerson & Associates v. Dittmar in 2001, the ruling
described autonomy, liberty, and emotional health values for privacy.168 That case arose
because Joe Dickerson’s private investigation firm published an article in a newsletter
stating that Rosanne Dittmar had been convicted after the firm investigated her
involvement in the theft of bearer bonds from her place of employment.169 Finding that
Dittmar’s privacy had not been invaded, the court quoted from the 1890 Harvard Law
Review article “The Right To Privacy,” stating that privacy law would protect the
“‘general immunity of the person—the right to one’s personality’” and “‘the individual’s
right ‘to be let alone.’”170 As personality relates directly to the autonomy value for
privacy, the right “to be let alone” relates directly to the personal liberty value. In
discussing the evolution of privacy law, the majority also mentioned a mental health
value for privacy. The court explained that states have allowed individuals to “recover for
personal injuries such as mental anguish and injured feelings,”171 and the injury resulting
from appropriation of identity “may be ‘mental and subjective’—in the nature of
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humiliation, embarrassment, and outrage.”172 Although the Supreme Court of Colorado
discussed those individual values for privacy, the majority concluded that the information
at issue in Dittmar’s claim was a privileged publication of a matter of public interest. In
fact, a concurring opinion criticized for the majority for recognizing the tort when the
facts at issue did not constitute a tortious invasion of privacy.173
Although key literature has included both emotional release and protection from
emotional injuries under the mental health value, state high courts and federal circuit
courts of appeals have focused primarily on the privacy-based appropriation tort as a
shield from emotional harm. One ruling in which a state court first recognized the
privacy-based appropriation tort discussed an emotional health value for the right to
privacy. 174 In that 1990 ruling, Staruski v. Continental Telephone Company of Vermont,
the Supreme Court of Vermont reasoned that the plaintiff did not need to prove that her
identity had “pecuniary value” in order to receive damages for the appropriation of her
name.175 Staruski sued her employer for using her name and photograph in an
advertisement for the company even though she refused to participate in the company’s
advertising. The Vermont Supreme Court found that courts in other jurisdictions had
awarded damages even when the “‘injury suffered is mental anguish alone.’”176
Upholding an award of damages for Staruski, the court wrote that Staruski “feared
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harassment” and Continental’s management “showed ‘a reckless or wanton disregard’ of
her rights” by ignoring her request not to include her name and photograph in an
advertisement for the company.177 That rationale, accordingly, relates to the individual
mental health value as well as the individual liberty value for privacy.
In addition to mentioning at least one individual privacy value, two rulings
involved a societal value for privacy, promoting civility and community.178 In 1998 in
Reid v. Pierce, the Supreme Court of Washington considered whether plaintiffs’ privacy
was invaded by county employees’ unauthorized public displays of plaintiffs’ relatives’
autopsy photographs.179 The court held “the immediate relatives of a decedent have a
protectable privacy interest in the autopsy records of the decedent.” 180 The court
continued, “That protectable privacy interest is grounded in maintaining the dignity of the
deceased.”181 Thus, the court’s ruling that the Reid family’s privacy could have been
invaded by the county employees’ exploitation of their deceased relative was undergirded
by the autonomy of their deceased relative.182 The court’s rationale relates to the privacy
value of civility and community because the county employees failed to extend a basic
form of respect to the deceased and their relatives.183 In Showler v. Harper’s Magazine,
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Inc., the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that under Oklahoma
law a news magazine’s publication of photographs of an Oklahoma National Guard
member in his coffin at a public funeral was different than the gruesome autopsy
photographs at issue in Reid v. Pierce.184 In Showler, the Tenth Circuit explained that the
funeral photographs of Sergeant Brinlee clearly involved a matter of public interest and
thus were not the type of images that could harm the privacy of Brinlee’s relatives by
offending community standards of decency.185
In summary, relevant rulings primarily explored three individual values for
privacy—the autonomy, liberty, and emotional health values.186 References to liberty or
autonomy typically arose when courts discussed the development of privacy torts or the
right to control the use of one’s identity.187 And some discussion of the emotional health
value resulted from plaintiffs’ claimed injuries.188 Although relevant rulings often
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mentioned one or more individual privacy values, especially when courts recognized an
appropriation tort for the first time under state common law, only two rulings involved a
societal privacy value, promoting civility and community.189 The following section
explores if and how courts have reconciled conflicts between freedom of expression and
privacy values.
D. Reconciling Free Expression and Privacy Values
Few privacy-based appropriation rulings discussed both free expression values
and privacy values,190 and in only one case did the court explicitly attempt to balance free
expression and privacy values.191 In a couple of cases, courts allowed the elements of the
tort or defenses to delineate the boundaries between free expression and privacy rights as
if those boundaries prevented free expression and privacy values from conflicting, thus
negating the need for ad hoc balancing.192
In a 1994 case, Doe v. Roe, the Supreme Court of Alabama analyzed whether the
use of plaintiff’s adoptive children’s identities was actionable under the appropriation tort
or privileged under the free speech and free press provision of the Alabama
Constitution.193 John Roe filed the invasion of privacy claim on behalf of his children,
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alleging that Jane Doe would invade the privacy of the children if she distributed a novel
based on the murder of the children’s natural mother by their father. Roe argued that
distributing the book would harm the children “by appropriating a tragic event in their
lives for commercial gain.”194 The Alabama Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a trial
court erred by issuing a temporary restraining order to prevent Doe from distributing the
story.
The court held that Doe’s novel did not violate the children’s personality-based
privacy interest, which literature has associated with autonomy, or society’s privacy
interest in promoting civility and community because the novel was “based on events of
public interest.”195 The court explained, “Doe’s novel possesses social worth and is a
significant medium for the communication of her ideas about an event in which society
has an interest.”196 That rationale recognized non-specific communicator-based and
audience-based values for free expression, but it did not suggest that expression serving
those values would always outweigh the values underlying the appropriation tort. The
court implied that privacy interests might overcome free expression interests under
different circumstances, stating that Doe “may not exercise” her free speech “right in a
manner that will injure the children’s right to privacy.”197 Distribution of the novel,
however, did not violate those rights.198 Distributing information that was already
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available to the public and was matter of public concern could not offend community
standards of decency, associated with the social value of promoting civility and
community, or a personal interest in agency, associated with the individual privacy values
of autonomy and liberty.
During the past twenty years, ad hoc balancing was not used in states where
privacy is recognized by statute.199 The New York Court of Appeals said balancing free
expression and privacy interests was not a job for the court because privacy is recognized
by statute in the state.200 The court wrote, “Balancing the competing policy concerns
underlying tort recovery for invasion of privacy is best left to the Legislature . . . .”201 The
court explained that the statute only applies to uses for advertising or trade purposes and
courts have held that uses for news purposes are exempt from liability. “This is both a
matter of legislative intent and a reflection of constitutional values in the area of free
speech and free press,” the court wrote.202 As mentioned previously, in Howell v. New
York Post, Inc., the court indicated that the New York Post had not invaded Pamela J.
Howell’s privacy by publishing a photograph of Howell walking with another patient at a
private psychiatric hospital.203 The court reasoned that the newspaper’s use of the
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photograph was privileged because the photograph was related to the subject of an article
about the other patient’s recovery from being beaten by her lover, the man accused of
killing the patient’s six-year-old adoptive daughter. That reasoning was grounded by the
court’s previous interpretations of a newsworthiness exception that corresponds to
constitutional concerns about penalizing the publication of truthful information.204 The
New York Court of Appeals wrote, “Balancing the competing policy concerns underlying
tort recovery for invasion of privacy is best left to the Legislature . . . .”205 Thus, the
ruling reconciled the potential conflict between press freedom and privacy by applying
the newsworthiness exception rather than by engaging in overt balancing of free
expression or privacy values.
In a 1995 ruling in Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, the Supreme
Court of Virginia found no need to engage in ad hoc balancing because the speech at
issue, a flier designed to sell the house where John Riggins once lived, primarily served
the advertiser’s interest in promoting a sale rather than the public’s interest in receiving
information that could benefit the public.206 The court disagreed with the defendant’s
assertion that a trial court violated the free speech provisions of the First Amendment and
the Virginia Constitution by awarding damages to the plaintiff for invasion of privacy by
appropriation.207 The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court had tied First
Amendment protection for commercial speech to the informational function that speech
                                                                                                                                                               
204 Id.
205 Id. at 703.
206 Town & Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 363-64 (Va. 1995).
207 Id.
181
serves for message recipients.208 Thus, the state court reasoned that Virginia’s privacy
law “is not constitutionally invalid” as applied to award the football star damages for
appropriation because the published information did not serve the audience-based values
that the Court has tied to the protection afforded to speech that promotes a product or
sale.209 That suggests the court did not need to weigh competing interests because the
court defined the use of Riggins’ name as expression unrelated to core constitutional
values for freedom of expression.
In summary, most courts did not engage in balancing free expression values and
privacy values when attempting to reconcile conflicts between the right to publish and the
right to privacy in the appropriation cases studied in this research. 210 The only ruling that
did seek to balance free expression and privacy interests compared broad communicator
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and audience-based free expression values to the individual privacy values of autonomy
and liberty.211 While the Supreme Court of Alabama in Doe v. Roe suggested that privacy
interests might overcome free expression interests under different circumstances, the
court concluded that the alleged appropriation of the plaintiff’s children’s life stories did
not invade the children’s privacy.212 The New York Court of Appeals in another case
only mentioned balancing free expression and privacy values when it assigned the job of
balancing competing policy interests to state legislators.213 And the Virginia Supreme
Court found no need to engage in balancing when it determined the use of a plaintiff’s
name for advertising purposes was not protected expression.
E. Conclusion
Recognition of the common law invasion of privacy by appropriation tort has
expanded during the past twenty years.214 The highest courts in four states recognized the
privacy-based appropriation tort for the first time after the U.S. Supreme Court suggested
in 1989 in Florida Star v. B.J.F. that privacy and freedom of expression are both
significant interests.215 To date, more than half of the states have recognized an invasion
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of privacy by appropriation tort.216 And only one ruling reviewed for this chapter has
indicated that the invasion of privacy by appropriation tort might not be recognized under
a state’s law.217 Most other rulings focused on whether the use was a privileged
publication of newsworthy information or whether the plaintiff satisfied the three
elements of the tort—commercial use of name or likeness without authorization.218
Courts have discussed individual privacy values when considering the
commercial use element. Several rulings implicated the liberty, autonomy, or emotional
health privacy values when assessing whether a defendant exploited an individual’s
identity by using her name, image, or likeness for the purpose of advertising a product or
service.219 Courts have found that actionable uses for advertising purposes include
publishing a former football star’s name in a flier promoting the sale of a home and using
a physician’s name in a medical center’s calendar sent to solicit patrons. Those uses
harmed the plaintiffs’ autonomy and liberty. 220  The court’s consideration of whether the
flier’s use of the football player’s name was actionable also related to the emotional
health value because the player alleged he felt “humiliated” and “violated” by the
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exploitation of his name.221 A Supreme Court of Massachusetts’ ruling that defined a
commercial use as an exploitative use for trade purposes related to the individual liberty
value for privacy. The court reasoned that that an attorney had not used a professor’s
name for trade purposes when he included the professor’s name in a list of experts he
expected to call as witnesses because the attorney had talked with the professor and
considered using the professor as an expert witness. 222
Courts’ discussion of the use of identity, name, or likeness primarily related to the
individual privacy values of autonomy and liberty.223 A few courts found that uses of
individuals’ life stories did not exploit their names or likenesses when those stories were
already available to the public prior to the alleged appropriation.224 The later use of
material that was distributed in manners the plaintiff could not control did not undermine
a plaintiff’s autonomy or liberty. But the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ rationale
in Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., which found that using a pitcher’s skin tone and unique
stance in a beer advertisement might be an exploitative use of his identity under
California law, related to the individual privacy values of autonomy, liberty, and
emotional health because the plaintiff, a “known recovering alcoholic,” would not have
promoted beer.225 The connection to emotional health arose because the plaintiff claimed
he endured emotional distress from the association of his identity with beer.
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One court’s discussion of the final element, lack of authorization, related to all
three individual privacy values and to the societal value of promoting civility and
community when it focused on dignitary harms. 226 The Supreme Court of Washington’s
ruling related to autonomy and civility and community when it found that county
employees’ unauthorized displays of gruesome autopsy photographs at parties and other
settings invaded the privacy of decedents’ immediate relatives because the employees
failed to respect the deceased and their relatives.227
Community standards for decency, which undergird the social value of civility
and community, also were mentioned in a U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that
considered whether the publication of a national guard soldier’s funeral photographs were
privileged. Applying Oklahoma law in Showler v. Harper’s Magazine, Inc., the court
found the magazine’s publication of the photographs did not harm the decedent’s family
members’ privacy because the photographs were closely related to the matter of public
interest that they illustrated.228 The court explained that publishing the photographs was
not “so extreme and outrageous ‘as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”229
 Courts more often discussed the communicator-based autonomy value or the
audience-based marketplace of ideas values for free expression when considering
whether an alleged appropriation was a privileged publication of a matter of newsworthy
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information or an advertisement “in disguise.” 230 When courts suggested that a public
interest or newsworthiness exception relates to the communicator-based autonomy value,
their rationales tied the importance of freedom from government censorship to the ability
for expression to serve audience-based interests. 231 For instance, in 1993 the New York
Court of Appeals mentioned courts’ reluctance to inhibit press freedom by “intrud[ing]
upon reasonable editorial judgments” in relation to a public interest privilege.232 That
ruling tied freedom of expression to the impact of the content on audiences.233 When
rulings suggested that an alleged appropriation served a communal value for free
expression, courts almost uniformly found the alleged appropriations were privileged,
leaving no need to balance privacy and free expression interests. 234
The only ruling that used balancing found that free expression values outweighed
the privacy interests at issue. 235 The Supreme Court of Alabama found that the trial court
erred by holding a prior restraint was necessary to prevent the distribution of a book from
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234 E.g., Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 764 (10th Cir. 2007); Groden v.
Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995); Joe Dickerson & Assoc.v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995,
998-1001 (Colo. 2001); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per
curiam); Lusby v. Cincinnati Magazine, No. 89-3854, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9144, at *7 (6th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished); Howell, Inc., 612 N.E.2d at 703; Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ctr, Inc., 587 N.E.2d
275, 279 (N.Y. 1991); Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 143-44; Leddy, 843 A.2d at 491; Town & Country Props., Inc.
v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Va. 1995).
235 Doe, 638 So. 2d at 829.
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injuring children’s privacy.236 Reasoning that the novel pertained to a matter of public
interest, the court wrote: “Thus, like most courts, faced with the competing interests of
the right to privacy and the right to freedom of speech, this [c]ourt has held that the right
to freedom of speech transcends the right to privacy so long as the speech pertains to a
matter of public concern.”237 The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, indicated that
liberty-based values for freedom of expression did not automatically outweigh privacy
interests. The Alabama court stated that its constitution provides individuals with
freedom to publish information but requires individuals to be “responsible for the abuse
of that liberty.”238
Courts routinely ruled in favor of defendants when their discussions of facts
related to free expression values.239 Courts only upheld awards for plaintiffs when uses of
plaintiffs’ identities were not clearly connected to matters of public interest,240 which
relate to the audience-based marketplace of ideas, self-governance, or checking function
values. State and federal courts upheld awards of damages for plaintiffs whose names
were used for unauthorized advertising purposes or exploitative purposes that received
little, if any, constitutional protection and that harmed at least one of the individual
privacy values—autonomy, liberty, or emotional health.241 In one of the few mentions of
                                                      
236 Id. at 827.
237 Id. at 828.
238 Id.
239 See supra notes 63–123 and accompanying text.
240 King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654,
662 (5th Cir. 2000); Bowling v. Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir.
1992)(unpublished) (per curiam); Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 599 (Ind. 2001); Town &
Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 1995).
241 See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text.
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societal privacy values, the Supreme Court of Washington remanded a case for trial on
whether the unauthorized use of autopsy photographs was tortious because the
“egregious” facts offended community standards for decency.242 Those findings bode
well for media defendants who publish individuals’ names or images to illustrate news
articles. Courts primarily found for defendants when their uses of plaintiffs’ names were
rationalized by relating protection for speech on matters of public interest to
communicators’ rights to publish information and audiences’ rights to receive
information.
If courts mentioned free expression values when finding a plaintiff’s privacy was
invaded under the appropriation theory, they tied constitutional protection for expression
to audiences’ rights to receive accurate information about advertised products or
services.243 The commercial speech doctrine supports those rationales because several
rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court have tied protection for speech that promotes a
product or service to audiences’ rights to be informed, and thus have indicated that the
First Amendment does not protect false or misleading commercial speech.244 In several
cases examined for this chapter, the unauthorized uses of plaintiffs’ names to promote a
product or service were misleading.245 Some rulings focused on whether the primary
                                                      
242 See supra notes 175–181 and accompanying text.
243 E.g., King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007); Town & Country Props.,
Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 363-64 (Va. 1995).
244 E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 384, (1997); Town & Country Props., Inc., 457 S.E.2d at 363-64.
245 E.g., King, 485 F.3d at 591-92; Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ctr, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 276-77
(N.Y. 1991).
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benefit intended for the unauthorized use was informing the public or promoting the
advertiser’s products or services.246
In sum, state high courts’ and circuit courts of appeals’ rulings typically relied on
the elements of the tort or the newsworthiness privilege to draw a definitional boundary
between the uses that served free expression values and uses that exploited an
individual’s identity. The rulings have indicated that individuals who publish other
persons’ names, likenesses, or images in advertisements without obtaining proper
authorization may be responsible for paying damages to plaintiffs whose identities are
used in a manner that conflicts with key privacy values without serving key free
expression values. But individuals who use persons’ identities to illustrate a matter of
public interest, a matter that serves communicator-based and audience-based free
expression values generally will not be found liable for invasion of privacy.
                                                      
246 See supra notes 35-62 and accompanying text.
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
Scholarship analyzing the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Florida Star v. 
B.J.F.1 suggested that ruling diminished legal rights to privacy protected by tort law and 
set the stage for lower courts to focus on freedom of expression at the expense of privacy 
rights.2 Florida Star established a First Amendment privilege that exempts disclosure of 
private facts plaintiffs from liability for the truthful publication of lawfully obtained 
information on matters of public significance.3 Lower courts also have protected freedom 
of expression by applying a common law newsworthiness defense that exempts 
disclosure of private facts and appropriation defendants from liability for publishing 
matters of public or general interest from liability.4 Indeed, First Amendment scholar 
Rodney Smolla called American privacy law “surprisingly weak,” in part because of the 
strong newsworthiness defense often raised in publication-based tort cases.5 Despite that 
                                                            
 
1 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 
2 Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 
1199 (1990); Ken Gormley, 100 Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1387-89; Deckle Mclean, 
Lower Courts Point the Way on Press and Privacy Rights, 22 COMM. & L. 41, 45 (2000). 
 
3 491 U.S. at 532. 
 
4 E.g., Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998) (plurality); Dickerson & Assoc. v. 
Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 998-1000 (Colo. 2001) (en banc);Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) 
(en banc); Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 6 S.E.2d 655, 657-58 (Ga. 1993); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr 
Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 612 
N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993). 
5 Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289, 289 
(2002). 
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broad swath of protection for freedom of expression, a communication law professor 
suggested in 2009 that protection for the media under the newsworthiness defense could 
decrease “as society grows more anxious about the loss of privacy.”6 Other authors have 
argued that courts should devote greater attention to freedom of expression and privacy 
by balancing the competing interests at stake in individual cases.7  
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine if and how federal circuit courts 
of appeals’ and state high courts’ opinions in disclosure of private facts and appropriation 
cases have reconciled conflicts between the fundamental democratic values undergirding 
freedom of expression and privacy since June 1989, when the Florida Star ruling was 
published.8  
Despite some scholars’ suggestions that Florida Star signaled the end of the 
disclosure tort, and perhaps other areas of privacy law,9 this dissertation found that state 
recognition of the disclosure of private facts and appropriation torts has expanded during 
the past twenty years.10 Most rulings did not discuss conflicts or clashes between freedom 
of expression and privacy rights.11 In many of those cases, courts refrained from 
                                                            
 
6 Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1104 (2009). 
 
7 Edelman, supra note 2, at 1207 (1989); Gormley, supra note 2, at 1387-88; Irwin R. Kramer, The Full-
Court Press: Sacrificing Vital Privacy Interests on the Altar of First Amendment Rhetoric, 8 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 116-17 (1990).  
 
8 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 
9 Edelman, supra note 2, at 207; Gormley, supra note 5, at 116-17. 
 
10 See, e.g., Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 379 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 
N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Karch v. Baybank, 794 A.2d 763, 774 (N.H. 2002). 
 
11 E.g., Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 591 (8th Cir. 2008); Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 
F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir., 2008) (per curiam); Meadows v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 638-39 
(5th Cir. 2007); Christian Broad. Network, Inc. v. Busch, 254 Fed. App’x 957, 958 (4th Cir. 2007)  
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engaging in that discussion perhaps because it was unnecessary as the appeals were 
simply based on claims that lower courts erroneously applied the elements of the torts.12 
Those rulings followed the long-recognized rule that courts address constitutional issues 
“only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital 
controversy between individuals.”13 Approximately half of the state high courts’ and 
federal circuit courts of appeals’ rulings, however, did discuss or imply at least one 
fundamental democratic value undergirding freedom of expression or privacy rights.14  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(unpublished) (per curiam); Zarrilli v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 231 Fed. App’x 122, 125. (3d Cir. 2007) 
(unpublished); Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2005); Botts v. New York 
Times, 106 Fed. App’x 109, 110 (3d. Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 
1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 2002); Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 313 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1236 (10th Cir. 1997), appeal after 
remand, 127 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 1999); McNewmar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 622 (3rd Cir. 
1996); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994); Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 32 
F.3d 953, 963 (5th Cir. 1994); S.B. v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 91-92 (Ala. 2006); Rosen v. 
Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So.2d 735, 739 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte The Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So. 
2d 814, 818-19 (Ala. 2000); Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So. 2d 700, 703 (Ala. 1997); Schifano v. Greene Cty. 
Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 179 (Ala. 1993); Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 937 S.E.3d 653, 653 (Ark. 
1997); Ozer, 940 P.2d at 377-79; Foncello v. Amorossi, 931 A.2d 924, 928 (Conn. 2007); Elliott v. 
Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C. 1993); Tannenbaum v. Grady, 604 N.E.2d 16, 17 (Mass. 1992); 
Simpson v. Central Maine Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me. 1996); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor 
Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 551-58 (Minn. 2003); Nemani v. St. Louis Univ., 33 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Mo. 
2000) (en banc); Wilkinson v. Methodist, 612 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Neb. 2000); Miller v. Am. Sports Co., 
Inc., 467 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Neb. 1991); Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 986 (Okla. 1992); Burger v. Blair, 
964 A.2d 374, 380 (Pa. 2009); Sloan v. South Carolina Dept. of Pub. Safety, 586 S.E.2d 108, 108 (S.C. 
2003); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131-32 (S.C. 1999); Shattuck-Owen 
v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 558 (Utah 2000); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 
273 (Vt. 1990). 
12 E.g., Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 591; Meadows, 492 F.3d at 638-39; Christian Broad. Network, Inc., 254 Fed. 
App’x at 958; Zarrilli, 231 Fed. App’x at 125; Karraker, 411 F.3d at 838; Botts, 106 Fed. App’x at 110; 
Willan, 280 F.3d at 1162; Parry, 236 F.3d at 313; McNewmar, 91 F.3d at 622; Schifano, 624 So.2d at 179; 
Tannenbaum, 604 N.E.2d at 17; Simpson, 669 A.2d at 1326; Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 551-58; Nemani, 33 
S.W.3d at 186; Wilkinson, 612 N.W.2d at 217; Miller, 467 N.W.2d at 656; Hadnot, 826 P.2d at 986; 
Burger, 964 A.2d at 380; Sloan, 586 S.E.2d at 108. 
13 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
14 E.g., Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 759-64 (10th Cir. 2007); King v. PA 
Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 591-92 (10th Cir. 2007); Alvarado v. KOB-TV, 492 F.3d 1210, 
1219-21 (10th Cir. 2007); Lowe v. Hearst Newspapers P'ship L.P., 497 F.3d 246, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2007); 
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This chapter provides a brief summary of the dissertation’s findings, analyzes and 
discusses those findings, and suggests how future research can advance scholars’ 
understanding of freedom of expression and privacy law. Section A summarizes what 
chapter two found about state high courts’ and federal circuit courts’ discussions of free 
expression and privacy values in disclosure of private facts cases. Section B summarizes 
what chapter three found about state high courts’ and federal circuit courts’ discussions 
of free expression and privacy values in appropriation cases. Section C explains and 
analyzes the findings of this study. Section D contains recommendations for future 
research.  
 
A. Reconciling Free Expression and Privacy in Disclosure Cases 
 Chapter two found that state high courts’ and federal circuit courts of appeals’ 
rulings primarily focused on the elements of the disclosure tort or the public interest 
privilege. Some rulings identified a liberty-based autonomy value for freedom of 
expression or at least one audience-based value for freedom of expression—marketplace 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160, 
1163 (7th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 2000); Howell v. Tribune Entm't Co., 
106 F.3d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1997); Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access, 111 F.3d 1395, 1404 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995); Matthews, 15 F.3d at 440; Reuber v. 
Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 719-21 (4th Cir. 1991); Lusby v. Cincinnati Magazine, No. 89-
3854, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9144, *7 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208-
09 (Cal. 2007); Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 553, 562-63 (Cal. 2005); Shulman v. Group 
W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998) (plurality); Dickerson & Assoc., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 
995, 998-1001 (Colo. 2001); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); Cape Publ’ns, 
Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (Fla. 1989); Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 6 S.E.2d 655, 657 (Ga. 
1993); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 34-6 (Idaho 2003); Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 
755 N.E.2d 589, 600-01 (Ind. 2001); Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 378, 384-85 (Miss. 1990); Svaldi v. 
Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, 106 P.3d 548, 552-53 (Mont. 2005); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 
727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699 
(N.Y. 1993); Finger v. Omni Pub. Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. 1991); Beverley v. Choices 
Women’s Med. Ctr, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 279 (N.Y. 1991); Leddy v. Naragansett Television, L.P., 843 
A.2d 481, 490-91 (R.I. 2004); WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 (Va. 2002); Town & Country Props., 
Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Va. 1995). 
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of ideas, self-governance, or checking function—when discussing whether the 
information at issue related to the matter of public interest privilege or newsworthiness 
defense.15  Some rulings discussed or implied at least one individual privacy value—
liberty, autonomy, or emotional health—or a societal privacy value—promoting civility 
and community or forming and maintaining relationships—when examining whether the 
case involved widespread publicity of private information.16 Few disclosure cases, 
however, used balancing to reconcile conflicts between the key democratic values 
undergirding freedom of expression and privacy.17 
  Almost half of the state high courts’ and federal circuit courts of appeals’ rulings 
in disclosure cases focused on whether the plaintiffs’ claims were able to satisfy the 
elements of the tort as matter of law.18 In seventeen cases, courts determined the 
                                                            
15 E.g., Lowe, 497 F.3d at 251-52; Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 421; Willan, 280 F.3d at 1163; Howell, 106 F.3d at 
220; Coplin, 111 F.3d at 1404; Reuber, 925 F.2d at 719-21; Gates, 101 P.3d at 562-63; Cape Publ'ns, Inc., 
549 So. 2d at 1378-79; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 34-6; Doe, 2003 WL at 21015134. 
16 E.g., Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 417-21; Foncello v. Amorossi, 931 A.2d 924, 929 (Conn. 2007); Ayash, 822 
N.E.2d at 682-83; Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 553-54; Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235; Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 866; 
Swinton Creek Nursery, 514 S.E.2d at 126); Star-Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473. 
 
17 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 486; Ozer, 940 P.2d at 378; Macon Telegraph, 6 S.E.2d at 657; Uranga v. 
Federated Publ’ns, No. 27118, 2001 Ida. LEXIS 71, *26-27 (June 21) (unpublished), vacated and 
superseded on rehearing by 67 P.3d 29, 35 (Idaho 2003). 
 
18 E.g., Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 591 (8th Cir. 2008); Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 
831, 838 (7th Cir. 2005); Willan, 280 F.3d at 1162; Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 132-33 (1st 
Cir. 2000); Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 313 (6th Cir. 2000); Roe v. 
Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1236 (10th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 
127 F.3d 879 (10th Cir. 1999); McNewmar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 622 (3rd Cir. 1996); Cinel v. 
Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1994); Thomas v. Pearl, 998 F.2d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1993); Haynes 
v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232-35 (7th Cir. 1993); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc. 925 F.2d 
703 (4th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991); Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 
1991); S.B. v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 91-92 (Ala. 2006); Rosen v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 
So. 2d 735, 739 (Ala. 2001); Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So. 2d 700, 703 (Ala. 1997); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 
1185, 1207-08 (Cal. 2007); Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C. 1993); Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 
682-84; Mulgrew v. City of Taunton, 574 N.E.2d 389, 393 (Mass. 1991); Gauthier v. Police Comm’r of 
Boston, 557 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1990); Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 
1991); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 551-58 (Minn. 2003); Hadnot v. Shaw, 
826 P.2d 978, 986 (Okl. 1992); Burger v. Blair, 964 A.2d 374, 380 (Pa. 2009); Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 
A.2d 849, 859 (R.I. 1998). 
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defendants had not given widespread publicity to private information.19 Three rulings 
turned on plaintiffs’ failure to prove the disclosed information was true.20 Eleven rulings 
scrutinized whether the information at issue was private, meaning the information was 
not widely available and was so intimate, intensely personal, or embarrassing that the 
disclosure would cause shame or humiliation.21 Three other rulings used reasonableness 
tests to determine whether plaintiffs expected the information at issue to remain private 
and whether community members agreed that expectation was reasonable.22 In almost 
one-third of the cases, however, courts used the final element, whether the disclosed 
information was a matter of legitimate public concern, to distinguish tortious disclosures 
of private facts from privileged disclosures of newsworthy information.23 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
19 Steinbuch, 518 F.3d at 591; Karraker, 411 F.3d at 838; Willan, 280 F.3d at 1162; Phillips, 312 F.3d at 
371-72; Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 132-33; Parry, 236 F.3d at 313; Roe, 124 F.3d at 1236; Cinel, 15 F.3d at 
1346; Thomas, 998 F.2d at 452; Lee, 948 F.2d at 1165; S.B., 959 So. 2d at 91-92; Rosen, 825 So.2d 735, 
739 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte The Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So.2d 814, 818-19 (Ala. 2000); Johnston v. 
Fuller, 706 So.2d 700, 703 (Ala. 1997); Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 551-58; Swinton Creek Nursery, 514 S.E.2d 
at 131-32; Shattuck-Owen, 16 P.3d at 558. 
 
20 Campbell v. Lyon, 26 Fed. App’x 183, 186 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (per curiam); Barker v. Huang, 
610 A.2d 1341, 1350 (Del. 1991); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 303 (Mo. 1993). 
 
21 Showler v. Harper's Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 764 (10th Cir. 2007); Dasey v. Anderson, 
304 F.3d 148 (1st Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 731-33 (5th Cir. 1995)(en banc); Merlo v. 
United Way of Am., 43 F.3d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1994); Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232-
35 (7th Cir. 1993); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 719 (4th Cir. 1991); S.B., 959 So. 2d 
at 92; Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208-09; Steele v. Spokesman-Review Publ’g Co., 61 P. 3d 606, 607 (Idaho, 
2002); Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, 106 P.3d 548, 553 (Mont. 2005); Steele v. Spokesman-
Review Publ’g Co., 61 P. 3d 606, 607 (Idaho 2002). 
 
22 Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2007); Zaffuto v. 
City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002); Pontbriand v. Sundland, 699 A.2d 856, 864 (R.I. 
1997). 
 
23 Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1235-37 (10th Cir. 2007); Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417 
(4th Cir. 2003); Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 132-33 (1st Cir. 2000), Cinel v. Connick, 15 
F.3d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1994); Thomas v. Pearl, 998 F.2d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1993); Haynes v. Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232-35 (7th Cir. 1993); Purnell v. Smart, No. 92-2053, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 
24313, at *7-8 (7th Cir. July 8, 1992) (unpublished); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc. 925 F.2d 703 (4th 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991); Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991); Taus 
v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207-08 (Cal. 2007); Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 553, 562-63 
(Cal. 2005); Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Fla. 1989); Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 
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 Courts typically discussed audience-based free expression values in relation to the 
legitimate public concern element or public interest privilege. One ruling discussed the 
liberty-based value of autonomy for individual speakers.24 Other rulings linked the 
liberty-based autonomy value for press freedom to the audience-based marketplace of 
ideas or checking function values.25 Most rulings that connected the public interest 
privilege to freedom of expression mentioned the audience-based marketplace of ideas 
value or implicated the audience-based checking function value.26 Judge Posner, chief 
judge for the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote two rulings involving a 
marketplace of ideas value for freedom of expression.27 Four circuit courts of appeals’ 
decisions cited the rationale from Posner’s opinion in Haynes v. Knopf.28 Other courts 
that suggested the self-governance and checking values for freedom of expression cited 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationale from Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn that connects 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
436 S.E.2d 655, 679 (Ga. 1993); Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 682-84 (Mass. 2005); 
Mulgrew v. City of Taunton, 574 N.E.2d 389, 393 (Mass. 1991); Gauthier v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 
557 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1990); Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991); 
Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 859 (R.I. 1998); Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 496 S.E.2d 636, 637 (S.C. 
1998); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473-74 (Tex. 1995). 
 
24 Doe v. Haw, No. CV-OC-0205441D, 2003 WL 21015134, at *6 (Idaho Feb. 5 2003) (unpublished). 
 
25 E.g., Lowe v. Hearst Newspapers P'ship L.P., 497 F.3d 246, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2007); Howell v. Tribune 
Entm't Co., 106 F.3d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1997); Reuber, 925 F.2d at 719-21; Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 
378, 384-85 (Miss. 1990); Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 552-53. 
 
26 Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 421; Howell, 106 F.3d at 220-21; Reuber, 925 F.2d at 719-21; Young, 572 So.2d at 
383-85; Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 552-53; Gates, 101 P.3d at 562-63; Cape Publ’ns, Inc., 549 So. 2d at 1378-79; 
Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 34-6 (Idaho 2003). 
 
27 Howell v. Tribune Entm't Co., 106 F.3d 215, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1997); Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 
F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
28 Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 2002); Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 104; Howell, 106 
F.3d at 220; Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access, 111 F.3d 1395, 1404 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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the public’s right to receive information to “the beneficial effects of public scrutiny of the 
administration of justice.”29  
 Several courts discussed individual values for privacy—liberty, autonomy, or 
emotional health—when examining the elements of the tort or when determining whether 
to recognize the disclosure tort under state common law.30 Some of those rulings implied 
a liberty value for privacy when they mentioned Warren and Brandeis’s definition of 
privacy as a right “to be let alone.”31 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, 
explicitly connected privacy to personal liberty when it chose to recognize the disclosure 
of private facts tort in 1998.32 That ruling also implied that privacy served personal 
autonomy, which is associated with personal agency and personal identity.33 Another 
ruling also related privacy to aspects of the individual autonomy value for privacy.34 But 
courts most often discussed the emotional health value for privacy as individuals’ desires 
to prevent emotional harm, such as shame or humiliation.35 Only one of those cases 
referred to “emotional security,” a concept broad enough to include the emotional well-
                                                            
 
29 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); Gates, 101 P.3d at 562-63; Cape Publ’ns, Inc., 549 
So. 2d at 1378-79; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 34-36. 
30 Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 417-21 (4th Cir. 2003); Foncello v. Amorossi, 931 A.2d 924, 
929 (Conn. 2007); Pontbriand v. Sundland, 699 A.2d 856, 866 (R.I. 1997); Swinton Creek Nursery v. 
Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131-32 (S.C. 1999). 
 
31 E.g., Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Warren & Brandeis, Right 
To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1980)). 
 
32 Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (en banc). 
 
33 Id. 
  
34 Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A. 2d  702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 
35 E.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Randolph, 973 A. 2d at 711; Young v. Jackson, 572 So.2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990); Swinton Creek Nursery, 
514 S.E.2d at 131. 
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being and emotional release factors of emotional health. Courts’ references to societal 
values for privacy also were rare. In fact, the only references to the societal value of 
forming and maintaining relationships appeared in cases that also implicated the 
individual liberty and emotional health values for privacy.36 
 If courts mentioned conflicts,37 clashes,38 or tensions between freedom of 
expression and privacy39 and attempted to reconcile those clashes, they typically applied 
a form of definitional balancing. That approach sought to identify the boundary between 
categories of privileged disclosures and categories of tortious disclosures and determined 
whether the facts at issue fell into the category of privileged publications or into the 
category of invasions of privacy.40 Nine of those cases discussed values undergirding 
freedom of expression and values undergirding privacy.41 Rather than engaging in an 
explicit balancing approach that weighed competing interests, a few courts claimed to 
                                                            
 
36 Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind. 1997) (plurality); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto 
Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 131-33 (S.C. 1999); Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998). 
 
37 Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Statesman, 67 P.3d 29, 33 (Idaho 2003). 
 
38 Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998) (plurality). 
 
39 E.g., Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395, 1404 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 
40 Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2003); Coplin, 111 F.3d at 1405-06; Haynes v. 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993); Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208-09 (Cal. 
2007); Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 553, 562-63 (Cal. 2005); Shulman v. Group W. Prod., 
Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998) (plurality); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); 
Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 6 S.E.2d 655, 657-58 (Ga. 1993); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, No. 27118, 
2001 Ida. LEXIS 71, at *26-27 (Idaho June 21, 2001) (unpublished), vacated and superseded on rehearing 
by Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Statesman, 67 P.3d 29, 35 (Idaho 2003); Ayash v. Dana-
Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 683 (Mass. 2005); Gauthier v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 557 N.E.2d 
1374, 1376 (Mass. 1990); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473-74 (Tex. 1995). 
 
41 Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 422; Coplin, 111 F.3d at 1405-06; Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Taus, 151 P.3d at 1208; 
Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479; Ozer, 940 P.2d at 378; Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32-3; Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 683; Star-
Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473-84. 
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balance press freedom and privacy by applying a newsworthiness test that assesses the 
relevance of disclosed information to “a topic of legitimate public concern.”42   
 Most rulings that applied a test to assess whether the information at issue was 
newsworthy, or related to a matter of public interest, found that the liberty-based editorial 
autonomy value for freedom of expression and audience-based marketplace of ideas and 
checking function values for freedom of expression could trump any privacy interests at 
issue.43 Indeed, in 1993 when the Georgia Supreme Court asserted that clashes between 
press freedom and privacy require courts to weigh individuals’ privacy rights against the 
press’s right to provide audiences with information, 44 the court indicated that a 1905 
Georgia Supreme Court ruling had defined the formula for that balancing by recognizing 
privacy was limited by free expression rights.45 In 1995, the Supreme Court of Texas 
found a newspaper could not be liable for invading the privacy of a woman the paper 
identified as a rape victim. The court indicated that the public had a right to receive 
information about the commission of a crime, 46 thus implying an audience-based value 
for freedom of expression. In dicta, however, the court suggested the media have a moral 
obligation to “take precautions” to ensure they do not reveal sensitive information about 
crime victims. 47 
                                                            
 
42 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 486. Also see, Ozer, 940 P.2d at 378 (citing Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 
F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981) and Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975)); Star-
Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 474. 
43 E.g., Macon Telegraph v. Tatum, 6 S.E.2d 655, 657 (Ga. 1993); Star-Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 474. 
44 Macon Telegraph, 6 S.E.2d at 657. 
 
45 Id. at 658 (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905)). 
 
46 Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995). 
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 Only two rulings in disclosure of private facts cases upheld lower court rulings 
that found a plaintiff could receive damages for invasion of privacy.48 One of those 
opinions was vacated by the same state high court that issued it and was superseded on 
rehearing by a decision reaching the opposite conclusion.49 In the other decision, Zaffuto 
v. City of Hammond, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld $2 in compensatory 
damages and remanded the case for a new trial on the amount of punitive damages. 50 In 
that case, the court weighed the privacy interest of the plaintiff against the defendant’s 
interest in disclosing information and concluded the defendant disclosed information for 
the purpose of shaming Zaffuto, harming the emotional health that privacy is intended to 
protect, without serving individual- or audience-based values for freedom of expression.51   
 In sum, during the past twenty years, federal circuit courts of appeals’ and state 
high courts’ rulings have recognized significant individual and societal values for 
freedom of expression and for privacy.52 When courts have acknowledged the potential 
for freedom of expression and privacy to collide, though, they typically have found the 
published information was protected under constitutional or common law privileges for 
matters of public interest associated with audience-based marketplace of ideas or 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
47 Id. at 475. 
 
48 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 486-91 (5th Cir. 2002); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, No. 
27118, 2001 Ida. LEXIS 71, at *26-27 (Idaho June 21, 2001) (unpublished), vacated and superseded on 
rehearing by Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Statesman, 67 P.3d 29, 32-33 (Idaho 2003). 
 
49 See Uranga, 2001 Ida. LEXIS at *26-27. 
  
50 Zaffuto, 308 F.3d at 486-491. 
 
51 Zaffuto, 308 F.3d at 491 (affirming the award of $2 in compensatory damages and remanding for a new 
trial on punitive damages).  
52 See supra notes 24 to 35 and accompanying text. 
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checking function values.53 Two opinions, one of which was vacated and superseded, did 
however, suggest that free expression interests might yield to individual privacy interests 
in circumstances that undermine the emotional health value for privacy without serving a 
liberty-based or audience-based value for freedom of expression.54  
 
B. Reconciling Free Expression and Privacy in Appropriation Cases 
 Chapter three found that four state high courts recognized appropriation for the 
first time during the past twenty years.55 Although Dean Smolla asserted in 2002 that 
appropriation is the only area of privacy that “has been a ripping success for plaintiffs,”56 
state high courts and federal circuit courts of appeals upheld lower court rulings for 
appropriation plaintiffs only four times during the past twenty years among the cases 
identified in this study.57 Courts also remanded five cases for further proceedings.58 In 
                                                            
 
53 See supra notes 36 to 44 and accompanying text. 
 
54 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 
471, 475 (Tex. 1995).  
 
55 Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 997 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009-10 
(N.H. 2003); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 268-69 (Vt. 1990). 
 
56 Smolla, supra note 3, at 289. 
 
57  King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007)(affirming a judgment for King 
that included an award of damages in the amount of $57,672); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 
2000) (finding the jury did not err in awarding $100,000 for misappropriation); Bowling v. Bowling, No. 
91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. July 30,1992) (unpublished) (per curiam) (affirming 
a judgment for Bowling that included an award of $100 for the appropriation of his likeness); Town & 
Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 365 (Va. 1995)(affirming lower court’s finding for 
plaintiff and remanding for award to be reduced to $25,000 in actual damages). 
58 Am. Guarantee & Life Ins. v. 1906 Co., 273 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2001) (remanding with instructions for 
the district court to enter summary judgment against the insurance company and to indicate the company is 
legally required to defend and reimburse the 1906 Co. for damages related to misappropriation); 
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1998) (remanding for trial because 
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most other cases, appellate courts found lower courts had not erred by entering summary 
judgment for defendants or by dismissing plaintiffs’ appropriation claims.59  
  Almost half of forty-five appropriation rulings analyzed in this study turned on 
the court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements of the tort—
commercial use of identity or likeness without proper consent—as a matter of law.60 
Courts found that using a plaintiff’s name or photograph in a brochure61 flyer,62 or 
voicemail message without the plaintiff’s implied or explicit consent constitutes an 
actionable use of identity for trade or advertising purposes.63 Appellate courts affirmed 
lower court damages awards to plaintiffs only when the use promoted a product or 
service rather than serving a newsworthy purpose tied to at least one audience-based free 
expression value.64  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
summary judgment improperly was awarded); Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, (remanding the case to 
intermediate court of appeals with instructions to reinstate the trial court’s award of summary judgment for 
the defendant); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998) (en banc); Staruski v. Cont’l 
Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 273-74 (Vt. 1990). 
59 E.g., Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App'x 755, 759 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); 
Zarilli v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 231 Fed. App’x 122, 123-25  (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) 
(unpublished); Meadows v. Hartford life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 2007); Am. Guar. & Liability 
Ins. Co., 273 F.3d at 608; Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693; Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 
1994); Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178, 179 (Ala. 1993); Dickerson & 
Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 997 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 
589, 599 (Ind. 2001); Tannenbaum v. Grady, 604 N.E.2d 16, 16 (Mass. 1992); Simpson v. Central Maine 
Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me. 1996); Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236; Howell v. New York Post Co., 
Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 701(N.Y. 1993); Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 279; Leddy v. Narragansett Television, 
L.P., 843 A.2d 481, 490-91 (R.I. 2004); Sloan v. South Carolina Dept. of Pub. Safety, 586 S.E.2d 108, 108 
(S.C. 2003); Staruski, 581 A.2d at 273; Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 335 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). 
 
60 E.g., Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703; Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 143-44; Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490-91. 
 
61 Bowling v. Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. July 30, 1992) 
(unpublished) (per curiam). 
 
62 Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 365 (Va. 1995). 
 
63 King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007) 
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 When examining whether use of an individual’s identity related to a matter of 
public interest and was, therefore, privileged, courts primarily discussed the liberty-based 
free expression value of autonomy, at least one audience-based free expression value—
marketplace of ideas, self-governance, or checking function—or a combination of those 
values.65 A few rulings implicated the liberty-based autonomy value for freedom of the 
press when courts indicated that members of the press must decide what is newsworthy 
without judicial censorship or second-guessing.66  
 Rulings generally implicated the individual privacy values of autonomy, liberty, 
or emotional health when courts discussed the elements of the tort.67 Some discussion of 
plaintiffs’ injuries related to the emotional harm factor of the emotional health value.68 
Only two rulings implied a societal value underlies privacy, the forming and maintaining 
relationships value.69  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
64 King, 485 F.3d at 593; Brown, v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 2000); Bowling, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS at *2; Beverley v. Choices Med. Ctr., 587 N.E.2d 275, 279-80 (N.Y. 1991); Town & Country 
Properties, Inc., 457 S.E.2d at 365. 
 
65 E.g., Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Howell v. 
New York Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 278-79; Finger v. 
Omni Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 144 (N.Y. 1991); Leddy v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 843 
A.2d 481, 490 (R.I. 2004); WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 387-88 (Va. 2002); Town & Country Props., 
Inc., 457 S.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Va. 1995). 
 
66 Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995); Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 
P.3d 995, 998-1000 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 552-54; Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 704; 
Finger, 566 N.E.2d at 143; Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490-91. 
 
67 E.g., King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 591-92 (10th Cir. 2007); Bowling v. Bowling, 
No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at * 12-13 (6th Cir. July 301992) (unpublished) (per curiam); 
Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 600-01 (Ind. 2001); Miller v. Am. Sports Co., Inc. 467 
N.W.2d 653, 679-80 (Neb. 1991); Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998)(en banc). 
 
68 E.g., Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 105 (Colo. 2001) (Coates, concurrence); Staruski v. 
Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 269 (Vt. 1990).  
 
69 Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 763-74 (10th Cir. 2007); Reid, 961 P.2d at 
342. 
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 Courts rarely discussed both freedom of expression and privacy values or engaged 
in an explicit balancing of interests.70 A few courts followed the New York Court of 
Appeals’ tendency to treat the public interest privilege or newsworthiness defense as the 
definitional boundary between freedom of expression rights and privacy rights.71 Those 
rulings typically focused on whether the use was a newsworthy one related to a matter of 
public interest or was “an advertisement in disguise.”72 In most of those cases, courts 
suggested that uses of plaintiffs’ identities served an informative purpose related to the 
marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and/or checking function values, and thus the 
courts did not need to weigh the values undergirding freedom of expression against the 
values undergirding privacy.73  One ruling suggested that privacy rights could limit free 
speech and press rights provided under different circumstances than those presented by 
the case.74 That ruling identified general communicator-based and audience-based values 
for free expression and implied that appropriations that harm individual privacy values, 
such as autonomy and liberty, could be punished without violating free expression rights 
                                                            
 
70 E.g., Schifano v. Greene Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 179 (Ala. 1993); Miller v. Am. 
Sports Co., Inc., 467 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Neb. 1991); Sloan v. South Carolina Dept. of Pub. Safety, 586 
S.E.2d 108, 108 (S.C. 2003); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 273 (Vt. 1990). 
71 Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 763-64 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); 
Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003-04 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr 
Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 
699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ct., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991); 
Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 144 (N.Y. 1991); Leddy v. Narragansett Television, 
L.P., 843 A.2d 481, 490 (R.I. 2004); WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 387-88 (Va. 2002); Town & Country 
Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Va. 1995). 
 
72 Showler, 222 Fed. App’x at 763-64; Dickerson & Assoc., 34 P.3d at 1003-04; Messenger, 727 N.E.2d 
553; Howell, 612 N.E.2d at 703; Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 278-79; Leddy, 843 A.2d at 490-91; WJLA, 564 
S.E.2d at 387-88. 
 
73 But see, Town & Country Props., Inc., 457 S.E.2d at 361-62. 
 
74 Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam). 
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if children’s identities are used in an exploitative manner unrelated to matters of public 
interest.  
 Two courts found that plaintiffs’ privacy was invaded by the unauthorized use of 
their identities for advertising purposes because the exploitative uses did not provide the 
type of information that served a public interest.75 Those rulings also applied a 
definitional boundary to assess whether a person’s identity was appropriated in a manner 
that harmed individual liberty, autonomy, or emotional health without benefiting society 
by contributing to audiences’ right to receive information that facilitates discussion or 
debate of public issues, contributes to self-governance, or checks abuses of power. 
 In sum, courts primarily have recognized individual values for privacy—liberty, 
autonomy, and emotional health—and audience-based values for freedom of 
expression—marketplace of ideas, self-governance, or checking function values.76 When 
uses of a person’s identity implicated an audience-based value by providing information 
of public interest, courts found those uses fell on the privileged side of a definitional 
boundary associated with the newsworthiness exception.77 Courts ruled in favor of 
plaintiffs only when the uses of their identities harmed individual privacy values rather 
than promoting free-expression values associated with audiences’ rights to receive 
information on matters of public interest.78  
                                                            
 
75 Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 279-80; Town & Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 365 Va. 
1995). 
 
76 See supra notes 28-38, 67-73, and accompanying text. 
 
77 See supra notes 43-47, 75, and accompanying text. 
 
78 King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 591-92 (10th Cir. 2007); Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 
308 F.3d 485, 486-91 (5th Cir. 2002); Bowling v. Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at 
* 12-13 (6th Cir. July 30, 1992) (unpublished) (per curiam); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, No. 27118, 2001 
  207 
 C. Reconciling Conflicts between Free Expression and Privacy 
 Today, when digital media enable any person with access to the Internet or a 
mobile phone to act as a mass communicator, to distribute information to large audiences 
within seconds, individuals’ anxiety about invasions of privacy has increased.79 During 
the past twenty years, technological changes have enabled any person with a digital 
media device to widely publicize another person’s private information or to use another 
person’s identity to one’s own benefit, which in turn, allows any user to invade others’ 
privacy and to be sued under the disclosure of private facts or appropriation torts. As 
technology has increased the ease through which individuals can communicate to mass 
audiences, the number of states that have recognized the disclosure of private facts or 
appropriation tort also has increased.80 As the potential for individuals to become 
plaintiffs or defendants has grown, so has the need for courts to clarify what types of 
communications are protected by the First Amendment and what types are vulnerable to 
tort claims.  
 This dissertation found that an increasing number of states have recognized two 
common law invasion of privacy torts that involve potential conflicts between the right to 
publish and the right to privacy since Justice Marshall asserted that both interests are 
important. Despite Justice Marshall’s suggestion that courts should balance those 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Ida. LEXIS 71, at *26-27 (Idaho June 21, 2001) (unpublished), vacated and superseded on rehearing by 
Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Statesman, 67 P.3d 29, 32-33 (Idaho 2003); Felsher v. Univ. of 
Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 600-01 (Ind. 2001).  
 
79 See, e.g., DAMIAN TAMBINI, DANILO LEONARDI & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, CODIFYING CYBERSPACE: 
COMMUNICATS SELF-REGULATION IN THE AGE OF INTERNET CONVERGENCE 72 (2008); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6-7 (2004).  
 
80 Joe Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 997 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 
371, 379 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (en 
banc); Karch v. Baybank, 794 A.2d 763, 774 (N.H. 2002); Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 
1009-10 (N.H. 2003); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vermont, 581 A.2d 266, 268-9 (Vt. 1990). 
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competing interests,81 few state high courts and federal circuit courts of appeals explicitly 
balanced privacy and free expression values.82 Rather, courts consistently have 
considered the elements of disclosure or appropriation torts and privileges for publishing 
matters of legitimate concern or interest to the public.83 That tendency suggests that 
courts have assumed that the decades of precedent that defined common law and 
constitutional principles have struck a proper balance between the right to publish and the 
right to privacy,84 both of which are undergirded by fundamental democratic values. 
During the past twenty years, however, courts have operationalized the conceptual 
boundaries for free expression and privacy in a manner that allowed the constitutional 
right to publish to trump common law privacy rights in disclosure cases and in 
appropriation cases.85 
 This dissertation found no state high courts’ or federal circuit courts of appeals’ 
rulings that upheld an award of damages against any member of the news media. But 
courts upheld damage awards for plaintiffs in one of seventy disclosure cases86 and in 
                                                            
 
81 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989). 
 
82 See supra notes 39-47, 70-74 and accompanying text. 
 
83 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532. See supra notes 18-23, 60-66 and accompanying text. 
 
84 The privilege for matters of public or general interest first was recognized in the now famous 1890 article 
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L.REV. 193 (1890). The Supreme Court connected that privilege to a constitutional privilege in Time, Inc.v. 
Hill., 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Eight years later, the Court identified a narrower category of protection in 
Cox Broadcasting by stating that press freedom protected reporting on the prosecution of criminals and 
judicial proceedings, which were matters of public concern. Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). 
In 1989, the Court established another narrow category of privileged information for matters of public 
significance in Florida Star. 492 U.S. at 532. 
 
85 See supra notes 42-46, 75, and accompanying text. 
 
86 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court of Idaho vacated a 
ruling that found a newspaper’s publication of a court record, which disclosed the name of an individual 
who engaged in homosexual activity with his cousin decades earlier, was an actionable disclosure of a 
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four of forty-five appropriation cases.87 And one court upheld an injunction to protect 
plaintiffs against invasion of privacy by an individual’s appropriation of plaintiffs’ 
identities online.88 In each of those cases, courts applied the elements of the privacy torts 
and occasionally key defenses to the facts at issue, implying courts accepted that those 
standards of law struck the proper balance between the right to publish and the right to 
privacy. 
 In disclosure of private facts cases, courts relied almost exclusively on whether 
the disclosed information related to a matter of public concern or significance and thus 
was privileged under the First Amendment. They followed the constitutional tests created 
by the Supreme Court’s rulings in Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn and Florida Star v. B.J.F. 
For instance, in 2003, the Supreme Court of Idaho reasoned that a newspaper’s 
publication of a document found in a twenty-year old court record was privileged because 
the First Amendment prohibited a state from sanctioning a media defendant for 
publishing information found in a court record available to the public. In fact, some 
rulings that determined the disclosed information related to a public concern did not 
discuss the elements of the tort, much less the values undergirding the tort. Those rulings 
suggested those privileges provided a categorical boundary for constitutional rights that 
necessarily outweighed privacy rights. That tendency supports legal scholars’ assertions 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
private fact. Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, No. 27118, 2001 Ida. LEXIS 71, *26-27 (June 21) (unpublished), 
vacated and superseded on rehearing by 67 P.3d 29, 35 (Idaho 2003). 
 
87 King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 
662 (5th Cir. 2000); Bowling v. Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. 
1992) (unpublished) (per curiam); Town & Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 
1995). 
 
88 Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 599 (Ind. 2001). 
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that lower courts could use the Florida Star ruling to focus on free expression rights and 
negate privacy rights.89 
 The only award of damages to a disclosure of private facts plaintiff upheld on 
appeal did not apply the constitutional privilege nor did it apply the element of the tort 
some states have recognized that exempts disclosures of legitimate matters of public 
concern from liability. In Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied a balancing test under Louisiana’s disclosure tort.90 The court found an assistant 
police chief invaded the privacy of a police sergeant and the sergeant’s wife’s by 
recording and replaying one of the couple’s private telephone conversations about the 
police sergeant’s approval of “a controversial department restructuring.”91 That ruling 
was limited to considering whether a lower court erred in its application of Louisiana’s 
reasonableness test, which assesses “the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct . . . by 
balancing the plaintiff’s interest in protecting his privacy from serious invasions with the 
defendant’s interest in pursuing his course of conduct.”92 Reasoning that the defendant 
had no legitimate interest in disclosing that information other than to benefit the 
defendant, the court upheld a $2 award of compensatory damages and remanded the case 
for trial on punitive damages. That ruling focused on the intentional nature of the tort, 
examining whether a defendant’s motivation for the disclosure could justify harming the 
                                                            
 
89 See 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989). 
 
90 Zaffuto, 308 F.3d at 491. 
 
91 Id. 
 
92 Id. at 491. 
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plaintiff’s privacy interests.93 The rationale, however, loosely parallels questions about 
whether a disclosure benefits message recipients as well as the communicator. 
 Courts also focused on the primary purpose for any use of a plaintiff’s identity 
when determining whether an alleged appropriation was privileged.94 If the purpose for 
using a plaintiff’s name or likeness related to a matter of public interest, those uses were 
protected under common law or constitutional privileges.95 The rulings that were not 
privileged, however, were considered exploitative or uses that primarily were intended to 
benefit the communicator in a manner that provided minimal, if any, benefit to others.96 
Those rulings, accordingly, respected the boundaries for constitutional protection in a 
manner that prevented defendants from paying damages for accidental, or unintended, 
uses of others’ names or identities. 
 Not surprisingly, state high courts and federal circuit courts awarded damages 
more often in appropriation cases involving commercial speech than in disclosure of 
private facts cases.97 The U.S. Supreme Court established in a 1976 ruling in Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Consumer Council that commercial speech, which does no 
                                                            
 
93 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 
94 See supra note 65, 75 and accompanying text. 
 
95 Showler v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 222 Fed. App’x 755, 763-64 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); 
Dickerson & Assoc. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003-04 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr 
Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 
699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 144 (N.Y. 1991); Leddy v. 
Narragansett Television, L.P., 843 A.2d 481, 490 (R.I. 2004); WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 387-88 (Va. 
2002).  
 
96 E.g., Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ct., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991); Town & 
Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Va. 1995). 
 
97 Courts upheld an award of damages in one disclosure of private facts case. Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 
308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts upheld awards of damages in four appropriation cases. King v. 
PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Bowling v. Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(unpublished) (per curiam); Town & Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 1995). 
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more than promote the sale of a product or service and is true and not misleading, 
receives limited First Amendment protection,98 less than would be extended to the 
truthful publication of news. Whereas the constitutional protection for publications of 
matters of public interest is grounded in the audience-based model’s acknowledgement of 
benefits to information recipients and the liberty-based model’s acknowledgement of 
benefits for communicators and audiences,99 the constitutional protection for commercial 
speech is tied to the audience-based model.100 Restricting that protection based in the 
ability of information to benefit audiences has allowed courts to exclude false or 
misleading communications from the scope of constitutional protection. Thus, when 
unauthorized uses of plaintiffs’ names or likenesses mislead audiences by falsely 
implying that plaintiffs are promoting a product or service, those uses fall outside the 
scope of constitutional protection.101 The elements of the tort provide a mechanism for 
courts to determine whether a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s name promotes a product or 
service and whether a use misleads audiences. 
 Courts consistently have used the elements of the disclosure and appropriation 
torts and the newsworthiness defenses or public interest privileges to identify definitional 
boundaries between publicity associated with the right to publish and abuses of that 
                                                            
 
98 425 U.S. 748, 759-65 (1976). 
 
99 E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-92 
(1977); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLE 71 (1982). 
 
100 E.g., Gerald J. Baldasty & Roger A. Simpson, The Deceptive ‘Right to Know’: How Pessimism Rewrote 
the First Amendment, 56 WASH. L. REV. 365 (1981); Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the 
Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1; James C. Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 29; Michael J. Hayes, What Ever Happened to ‘the Right to Know’?: Access to Government-
Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2007); William E. Lee, The 
Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303; David M. Obrien, The First 
Amendment and the Public’s ‘Right to Know’, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1979). 
 
101 E.g., Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 365 (Va. 1995). 
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right.102 Those legal principles indicate that the right to publish and the right to privacy 
are both important for a democratic society. But a couple of courts that associated speech 
and privacy rights with liberty indicated that individuals’ freedom to express themselves 
may end at the point that the expression intentionally would harm an individual’s 
privacy.103 Accordingly, courts only upheld an award of damages for an appropriation 
plaintiff when the use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness fell outside the scope of 
protected expression.104 Similarly, the only award of damages upheld for a disclosure 
plaintiff resulted from an individual’s abuse of his liberty-based right to distribute 
information.105  
 Those findings suggest that publishers might benefit by asking several questions 
before they send communications to multiple recipients. First, they could ask whether a 
communication is likely to benefit intended message recipients less than the sender. If the 
communication primarily will benefit the sender without benefiting recipients by serving 
an audience-based value for free expression—marketplace of ideas, self-governance, or 
checking function—the communication might fall outside the scope of constitutional 
protection and thus lead to a successful invasion of privacy claim. Second, they could ask 
whether the communication is likely to harm any person identified in the communication. 
If the communication is likely to cause harm that conflicts with individual values for 
                                                            
 
102 See supra notes 18-29, 60-64, 70-75 and accompanying text. 
 
103 E.g., King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 
826, 829-30 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam).  
 
104 King, 485 F.3d at 593; Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 2000); Bowling v. Bowling, No. 91-
5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992 (unpublished) (per curiam); Beverley v. Choices 
Women’s Med. Ct., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991); Town & Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 
457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 1995). 
 
105 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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privacy—liberty, autonomy, or emotional health—or social values for privacy—forming 
relationships or promoting community and civility—the communication might lead to a 
successful invasion of privacy claim. Third, they could ask whether the intent of the 
communication is closely tied to misleading message recipients or harming a person 
identified in the communication. The communication might lead to a successful invasion 
of privacy claim if its purpose is closely tied to spreading false or misleading 
information, exposing a person identified in the communication to emotional harm, or 
undermining that person’s sense of autonomy or dignity. They must provide affirmative 
answers to at least two of those inquiries for the communication to lead to a successful 
invasion of privacy claim. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court also should take action to provide greater clarity in this 
area. Now that individual communicators instantly can transmit information to mass 
audiences, individuals may more easily give widespread publicity to another’s private 
information or use another’s name or likeness to their own benefit. The Court’s rulings 
involving disclosure of private facts and appropriation provide little guidance for 
individuals who widely publicize private information because the rulings focus on news 
media’s rights to disseminate information related to the audience-based self-governance 
and checking function values. Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star, however, do not 
clearly extend First Amendment protection to communications that serve a marketplace 
of ideas value or to individual free expression values without serving the self-governance 
and checking function values.106 In the cases analyzed for this study, however, lower 
                                                            
 
106 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989); Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). 
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courts have demonstrated a willingness to protect communications that serve a 
marketplace of ideas value or an autonomy value for free expression.107 Indeed, lower 
courts upheld awards of damages in a private facts case involving an individual 
communicator and in an appropriation case involving an individual communicator when 
the publicized information were not connected to legitimate matters of public interest, 
concern, or significance.108  
 Those findings suggest the U.S. Supreme Court should accept an invasion of 
privacy case involving a non-media defendant and a matter of public or general interest. 
In that case, the Court should establish a constitutional privilege for individuals and for 
news media to freely publicize matters of public interest, a privilege undergirded by the 
individual autonomy value and the audience-based marketplace of ideas, self-governance, 
and checking-function values. Courts across the nation, then, could allow a new, broad 
constitutional privilege to strike the proper balance between the right to publish and the 
right to privacy.  
 But, as the Court will appear to broaden the scope of protection for free 
expression, it must clarify that the disclosure of private facts and appropriation torts are 
not facially unconstitutional. The Court may justify the constitutionality of those torts by 
requiring disclosure and appropriation plaintiffs to satisfy a constitutional fault level. 
Two cases included in this analysis provide a foundation for that fault level. In Zaffuto v. 
                                                            
107 See supra notes 43-46; 73 and accompanying text. 
 
108 King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007); Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 
308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 2000); Bowling v. 
Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (per curiam); 
Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ct., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (N.Y. 1991); Town & Country 
Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 1995). 
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City of Hammond, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the intentional and 
unreasonable nature of an assistant police chief’s disclosure of a phone conversation, 
which Terry Zaffuto and his wife assumed was private.109 In Town & Country Properties, 
Inc. v. Riggins, the Supreme Court of Virginia indicated that a former professional 
football player’s name was used in a manner intended to benefit an advertiser without 
providing message recipients with information that would help them make a decision 
about whether to purchase the advertised product.110 Both of those rulings indicated that a 
plaintiff could prevail because a defendant intended to use another’s sensitive, personal 
information or identity in a manner that would benefit the communicator without 
providing message recipients with information a reasonable person would relate to public 
health, public safety, public policies, or social awareness or with information that would 
help recipients make decisions related to the disclosed subject matter. Thus, a plaintiff 
can only satisfy the recommended constitutional level of fault by proving that she: 1) did 
not intentionally use another’s sensitive, personal information or identity; 2) solely to the 
benefit of the defendant; 3) because the use benefitted message recipients by providing 
information related to public health, public safety, public policies, or social awareness or 
providing information that would help recipients make at least one decision about the 
advertised or publicized subject matter.  
 Such a ruling from the high court would clarify how lower courts must 
conceptualize the boundaries between the right to publish and the right to privacy in a 
manner that protects fundamental democratic values undergirding freedom of expression 
                                                            
 
109 Zaffuto, 308 F.3d at 491. 
 
110 Town & Country Props., Inc., 457 S.E.2d at 362-64. 
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as well as privacy. The need for such a ruling will only increase in a digital age when 
individuals can publish messages for mass audiences once only reached by news media.  
 In sum, courts’ operationalization of boundaries between free expression and 
privacy rights has demonstrated the supremacy of constitutional law over common law. 
Courts only upheld awards of damages for common law invasions of privacy when 
claims involved an abuse of constitutional rights or a lack of constitutional rights.111 That 
tendency has allowed few plaintiffs to recover for invasion of privacy and has minimized 
the likelihood for invasion of privacy cases to chill freedom of expression. Still, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should accept an invasion of private facts and an appropriation case 
involving a non-news media defendant. That ruling must establish a constitutional 
privilege that clearly applies to non-media defendants’ publication of matters of public or 
general interest. 
 
D. Suggestions for Future Research 
 This dissertation focused on whether courts balanced competing interests after the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated in Florida Star v. B.J.F. that free expression and privacy 
values are significant112 Future research could deepen our understanding of how courts 
operationalized the conceptual boundaries for the right to press and the right to privacy 
by examining how courts have reconciled conflicts between free expression values and 
privacy values in false light invasion of privacy and intrusion cases. That research could 
                                                            
 
111 King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 593 (10th Cir. 2007); Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 
308 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 662 (5th Cir. 2000); Bowling v. 
Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18505, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (per curiam); 
Town & Country Props., Inc., v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362-64 (Va. 1995). 
 
112 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
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provide greater understanding of the individual and societal values that courts associate 
with press freedom and privacy. 
 Future research also could clarify the operational boundaries for privacy rights by 
applying a theory that categorizes individual privacy values and societal privacy values as 
complementary rather than dichotomous. Daniel Solove has argued that society benefits 
from protecting individual privacy rights, and thus individual privacy rights are valuable 
because they benefit society.113 Solve discussed that continuum of individual and societal 
values in relation to governmental intrusions.114 Exploring whether courts have identified 
such a continuum in any of the tort-based invasion of privacy claims also would 
illuminate the conceptual boundaries for privacy rights protected by the intrusion, 
disclosure, appropriation, and false light torts. 
 Analysis of courts’ discussions of fundamental democratic values in cases 
involving torts designed to protect personality or confidentiality also could yield a richer 
understanding of the conceptual boundary between press and privacy rights. Such studies 
could compare courts’ attempts to reconcile conflicts between freedom of expression and 
publicity-based appropriation to courts’ attempts to reconcile conflicts between freedom 
of expression and privacy-based appropriation. Other studies could examine how courts’ 
operationalization of privacy rights in privacy tort cases compares to courts’ 
operationalization of confidentiality in breach of confidentiality cases.  
  Finally, during a time of rapid technological changes that allow more individuals 
to give widespread publicity to private information or to exploit individuals’ 
                                                            
113 Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 745, 762-63 (2007). 
 
114 Id. 
  219 
personalities, future research should examine if and how courts have identified different 
values for traditional news media, social media, and other digital media. It would be 
particularly valuable for research to examine whether courts have taken different 
analytical approaches in cases involving members of the traditional press than they have 
taken in cases involving individuals’ communication via electronic or digital media.  
 
E. Conclusion 
 In sum, this dissertation found minimal balancing in state high courts’ and federal 
circuit courts of appeals’ rulings in disclosure and appropriation cases during the past 
twenty years.115 Some courts indicated that they balanced free expression and privacy by 
applying newsworthiness tests.116 Most cases implied that elements of the torts and the 
newsworthiness defense struck an appropriate balance between the right to publish and 
the right to privacy.117 And some rulings discussed free expression values—autonomy, 
marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking function—in relation to the 
newsworthiness defense.118  
                                                            
 
115 E.g., Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 829-30 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam). 
 
116 E.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1208 (Cal. 2007); Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 
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York Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703-05 (N.Y. 1993); Finger v. Omni Pub. Int’l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 
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117 See supra notes 42-47, 64-67 and accompanying text. 
 
118 E.g., Lowe v. Hearst Newspapers P'ship L.P., 497 F.3d 246, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2007); Doe 2 v. Associated 
Press, 331 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2003); Willan v. Columbia County, 280 F.3d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Howell, 106 F.3d at 220; Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access, 111 F.3d 1395, 1404 (8th Cir. 1997); Messenger 
v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552-54 (N.Y. 2000) (per curiam); Howell v. New York Post 
Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 278-79; Leddy v. Narragansett 
Television, L.P., 843 A.2d 481, 490 (R.I. 2004); WJLA v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 387-88 (Va. 2002). 
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 The rationales from some rulings focused on respecting the constitutional 
boundaries for protection of freedom of expression.119 In an unpublished ruling, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho indicated that taking another approach would limit speech and 
“shackle the First Amendment.”120 Other courts indicated that defendants’ disclosures of 
information about plaintiffs or defendants’ uses of plaintiffs’ identities were privileged 
because the publicized information encouraged a free flow of information or provided 
audiences with details that would foster discussion and debate, self-governance, and 
checking the power of government.121 Their approaches suggested that publishing 
information that served First Amendment values could outweigh privacy values.122 
Indeed, courts upheld awards of damages for plaintiffs when publicity was given to 
sensitive information and when uses of identity conflicted with individual privacy 
values—liberty, autonomy, or emotional health—but did not serve any audience-based 
First Amendment values.123  
                                                            
119 E.g., Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995); Dickerson & Assoc. v. 
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121 See supra notes 25-29, 64-65, 73, and accompanying text. 
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123 E.g., King v. PA Consulting Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 577, 591-92 (10th Cir. 2007); Zaffuto v. City of 
Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 486-91 (5th Cir. 2002); Bowling v. Bowling, No. 91-5920, 1992 U.S. App. 
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